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In this thesis r raise Nietzsche's qucHtiol\ or cthicti,
his question of the value of ethics itself, in light of IltS
call for the rebirth of tragedy, r contend that, (or
Nietzsche, the question of ethics is the necessi.lry prepilriJtlon
and education for the rebirth of tragedy and iJ new trag i.e
sensibility beyond particular Christian-moral intcl:.'"pr.eta t lon~;
of existence.
I claim that there are three overlapping stagml in the
structure of Nietzsche's philosophy: his initii.ll <In(\ prclIli.lturc
hope for the rebirth of tragedy, his awareness that humanity
must be free from morality to be prepan~d for the rcbir:th of
tragedy, and his renewed hope for the rebirth of tragedy after
overcoming morality,
Within the framework of this structure I discuss
Nietzsche's question of ethics in three par:ts: his inqu l ry
into the origins of morality through an appeal to sciences,
his critique of the origins of morality through <1 method of
genealogy, and his overcoming of morality defined as nihili.sm
through a revaluatiOn of values. I appeal to !'oucault's and
Deleuze's analysis of Nietzscheiln genealogy <.lfld I raise
Heidegger's question of Nietzsche's nihilism in tecms of
whether he overcomes nihilism or whether he is entangled ilnd
encourages nihilism,
I maintain that art, specifically tragedy, is the vchiGl(~
of Nietzsche's overcoming of nihilism through the revaluation
of values. I discuss the manner in which trilgedy contr.ibutcs
to his overall project of establishing an aesthetic ilnd ilnti.-
moral interpretat.ion of existence through the [lguro of
Dionysus.
Yet Nietzsche claims that morality overcomes itsel r
through honesty and truthfulness and that tragedy redeem:o;
humanity and existence, which suggests that cert.ain othical
and religious themes survive in his philosophy. In this
context I raise the question of Nietzsche's ambiguous legilcy
with regards to the question of ethics. I also appeal to
Camus's interpretation of Nietzsche in order to indir.ectly
indicate that Nietzsche makes a positive contribution La the
question of ethics in contemporary philosophy.
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Cll1\PTgR 1. IN'fROOUC'rrON
THE QUESTION OF ETHICS IN NIE'l'ZSCIIE'S PlIIT,OSOPlIY
An educator never says what he himself
thinks, but always only what he thinks o(
a thing in relation to the requirements
of those he educates. He must not be
detected in this dissimulation; it is
part of his mastery that one believes his
honesty ... Such iln educator is beyond
good and evil; but no one must know it.'
1.1 Nietzsche's Question of Ethics
My intention in this thesis is to raise Nietzsche' R
question of ethics in light of his call for the r0birth of.
tragedy. Nietzsche's question of ethics is radical in il manner
unlike that of any earlier moral philosophers. Kant
revolutionized modern moral philosophy, but he nonetheless
still believed in the significance and value of morillity.1
Moral questions and questions about morality have always boon
raised. However, a new type and scope of questioning appears
for the first time with Nietzsche. In a section of Tile G,ly
science titled Morality as a problem Nietzsche writes:
I Friedrich Nietzsche, The will to Power, trans. Willtcr.
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, ed. Walter Kaufmann, (New Yor.k:
Random House, Inc., 1967), 900; cited hereafter ,15 riP.
Citations from Nietzsche's work refer to section or note
numbers, while those from other sources refer to pages.
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: 'l'houghts on the
Prejudices of Morali ty, trans. R. J. Hollingdalc, (Cambdrlge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), Preface, 3j cited hcr.Oi.lfter
as D.
It is evident that up to now morality was no
problem at all but, on the contrary, precisely that
on which after all mistrust, discord, and
contradi.ction one could agree - the hallowed place
of peace where our thinkers took a rest even from
themselves, took a deep breath, and felt revived. I
see nobody who ventured a critique of moral
valuations; I miss even the slightest attempts of
scientific curiosity, of the refined, experimental
imagination of psychologists and historians that
readily anticipates a problem and catches it in
flight without quite knowing what it has caught. I
have scarcely detected a few meagre preliminary
efforts to explore the history of the origins of
these feelings and valuations (which is something
quite different from a critique and again different
from a history of ethical systems), In one
particular case I have done everything to encourage
a sympathy and ..:alent for this kind of history - in
vain it seems tc me today... Thus nobody up to now
has examined the va.!.ue of that most famous of all
medicines which is called moralitYi and the first
stl!lp would be - for once to question it. Well then,
precisely this is oLir task. J
rt is one thing to raise reoral questions and questions about
morality, it is quite another to raise the question of ethics.
The question of ethics makes morality itself questionable. It
is not just a matter of choosing which moral code to adhere to
or how best to fulfil one's chosen moral code, but a matter of
determining the validity and efficacy of moral code
themselves. As Nietzsche indicates, the question of ethics is
the question of the value of morality: "Let us articulate this
new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of
J Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, with a Prelude in
Rhymcs and an Appendix of Songs, trans. Walter Kaufmann t (New
York: Random House, Inc., 1974), 345; cited hereafter as GS.
these values themselves must first be called into qlle~;t.ioll."·
In The Question of Ethics Charles r:. Scott writell about
this matter in terms of an "interruption":
The 'question of ethics' indicates <>~ interruption
in .an ethos, an interruption i,l wh icll the
definitive values that govern thought and everyday
action lose their power and authority to provide
immediate certainty in their fUllction:;. 'l'lley
continue to function in a persall's I iCc <lnd
thought, but they become optional rather than
axiomatic to the extent that th(~y i).re i.n
question. To say that ethics is in question is
also to say that the complex structure::; of thought
and action that fall under the category of ethic:i
comes to be questionable. Ethics, as the body of
values by which a culture unde-rstc1nds and
interprets itself with regards to what is good and
bad, is interrupted. 5
For Scott, "interruption" means that ethical dialogue ,md
dialogue about ethic!.I c.:annot continue as before, that ethical
traditions can no longer be communicated feom one cHJC to the
next or even within a single age, that ethical pr.inciplcs
cannot be translated smoothly into ethical actions. 'J'he
question of ethics interrupts or breaks into the conversation
of our culture unbidden and insistent, after which it i.s
impossible to ignor.e it.
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, On tho Gcneillogy of Moralu: II
Polemic in On the Genealogy of Morals/1:.'cce Homo, tCi.lOS. Wa ltcr
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, (New York: Random I!ouse, Inc.,
1967) Preface, 6; cited hereafter as GM.
~ Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethier;: NioLy.uf:hc,
Foucault, Heidegger, (Indianapolis: Indiana University l'rf~:>:;,
1990), 4; cited hereafter as QE.
1. J • I I':t.h ics and Mor.<llity
Scott dOGS not sharply distinguish ethics from morals
sinCH (or him they both name the body of values of a culture
<Ind their underlying attitude to life (OE, 4). Yet he uses the
::erm rlcthics rl and its root word rlethos" in order to focus on
the operation of principles for both theoretical kno~lledge and
non-theoretical conduct (OE, 4). However, I maintain a
distinction between ethics in a wider sense, as the reflection
on the meaning of existence and the human action appropriate
to that meaning, and morality in a narrower sense, as any
particular configuration of the meaning of existence and its
corresponding code for hun,an acU.on, for example, Christian
morality. I consider ethics as the perpetual questioning about
meaning and action and morality as the answers gi~·en to that
questioning. In my view, ethics is not and should not be
exhausted by any morality. The question of ethics, then,
challenges the manner in which we question the m~aning of
existence and human action. Ethics, the question and the
ques tioning of ethics, interrupts particular forms of morality
so that the continual process of ethical reflection can
'l'his is especially the case with Nietzsche. In light of
hil; philosophy, another way of maintaining the ethics-morality
distinction would be to distinguish ·second order" or
"speculative" ethics Clnd "first order" or "applied" morality.
Nietzsche distinguishes between the ethi.cdl prjncipl,~~ ..... hich
underlie our moral deliberations and the priwtic,11 llxpn~HHi')II~;
of those principles in particular moral. code!>. Yet l.h(~
important issue for him is the recognition thilt .....hill. W,~r:(l OIlC,)
considered as ahistorical or eternal ethical :"JI' i Ill: ipl,'~;,
distinct from their particular historical expression,,; in lIlor,ll
codes, are just as historical and il part of our: chilnuinu
cuI tural ethos as their particular expre~siuIl5. NL,:,; L":;Chl~ dou~;
not just question moral values but also the valllo of mor,.l]
values, thereby implying that he engage~ in both il fin;!. on.h~r.
and a sp,cond order discussion with respect to lIlocal i.ty.
Throughout the main part of my discu~flion o[ Ni.cl:z~.;chl!·B
inquiry, critique and overcoming of macaU ty ilnd mora]
interpretations of existence, I use the terms "n1oc<Jlity" ilnd
rtmaral" because they are the terms Nietzsche use:.; to df!Biqnilto
the particular configurations of morality which he oppos"s.
The morality Nietzsche opposes is variollsly n·fnr.l:"cd to as
metaphysical morality, nihilistic morality, or. espec,i.i1lly
Christian morality, but they all refer to the Huppm;j,1.ion 01
a dualism by which this sensuous world of becoming i:.; nrl(JiJ!.(ld
in favour of another world of ab!iolutc v<.Il\lo:;. [n th"
Conclusion I discuss Nietzsche's philosophy in tc:r.mH of '~Lhic:;
in order to suggest that even though ho attempt:.; Lo ovr~CC()In<:
Christian morality he nonetheless develops <.In othi.c in thaI. hr,
is concerned .....ith the meaning of Qxi:.;tcncf.:! and thr~ biJ;'; i.:-; for
a '"ilY af living that is adequate to existence. In fact, he
iltt<.:rnpts to overcome morality on ethical grounds. I discuss
further the distinction between ethics and morality with
respect to Nietzsche's ethic of honesty and truthfulness and
the milnner in which he applies it to overcome morality.
1.2 'l'he Structure of Nietzsche' s Philosophy
Nietzsche's work is sometimes con::;idered by critics and
enthusiasts illike to be an artistic amalgam of aphorisms, a
collection of scattered thoughts that do not contain, yield,
or merit serious philosophical reflection. However, I contend
that underlying Nietzsche'S style there is a continuity and
progression in his philosophy which belies a serious
philosophical project. This is not to say that his work is
systematic. Indeed, he writes in the style he does in order to
avoid fateful systematization either by his own hand or those
of his unfaithful and faithful readers (TI, I, 26). It is for
the reader to decide which I am. All the same, there is a
certilin internal coherence to Nietzsche's thought that must. be
worked through if we are to understand him at all. This is not
a new <1ttitude or approach. Many interpreters of Nietzsche are
at pains to express and explain the relationship between his
notions of the will to power, the eternal recurrence, and
such. Despite the importance of these notions, they are not of
central interest to me in this thesis, though I refer to them
at various pojnts in order to clilrify certain notions about
the overcomi.ng of nihilism and the rcvailliltion of va luo!;
through tragedy.
My concern in this thesis is to discuss wha.t I COilS ider
as the basic structure of Nietzsche's philosophy with respect
to his inquiry, critique and overcoming of morality in light
of his notion of tragedy. As I see it, the busic structur.e hilS
three stages. However, I do not mean to suggest that 8ilCh
stage is discrete unto itself and must be completed before the
next stage continues; there is certainly overlap among them.
While I recognize that dividing Nietzsche's worle in this
manner is a matter of much debate, Nietzsche himscH
continually outlines his work in terms of parts of i.I larger
project, most notably as the revaluation of values, My mil In
reasons for doing this is not so much to est<Jblish il
chronology of definite periods in Nietzsche's philosophy as to
call attention to certain themes within it. I propose the
following structure and stages in order to better undcrstilnd
Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole and his notions of mornli ty
and tragedy in particular.
(1) Nietzsche's initial "faith" in the birth of trilgedy.
For Nietzsche, the rebirth of tragedy is a call for the return
of a heroic and classical culture, a Dionysian tragic attitude
towards the unity of all life, joy and suffering. Both 'I'he
Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely Meditation~ give indication
of this."
(2) Nietzsche's realization that the time is not yet ripe
for the rebirth of tragedy and that the ground must be
prepared for it. 'I'his realization may be responsible for the
(not sol sudden "scientific" shift in Nietzsche' I:: work and the
(false) impression that h~ rejects his earlier "artistic ft
sensibility. This second stage which raises the question of
ethics is the longest, encompassing Human, All Too Human,
D<,ybreak, The Gay science, Thus spoke Zarathustra as well as
Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals. In these
works Nietzsche demonstrates the falsity of the idols of the
time, specifically morality. His later philosophy in Twilight
of the Idols and The Anti-Christ as well as his posthwnously
collected and edited notes in The will to Power is the highest
expression of his attempt to overcome Christian morality
defined as nihilism. 7
G Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans.
Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967); cited
hereafter as BT.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. R.J.
Hollingdale, (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1983);
cited hereafter as UM.
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for
Free Spirits, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986); cited hereafter as HH.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus spoke Zarathustra: A Book for
Everyone and No One, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, (Middlesex:
PengUin Books Ltd., 1969); cited hereafter as Z.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a
Philosophy of the Future, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York:
Random House, Inc., 1966); cited hereafter as BGE.
(3) Nietzsche's reintroduction and reinterpretation of
the rebirth of tragedy. Though the interest in triH)edy remains
constant throughout Nietzsche's work, for ex,]olple, ~'hc Gily
Science and Thus spoke Zartlthustr<1, in hi!'; later work he once
again becomes increasingly concerned with tragedy Llnd the role
of art as the countermovement to nihilism, as evidenced by
references to Dionysian tragedy in Ecce Homo and The Will to
Power. B
The proposed structure of Nietzsche' 5 philQl,;ophy is
reflected in the structure of this thesis. The chapters <lrc
titled so as to name some of the various roles or masks which
Nietzsche assumes throughout his philosophical coreer - there
are many Nietzsches. He dissimulates deliberat131y because he
cannot but dissimulate. In his view, everything we say is
always only an interpretation from a particular perspective.
We cannot tell the "truth" because there is no "truth" to
tell. We cannot simply say what we think beclluse we always
speak from a certain role or from behind a certain mask,
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, or /Iow to
Philosophize with a Hammer in Twilight of the Idols/~'he Anti-
Christ, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, (Middlesex: Penguin l300ks
Ltd., 196B); cited hereafter as TI.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ in Twilight of the
Idols/The Anti-Christ, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, (Middlesex:
Penguin Books Ltd., 1968); cited h13reafter as AC.
I Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce flomo: How One Becomes What
One Is in On the Genealogy of Morals/Ecce Homo, trans. Walter
Kaufmann, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967); cited
hereafter as EH.
depending on the relative position of our audience. Nietzsche
deaw!:! this to our attention by utilizing various roles and
masks in his own philosophy. Most of this thesis is devoted to
the second stage of the proposed structure, the stage of
Nietzsche's question of ethics and his preparation and
education for the rebirth of tragedy. The second stage itself
can be divided into three parts which correspond to the first
three chapters of this thesis and three roles or masks which
Nietzsche assumes in the preparation for the rebirth of
tragedy.
1.2.1 Scientist, Genealogist, Nihilist
Chapter 2. Science discusses the in which
Nietzsche, through an appeal to various sciences, inquires
into the origin and history of morality. He reveals that it
does in fact have an origin and history, and hence reveals
that it is not eternal and immutable.
Chapter 3. Genealogy discusses the m~nner in which
Nietzsche engages in the genealogical critique of the origins
of morality. He challenges the very notion of origin as
essential and unitary, and hence challenges the essence and
uni ty of morall ty itsel f. Foucault' 5 and Deleuze' s
interpretation help to understand the operation and
implications of Nietzsche's genealogy.
Chapter 4. Nihilism analyzes Nietzsche's at tempt to
10
overcome Christian morality defined as nihilism. 'fhis i.~; the
crucial crux of Nietzsche's entire project. !lis reflections
turn back on himself with respect to nihilism. 115 /Ieidcgger
demonstrates throughout Nietzsche and other essays, the
decisive question must be asked and addressed as to whether
Nietzsche overcomes nihilism or whether he is entangled in and
further encourages nihilism. 9
I appe'~l to Foucault, Deleuze and HcidelJger in order. to
articulate the structure of Nietzsche'S philosophy in terms o[
the question of ethics as the preparation and education [or
the rebirth of tragedy. Their interpretations of Nietzsche
figure largely in this thesis. They work close to the spirit
of Nietzsche and help to demonstrate the nature of Nietzschean
philosophizing in their own work.. Yet they not only raise
questions in the manner of Nietzsche, they also r.aise
questions about Nietzsche which he could not raise himself.
This is especially true of Heidegger.
9 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volumes I-IV, ed. David
Farrell Krell, trans. David Farrell Krell, Joan Stambaugh and
Frank A. Capuzzi, (New York: Harper Collins, 1991); cited
hereafter as N. The four volumes are organized LIS follows - !:
The will to Power as Art, II: The Eternal Recurrence of the
Same, III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphy:;ictl,
IV: Nihilism. References to this work include volume number.
11
1.2.2 Preparatory Educator
Nietzsche can be considered as an educator with respect
to the second stage of his work. In Ecce Homo, in the context
of his revie.... of the Untimely Meditations, he refers to
himself as ~Nietzsche as Educator~ in opposition to
-Schopenhauer as Educator~ (EH, UM, 3). That is, his is an
education in classical and strong pessimism rather than
romantic and weak pessimism. Yet Nietzsche's education, what
and how he teaches, depends on who he considers to be his
audience and where he considers them to be with respect to his
own thought at any given time (WP, 980). This is why he
assumes different roles and masks. For example, he finds it
necessary to raise the questi.on of ethics in various ways
before he can relate the full scope of his tragic vision.
However, we must be careful not to see Nietzsche's
teaching as an attempt to "improve- humanity (EH, Preface, 2).
In The Will to Power he renounces any attempt to enhance
humanity through morality in favour of creating the conditions
for a -morality· as a discipline of strength.
Not to make men "better,· not to preach morality to
them in any form, as if -morality in itself, - or
any ideal kind of man were given; but to create
conditions that require stronger men who for their
part need, and consequently will have, a morality
(more clearly: a physical spiritual discipline)
12
that makes them strong! (WP, 981) .l~
Nietzsche also criticizes the improvement of hum<lnity through
morality in '!'"wilight of the Idols. He considers sllch il projC!ct
faulty because there are no moral facts on which to bilse such
improvement (TI, VII, 1). In his viow, improvement ls
effectively a "taming" or domestication of hunw,nity which
weakens the stronger instincts (TI, VII, 2). lie only suppor.ts
the improvement of humanity in terms of "breeding" particu Lar
classes or races of people withln society - a project, he
claims, that presupposes human beings who arc more rat.ione'll
and gentle than Christian moral i ty presupposes ('1'1, VI I, J).
Nietzsche repeatedly claims that he does not care about:. tho
future of humanity. "Man is something that should be ovorcolllo.
What have you done to overcome him?" (Z, Pro toguo, J).
Likewise, in The Will to Power he states: "Not "mankind" but.
overman is the goall" (YiP, 1001). This puts Niot~seho in
opposition to other social and political thinkers who (oeus on
emancipation for all humanity. He considers himself as
opponent of the enlightenment as it is roproscnt.eu by
Rousseau, Kant, Mill, Marx and others. ll
10 This passage also suggests that Nietzsche's question
of ethics does not necessarily preclude an ethic for those
"beyond good and evil" or beyond Christian mor<llity, a3 T
discuss in Chapter 6.
11 However, Nietzsche's statement of opposition to the
enlightenment may be premature since he advocates fr:ouom fr.om
superstition and false consciousness 115 well ilS social and
13
1.'-.3 Disciple of Dionysus
Chapter 5. Tragedy indicates that Nietzsche maintains an
interest in tragedy throughout his philosophy. He calls
himself a disciple of Dionysus (EH, Preface, 2). In his early
work he is concerned ....i th the dynamic between the
individuating Apollonian aspect and the unifying Dionysian
aspect of art as exhibited by tragedy (BT, 1). In his later
work hc focuses mainly on the Dionysian aspect of tragedy and
its function in the affirmation of will to power and eternal
recurrence (WP, 1041). In this sense tragedy contributes to
the overcoming of nihilism and the revaluation of values.
Tragedy is thus the site of Nietzsche's central philosophical
thinking.
Nietzsche's notion of tragedy also involves the theme of
redemption. In his early and later philosophy he considers
art, especially when expressed in the grand style of tragedy,
to have a justifying and transfiguring capacity. In The Birth
lJf Tragedy he states that "existence and the world seem
justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon- and he refers to
the -metaphysical intention of art to transfigure" (BT, 24).
spiritual emancipation (though admittedly only for a select
few rather than all humanity). The influence of the
enlightenment principle of freedom through knowledge -
epitomized, for example, by Kant's "Dare to know I " - on
Nietzsche's philosophy may be responsible for his retention of
an ethic of honesty and truthfulness which I discuss further
in Chapter 6.
Related notes concerning tragic art appear in '1'111.' wi Ii to
Power (WP, 853). In Tnus Spoke Zarathustril he cliJ.i.ms that the
affirmation of the eternal recurrence redeems us fL·om the
spirit of revenge against temporal existence (Z, II, ~Of
Redemption~). Howel/er, Nietzsche's notions of tL'iJgic
redemption also raise questions about the niJture and status of
his notion of tragedy, as 1 indicate in the Conclusion.
Generally, there is a continuity and progression in
Nietzsche's philosophy concerning his notion of tragedy. His
interest in tragedy is constant but his understanding of it
changes. His early works express a premature hope ..... ith respect
to the rebirth of tragedy, He realizes that it is not enough
to herald or call for the rebirth of tragedy, we hilve to be
transfigured first, His middle works are our preparatlon <md
education, not for our improvement but for our overcoming,
They can be seen as his attempt to give himself grounds [or
hope in a genuine rebirth of tragedy. In his later work he
affirms the tragic vision expressed in terms of eternal
recurrence, an affirmation which redeems and transfigures
humanity and existence.
1.3 Nietzsche's Ambiguous Legacy
Chapter 6. Conclusion reflects on NietzschEl'!; ilmbiguous
legacy with respect to the question of ethics in contemporary
philosophy. I raise questions about the ethical and religious
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statu!> of his notion of tragedy. Nietzsche develops an
oJesthetic ethics of honesty and truthfulness epitomized by
tragedy and he seems to accept a pagan religion of Dionysus.
'rhis paradox poses difficulties in assessing his contribution
to the ques tion of ethics in contemporary philosophy. I appeal
to Camus's interpretation of Nietzsche in order to indirectly
datermine Nietzsche's contribution. Camus, following
Nie!;.;t;sche, explicitly asks and addresses the question of
whather or not there can be a way of life beyond the nihilism
of <1bsolute values. In this context I consider Camus's notion
of the tragic or the absurd and the proper re.'.ponse of
artistic creation as well as his ethic of lucidity and
integrity toward absurdity. Though the discussion of Camus I
suggest that Nietzsche does in fact make a positive
contribution to the manner in which we live our lives.
Nietzsche develops a notion of ethics as the perpetual
questioning and creating of meaning in the face of absurdity,
and though he does not offer the security of absolute values,
he nonetheless provides us with the basis for a principled way
of human life within temporal existence.
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CHAPTER 2. SCIENCE
NIETZSCHE'S INQUIRY INTO TilE ORIGINS 01' MORl\.LI'l'Y
2.1 Nietzsche's Attitudes to Art and Science
Why consider Nietzsche as a scientist when he is often
considered the artist's philosopher par excellence, not only
because of the artistic style of his work but also because of
the significance he attributes to art? Indeed, the central
claim of this thesis is that throughout his philosophy
Nietzsche maintains a focus on art, specifically tragedy, in
terms of fostering an aesthetic and anti-moral attitude which
affirms the totality of life as becoming. What, then, ace we
to make of his appeal to science? How does the 1/11ag8 of
Nietzsche as a scientist relate to his notion of tragedy ilnd
its establishment of an aesthetic and anti-mocil1 pcrspecti.ve?
How does it help us to understand his question of ethics?
Compared to Nietzsche's Mfaith" in the metaphysical
actiVity of art in terms of the redeeming and transfiguring
capacity of tragedy evidenced in The Birth of Tragedy ilnd
Untimely Meditations, his criticism of art as an error <lnd 110
illusion in Human, All Too Human and Daybreak secms to be il
contradictory reversal. Yet Michael Tanner indicilteH that
Nietzsche's criticism of art is not roo much a criticism of art
itself as it is a criticism of the romantic <lrt that fails Lo
combat decadence and nihilism by advocating resignation [rom
the world (D, xv). In 7'he Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche states,
·.... ith respect to the .. illusions· or "mere appearances~
(~schein"J produced by art, that art is necessarily illusory
(DT, lff). By its very nature art must produce images and
representations of things in the world and so it is inherently
illusory, deceptive and dissembling. l However, in his
subsequent philosophy his questioning turns more on the motive
force of the production of illusions or appei!lrances and the
type of attitude toward life it expresses and enhances. This
was already the case in The Birth of Tragedy, as i.ndicated by
his Attempt at a Self-Criticism (BT, AS, 5), and it also
remains a central theme in The Will to Power (WP, 845-853).
Nietzsche asks whether art comes from an impoverishment of
life, as with romanticism and a decadent or nihilistic
perspective, or an overfullness of li.fe, as with classicism
and a heroic or tragic perspective. He writes: "Is art a
consequence of dissatisfaction with reality? Or an expression
of gratitude for happiness enjoyed?" and "In regard to all
aesthetic values, I now employ this fundamental distinction:
I ask in each individual case "has hunger or supE':rabundance
become creative here?"" (WP, 845-846).
1 Nietzsche's notion of art's illusory character is
similar to Schiller's claim that schaner Schein or "beautiful
illusion" is the central aesthetic category. I discuss
Nietzsche's relationship to Schiller in terms of the
conjunction and separation of art and morality briefly in
section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5.
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Yet even in Human, All Too Human, where tho criticism of
art perhaps is strongest, Ni~tzsche claims that art has 11
crucial critical function because it allows us t() rcpres0nt
the ideas and feelings characteristic of the stuges of the
development of humanity in such a way as to enable us to
recognize how each stage necessarily develops but also how the
overall development can be changed> Concerning tha »higher
species of painting" Nietzsche writes: "The first result of it
is that we comprehend our fello ..... men as being determined by
such systems and representatives of different cU,ltur8s, that
is to say as necessary, but as alterable" (1111, 274). Nietzsche
looks to art as a symptom of the temper of tho tim~s, und i.n
most cases, even with artists he once admired, the report is
not positive. However, this is not a condemna'.'ion of ,,11 IIrt
but of the spirit which works through it and the use to .....hich
it is put. In any case, the extent to which he considers
artists as the spokespersons for an age or a pilrticulill."
configuration of culture, whether for better or worse, speaks
of the value he bestows on them.
The difficulty in assessing Nietzsche's attitude to <lct
increases in light of his appeal to science. In 'I'he lJirth of
Tragedy Nietzsche initially criticizes the RcientUic or
theoretical approach to life as it is embodied in th~ figure
of Socrates whose Apollinian drive to logical 5chemi.ltisJn
brings a false optimism in the human ability to control nature
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and hinder.s the Dionysian experi,mce of the tragic unity of
life (81', 14-15). lIowever, in Human, All Too Human Nietzsche
calls upon various sciences to help hiJa challenge assumptions
about morality and claims that science is valuable not because
it increases our knowledge about things but because it
furthers our ability to be rigorous and -to achieve an
objective by the appropriate means R (HH, 256). This suggests
that Nietzsche gives up his earlier attempt to base his
philosophy on aesthetic experience in favour of scientific
methods, b'Jt in fact this is not the case.
Erich Heller points out that Nietzsche's Rscience- is not
positivism or objectivism (HH, xVi). Nor, it must he quickly
added, is it a form of relativislll or SUbjectivism. Nietzsche
states his position with respect to science in The Will to
Power:
Against positivism, which stops at phenomena -
-There are only facts· - I would say: No, facts is
precisely what there are not, only interpretations.
We cannot establish any fact -in itself-: perhaps
it is folly to ....ant to do such a thing.
-Everything is subjective, - you say; but even
this is interpretation. The -subject- is not
something given, it is something added and invented
and projected behind ....'hat there is ...
In so far as the word Rknowledge- has any
meaning, the world is knowable; but it is
interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind
it, but countless meanings. - RPer~pectivism." (WP,
481).
Nietzsche's "perspActivism" claims that the world, the knower,
and knowledge are the constellations of many and varied
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perspectival interpretations. They are nt:!ver unified or
essential in themselves and whatever provisiollal form they
take must be questioned and challenged. In the context o{
Nietzsche's "perspectivism" science can never be a matter of
discovering and positing objective filets about tho world.
In Nietzsche's view, science, like every other human
activity, is a vehicle of our values: "It is our needs that
interpret the world; our drives and their f'or ilnd Against"
(!'IP, 481). Nietzsche places science under the
interrogation he places art - Does it combat or continue
nihilism? Does it affirm or reject this world? lie attempts t.o
determine the perspective - For and Against - from which
science approaches life. In On the Genealogy of Morals he
states:
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing al; il
science "without presuppositions" ... a philosophy,
a "faith," must always be th~re first of all, so
that science can acquire from it a direction, a
meaning, a l:l.mit, a method, a right to exist (GM,
III, 24).
Nietzsche claims that the will to truth which underlies all
science must be criticized because it turns away from this
world towards an otherworldly realm beyond (GM, III, 24). In
order to clarify his point he quotes from a section in 'I'he Gay
Science titled How we, too, are still pious:
No dOUbt, those who are truthful in that audilcLoU5
and ultimate sense that is presupposed b~' the fait.h
in science thus affirm another world than that o(
life, nature, and history; and iasofar as th0y
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affirm this "other world" - look, must they not by
the same token negate its counterpart, this world,
our world? But you will have gathered what I am
driving at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical
faith upon which our faith in science rests (GS,
344) .
In 7'he Gay Science this passage is preceded by an important
question in this matter: "Thus the question "Why science?"
leads back to the moral problem: Why have morality at all when
life, nature, and history are "not moral"?" (GS, 344). Science
is "moral' in the pejorative sense he reserves for nihilistic
morality. According to Nietzsche, science, in seeking to be
objective and truthful, posits a world that is objective and
truthfUl, and thus denigrates and denies this world as one
that is subjective and false. It does not direct itself to the
physical world which it claims to study and it is partially
responsible for the negative attitude towards natural life.
Niet<:schc states: "science rests on the same foundation as the
ascetic ideal: a certain impoverishment of life is a
presupposition of both of them" (GM, III, 25). As far as
Nietzsche is concerned, science is a modern expression of the
ascetic ideal. Therefore, science is not in direct opposition
to morality and religion.
Nietzsche reserves for art the opposing position to
morality and religior\ considered as expressions of the ascetic
ideal. In the context of his criticism of science he refers to
art as a more "honest~ human activity, though not in the usual
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sense. He states: "art, 1n which precisely the lio is
sanctified and the will to deception has a good conscience, i.s
much more opposed to the ascetic ideal than is science" (GM,
III, 25), Art is somehow more honest because it lies with a
good conscience. It does not try to pass itself off as truth,
it knows that it dc.es not and cannot tell the truth. 'rho
statement about the sanctity of the lie in art must be read in
the light of the claim that art is necessiJrily illusory.
Nietzsche claims that "we possess art lest we perish of the
truth" and "art is worth more than truth" (WP, 022, OS3).~
Nietzsche reintroduces the issue of the relation of art
and science when he returns to The Birth of 'l'ragedy 14 years
after he wrote it in 1872 to add his Attempt at a 5e1[-
Criticism as a preface to the 1886 edition. He mentions this
in On the Genealogy of Morals (GM, III, 25). He claims that
his early work already broaches "the problem of science,
science considered for the first time as problematic" (B'l', AS,
2). According to him, the problem of science C<'lnnot b~
recognized in or through science itself, so it must be
presented in the context of art (BT, AS, 2). 'fa him, science
is not yet critical enough, though it could be, and art is
simply of more value. In this sense Nietzsche states the <'lim
~ The paradoxical honesty and truthfulness of art in
terms of its illusory char<'lcter is discussed in scctions 5.1
and 5.2.2 in Chapter 5. Nietzsche' s aesthetic ethic of honesty
and truthfulness is discUlised in the Chapter 6.
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of his early work: ~the task which this audacious book dared
to tackle for the first time: to look at science in the
perspective of the artist, but at art in that of life~ (BT,
AS, 2). Thus, while the probl-:m of science must be presented
in the context of art, both science and art mus::' have recourse
to the perspective of life, both must answer for their
evaluation of life.
Furthermore, Nietzsche raises two related parallel
questi':lns: "And science itself, our science - indeed, what is
the significance of all science, viewed as a symptom of life?M
and -What, seen in the perspective of life, is the
significance of morality?M (BT, AS, 1, 4). Nietzsche claims
that science and morality must be questioned as to their
evaluatio!l of life and from the perspective of life. He raises
both questions in light of his considerations of the value of
tragedy for lifl'!. Therefore, for Nietzsche, art remains the
primary context in which these questions about the evaluation
of life can be asked and Clddressed. J
In the Translator's Introduction to The Gay Science
Walter Kaufmann writes of Nietzsche' s approach to science in
the following terms:
Nietzsche certainly rejected the simplistic
) Here Nietzsche reinterprets The Birth of Tragedy in
light of his later consideration of tragedy as establishing an
aesthetic and anti-moral interpretation of life. I discuss
this further in Chapters 5 and 6.
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al ternative of being ei ther "for" Bc ience, like
some positivists, or "against~ science, like some
neoromantics ... The position to which his intricate
dialectic finally led was, in his own words, an
"artistic Socrates" - a philosopher with .nn
intellectual conscience llnd with tho feeling (or
art that the historical Socrates lacked. Illdeed,
not only a feeling for art. Nietzsche also spoke of
"a Socrates who makes music~ - a philosopher who
also is an artist (GS, TI, 3).
Nietzsche's appeal, if not to science as such or to scientific
facts, then at least to the name of science or to scientific
methods, does not signal either an olltright rejection of art
or a wholesale acceptance of the presuppositions of scienr-e.
It is an acknowledgement that science, like art, could and
should perform a self-critical and critical function with
regards to our attitude to life. Science can ask about it~
evaluation of life, whether it affirms or rejects life in this
world, and it can l.lelp us ask about our own such evaluations
of life. Such science would be self-critical and critical, .IS
opposed to non-critical.
The attempt to assess Nietzsche's attitude to science is
complicated e',en further by the difficulty of determining the
manner in which he appeals to science. lie uses science more as
a metaphor for his critical inquiry in some cases, especially
with chemistry and archaeology, though physics and physiology
could be included as well. He uses science more aR a genuine
method of critical inquiry in other cases like psychology and
history. Yet in all cases Nietzsche is attracted 1:0 what he
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considers to be the sceptical attitude of science. However,
while we may be attentive to the difference between metaphor
and method with respect to Nietzsche's appeal to science, it
is nonetheless difficult to entirely disting'Jish or isolate
the metaphorical aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy because
metaphor is inherent in it.
2.2 Nietzsche's Critical Sciences and Morality
The order in which Nietzsche's critical sciences are
discussed does not follow the order of their appearance in his
philosophy and it does not mean to suggest that one
necessarily develops from another or that the former are
rejected in favour of the latter. Instead, they are ordered in
such a •....ay as to advance thematically towards the discussion
of Nietzsche's llJoter genealogical method. Since aspects of
Nietzsche's critical sciences culminate and coalesce in his
genealogy, the discussion of them also serves as an
introduction to genealogy. Furthermore, this also reveals
certain major themes that appear throughout Nietzsche's work
and it is therefore useful as a general overview of t.is
philosophy.
The crucial characteristic of all Nietzsche's critical
sciences is their value for the inquiry into the origins of
morality. Chemistry analyzes the basic materials that comprise
the physical world. Nietzsche applies it to the analysis of
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the origins of moral sensations and concepts. 't'he critical
inquiry into the origins of morality through physics and
physiology becomes apparent in light of the other sciences to
which Nietzsche appeals, His emphasis on the earth and the
body, as opposed to the metaphysical concern with the beyond
and consciousness, indicates his critical orientation towards
origins, psychology investigates the mental and emotional
processes which affect our modes of behaviour. Nietzsche uses
it throughout his work to investigate the historical motives
in morality and to classify morality according to its
psychological types and the values it exhibits and enhances.
The critical inqUiry into the origins of morality i~ more
obvious in the cases of history and archaeology, two human
sciences which investigate the significance of historical
events and artifacts. Niet.zsche does not appeal to these
sciences out of idle curiosity about the past origins of
morality but out of deep concern for their value for life in
the present and the future,
2.2.1 Chemistry
Chemistry of concepts and sensations is the title of the
opening section of the first part of Human, All Too /luman.
Nietzsche presents the notion of chemistry in the context of
the perennial philosophical question of how something can
originate from its opposite. His answer is that there arQ no
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real opposites, such as good and evil, just development which
mayor may not be a progression or digression (HH, 1). He
raises this issue of opposites again in Beyond Good and Evil
when he states: "The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians
is tha faith in opposite values" (BGE, 2).~ Yet, for
Nietzsche, the question of opposites is more specific: How
could our supposedly virtuous and civilized culture have
developed out of evil and violent forces? Through images of
bell-founding and the cyclops he suggests that the forces
which condition and create our culture are generally
considered to be coarse and savage (HH, 245-246). These forces
are not alien to culture or overcome by our virtues, but
essential to culture, the core of our virtues. According to
Nietzsche, chemistry reveals that there are no opposites
values, just developments which reveal the "immoral" nature of
morality.
One common function of chemistry is the fabrication of
new compounds, and this is true of Nietzsche's chemistry only
in the sense that he creates a new acid to critically test the
mettle of culture. Another function of chemistry is the
analysis or break-down of previously constituted compounds,
and this is the primary function of Nietzsche's chemistry in
~ Nietzsche'S identification of metaphysics as the faith
in opposite values figures largely in his consideration of
what is necessary to overcome metaphysical or nihilistic
morali ty. I return to this issue in Chapter 4.
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the sense that he analyzes morality to its original component
parts. In both cases Nietzsche's chemistry is like his hammer
which sounds out empty idols rather than makes them anew ('l'I,
Foreword). The cultural alchemy which tries to make gold from
base materials and pass it off as pure and precious is
counteracted by the Nietzsche's chemistry which reveals the
beastly and frightening things hidden in our golden ideals.
Nietzsche writes:
All we require, and what can be given us only now
the individual sciences have attained their present:
level, is a chemistry of the moral, religious and
aesthetic conceptions and sensa tions, likewise of
all the agitations we experience within ourselvc:i
in cultural and social intercourse, and indeed even
when we are alone: what if this chemistry would end
up revealing that in this domain too the most
glorious colours are derived from base, indeed from
despised materials? Will there be many who desire
to pursue such researches? (HH, 1).
Nietzsche suggests that the answer to his question is negative
because it is a difficult and discomforting project: "Mankind
likes to put questions of origins and beginnings aut of its
mind" (HH, 1). Ir.deed, for Nietzsche, the problem with
morality is precisely that we have forgotten the origins ilnd
beginnings of our moral con;:epts and sensiltions, we have
forgotten that they have a history, so we consider them t·-· he
natural (HH, 96).~ Nietzsche considers chemistry as a metaphor.
, For reference to the role of forgetting in the history
of morality see also On the Genealogy of Morals (CM, I, 2-3;
GM, II, 1) and the discussion of it in terms of history in
section 2.2.4 of this chapter.
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for the inquiry into the origins of morality. He locates those
origins in what is considered base and despised. Thus he
points to the natural world and body, to the sciences of
physics and physiology.
2.2.2 Physics
Nietzsche's critical sciences of physics and physiology
concern his inquiry into the origin of morality but they also
indicate the direction or orientation to which he turns when
inquiring into that origin. The Greek word "physis" is usually
translated to mean nature and it is the etymological root for
the term physics (the study of the natural world) and
physiology (the study of the natural body). Nietzsche's
somewhat metaphorical notions of physics and physiology
mutually amplify each other throughout his work. Physics is
considered first in this section and physiology is considered
immediately after in the following section.
In the second of the Untimely Meditations Nietzsche
claims that the Greeks were able to develop a cuI ::.ure that was
distinctly Greek because they knew how to "organize the chaos"
that surrounded them (UlJ, II, 10). He refers to this as an
exemplary model for the present and future when he states:
"'l'his is a parable for each one of us: he must organize the
chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs" (UM, II,
10). He calls this reshaping of the world and our
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understanding of it "the conception of culture as i1 new and
improved physis~ (UM, H, 10). Nietzsche thus sees culture as
an improvement of nature fphysis) and he calls the science
which is engaged in that activity physics.
Nietzsche's early notion of physics does not merely
involve empirical and theoretical knowledge about the world,
though he claims that it helps us to be honest with respect to
moral interpretations of the world because it involves the
inquiry into the origins of morality. He suggests further that
our "moral" honesty and truthfulness should compel us to
reject customary moral interpretations and attempt to create
new values that suit ourselves and our situation. G
Nietzsche'S association of physics with the dual roles o(
inquiring into the origins of morality and of creating new
values is clarified in The Gay Science. Here he explicitly
charges that we cannot properly observe the world because we
invest it with grand words like "sin" and ~guilt .. as well as
"salvation of the soul" and ~redemption~ which artifIcially
colour our perception of it (GS, 335). He rejects these
interpretations of the world in terms of otherworldly moral
values in favour of interpretations which attl2nd to the
physical or natural world. This provides t.he context o(
Zarathustra's entreaty: "remain true to the earth, and do not
6 This is an example of Nietzsche'S paradoxical ethic of
honesty and truthfulness.
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believe those who speak to you of superterrestrial hopes! - (Z,
Prologue, 3). Physics helps us to see the ·....orld as it really
is by allowing us to see the origins of erroneous moral
interpretations of the world. Physics helps us to create new
values in light of our honesty and our particular needs.
Nietzsche's early work echoes in his later work:
Therefore let us limit ourselves to the
purification of our opinions and valuations and to
the creation of our own new tables of what is good,
and let us stop brooding about the "moral value of
our actIons"? We, however, want to become those
who we are - human beings who are new, unique,
incomparable, \o;'ho give themselves laws, who create
themselves. To that end we must become the best
learners and discoverers of everything that is
lawful and necessary in the world: we must become
physicists in order to be creators in this sense -
while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been
based on ignorance of physics or were constructed
so as to contradict it. Therefore: long live
physics I And even more so that which compels us to
turn to physics - our honesty! (GS, 335).1
This passage expresses the dual capacity of Nietzsche's
physics - the inquiry into the origins of morality and the
c: ~ation of new values. Here kJ'l.nwledge about the world is
linked directly to the capacity to create a new culture. For
Nietzsche, knowledge is evaluation and creation. This is the
sense in which we can consider all of Nietzsche's sciences
critical.
J Nietzsche's ethic of honesty and truthfulness which
underlies his entire project is obvious in this passage.
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2.2.3 Physiology
Through physiology Nietzsche seeks to devel0p a por..ition
that recognizes the crucial role of the body and 1 ts organic
life. He emphasizes the importance of physiology jn celation
to morality throughout his work. He opens Human, AI': 'l'oo lflllll,1t1
with conunents about the relationship of health ilnd :~kkncss to
philosophy and the value of "convalescence~ for developing :1
critical position (HH, Preface, 4-6). As Zarathustril speaks
against those who despise the earth through their morill
interpretations of the world, so also he chastises those who
have contempt for the body in favour of esteeming the soul (?o,
prologue, 3). Nietzsche repeatedly defines morality as baing
"anti-nature~ because it either spiritualizes or exterminatc~
the passions and all that concerns the body ('l'I, v, 1). In
Ecce Homo he discusses at length things that pertDin to the
body: "these small things - nutrition, place, climate,
recreation, the whole casuistry of selfishness - are
inconceivably more important than everything one hi!.!;l taken to
be important so far~ (EH, II, 10).
The comments he makl3s about culture 1lS il "new 1lnd
improved physis" can be compared with the foUowing passage
from The Gay Science about heeding the dictates of ouc
physiology:
The reason why these individuals have different
feelings and tastes is usually to be found in some
oddity of their life style, nutrition, or
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digestion, perhaps a deficit or excess of inorganic
salts in their blood and brain; in brief in their
physis. 'fhey have the courage to side with their
physis and to heed its demands down to the subtlest
nuances. Their aesthetic and moral judgements are
ilmong these "subtlest nuances" of the physis (GS,
39).
Again there is reference to the Greek notion of physis, though
focused more on the body through physiology than on the world
through physics. We may well question Nietzsche's particular
diagnosis, but his basic point that the state of our body
ilffects our outlook and judgement of the world is a tenet of
present day health medicine and is often confirmed by our
daily Qxperience.
However, according to Nietzsche, our daily experience of
our bodies is not reflected in our thought and evaluations. In
1'he Will to Power he states: "Through the long succession of
millennia, man has not known himself physiologically: he does
not know himself even today. To know, e.g., that one has a
nervous system (-but no "soul"-) is the privilege of the best
informed" (WP t 229). The moral, religious, even scientific
terminology we use have generally taught us to pay no heed to
the body or to denigrate the body. This is either done through
explicit moral through implici t moral
interpretations and misinterpretations. In this regard
Nietzsche writes: The unconscious disguise of physiological
needs under the cloaks of the objective, ideal, purely
spiritual goes to frightening lengths - and I often have ask'" 1
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mys~lf whether, taking a large view, philosophy hdS Hot buon
lll:=rely an interpretation ci the body and a misunderstanding of
the body" (GS, Preface, 2),
As with physics, physiology allows us to see things for
what they are without extraneous moral interpretiltlOll8.
Physiology thus raises the question of values, the question oE
what is valued as much as how it is valued, l\<.:cor.ding to
Nietzsche, this holds true for the question oE the origin of
morality, as he writes in The will to Power:
All virtues physiological conditions: particular.ly
the principle organic functions considered as
necessary, as good. All virtues are really re(1ned
passions and enhanced states (WP, 255).
I understand by "morality" a system of evaluations
that partially coincides with the conditions of a
creature's life (I1P, 256).
TO Nietzsche, our virtues are passions which we have relined
or interpreted in a moral sense. Morality in particular is a
function of our organic life which we mistakenly suppose to be
something other-worldly or divine. The science of phy!:liology,
the attention to our body, helps us to see that our morality
actually comes from our own physiology or body, Phys iology is
thus considered as the inquiry into origins of morality but it
is also an indication of the particular direction and
orientation towards which we must turn to rovE!ill those
origins,
However, Nietzsche str.esses that. the appeal to and U!iC of
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physics ilnd physiology should not be uncritical. In Beyond
Good and Evil he warns that physics is still an interpretation
of the world and not an explanation of it and that physiology
should be wary of positing superfluous teleological principles
(BGE, 13-14). He means to say that science is not the realm of
objectivity and that the claim to objectivity is itself an
erroneous supposition. Science, as well as morality and
religion, can also produce false interpretations of the world.
Th~ sciences of physics and physiology, if they are to remain
critical, must not import any external value into the world
and th~ body and thereby produce false interpretations of
them. Nietzsche is convinced that a truly critical physics and
physiology will avoid this pitfall.
2 . 2.4 Psychology
psychology is probably Nietzsche' s IDOst important.
critical science since he appeals to it most constantly and
often refers to his work as psychology and to himself as a
psychologist. Nietzsche's psychology is involved with all his
other critical sciences, therefore its scope is wide and at
times a little vague. However, its focus can be narrowed
somewhat when it is considered in terms of the inquiry into
the origins of morality. This is the precise context in which
Nietzsche appeals to psychology.
Psychology is usually defined as the science which
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investigates the hidden motivations that underlie observable
behaviour patterns. It traces the Ilnconscious sources and
processes of our conscious thoughts and actions. It is also
concerned with the origin~ and history of our sensations and
conceptions. This is true of Nietzsche's psychology, though he
more specifically addresses it to the origins of morality or
moral sensations and concepts. He is concernGd with the
sources of our contemporary morality. Thus, for Nietzsche,
psychology is a historical science. 1
Nietzsche begins the second part of Human, All Too Human
with a brief discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
psychology with regard to the investigation of the origins of
morality (HH, 35-38).9 Nietzsche's placement of the discussion
of psychology at the beginning of one of his most concise and
sustained inquiries into the origin of morality speaks volumes
for the importance of psychology in his overall project
concerning morality. He belongs to a tradition that associatGs
psychology with the investigation of the origins of morality.
I The psychology-history conjunction appears in /luman,
All Too Human and On the Genealogy of Morals, as becomes
clearer in this and the next section.
9 Nietzsche mention!:! his friend Paul R6e from whom hG
acquires the title for the second part of Human, All Too Human
(HH, 36-37). In the Preface of On the Genealogy of Morals he
becomes more critical in his assessment, signalling the
movement from historical psychology to genealogy. I maintain
a distinction between psychology and genealogy because c1
change in focus occurs in the shift from the former to the
latter, as r clarify in Chapter 3.
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tlietzsche writes concerning psycholoqy:
However the credit and debit balance may stand: at
its present state as a specific individual science
the awakening of moral observation has become
necessary, and mankind can no longer be spared the
cruel sight of the moral dissecting table and i.ts
knives and forceps. For here there rules that
science which asks after the origin and history of
so-called moral sensations and which as it
progresses has to pose and solve the sociological
problems entangled with them: _ the older
philosophy knows nothing of ~he latter and has,
with paltry evasions, al....ays avoided investigation
of the origin and history of the moral sensations
(1IIf, 37).
Nietzsche makes it very clear that psychology 15 a science
concerned with the inquiry into the origins of morality and
its value, not with di~interested and objective knowledge
about mental processes. He credits the science of psychology
with 11 critical role thl\t hitherto, at least in his view, no
other philosophy vould or could assume.
For Nietzsche, psychology is also the history of moral
sensations in the sense that it seeks the origins of our
feel.ings of guilt and conscience. In HUllt"!n, All Too Rwtlan he
points out that morality requires that we 1'lelieve we are free
and hence responsible for our actions, but he claims that the
notions of free will and responsibility are errors. Thus our
feeling of gUilt based on these errors, is also an error.
Nietzsche states: "Thus: it is because man regards himself as
[ree, not because he is free, that he feels remorse and pangs
of conscience" (HH, 39).
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Furthermore, Nietzsche states; "the character of c;"changc
is the original ~haracteristi.c of justice" (Ill!, !l2). lie
returns to this tt.cme of justice as exchange On the Genealogy
of Morals when he claims that free will and responsibility are
the sources of the notion of the human being as "all anim'11
with the right to make promises" (GH, II, 1-2). By focusing on
the promissory dimension of justice, he locates its origin in
the manner in wr.icb we enter into the relationships of
creditor and debtor llO a personal b,nd a communal level (GM,
II, 8). The need for punishment arises when a pledge or.
contract 1s broken and it must be repaid in order to maintain
the balance sheet of justice (GM, II, 9). Yet, in Nietzsche's
view with respect to morality I punishment is not only il means
of punishing because it is also meant to awaken our feelings
of gUilt and bad conscience in the first instance (GM, II I 12-
14).
Nietzsche's appeal to psychology in his inquiry into the
origi.ns of morality in On the Genealogy of Moraln also hilS a
further dimension. tO In these essays he develops a
psycholo)'ical typology with respect to morality I an analysis
of the psychological ~ypes that require morality. As a
10 Though his crith..:sms of Paul Ree and the English
psychologists in the Preface of On the Genealogy of MarDi!),
Nietzsche intimates that psychology (as a history of morality)
is to be replaced by genealogy (as a critique of the valutl of
morality). I discuss this further in Chapter J.
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psychologist, Nietzsche concerns himself with the motivation
of moral values like "good and evil" (as opposed to good and
bad) and moral sensations such as "guilt" and "bad conscience"
and he seeks to identify those people who are motivated to
create morality for themselves and others. Nietzsche maintains
a dist.inction between the dualisms of good-bad and good-evil,
il dist.inction which he first makes in Human, All Too Human and
later maintains in On the Genealogy of Morals. The powerful
consider themselves good and consider the less powerful bad,
but not in a moral sense, whereas the less powerful either
consider themselves good and the powerful evil, or they
condemn all humanity as evil, all in a moral sense (HH, 45).
This is the basis for Nietzsche's famous distinction of
master-morality and slave-morality or the knightly-
aristocratic mode of valuation and the priestly mode of
valuation (GM, I, 7).
According to Nietzsche, moral interpretations of life -
good and evil (as opposed to good and bad) and the notions of
guilt and bad conscience - come into existence through the
"ressentiment~ of less powerful and slavish people.
The slave revolt in morality begins when
resscntiment itself becomes creative and gives
birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that
are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and
compensate themselves with imaginary revenge (GM,
I, 10).
Nietzsche considers "ressentiment" or the negative reaction to
'0
the external world which is considered to be hostile as the
motivation of morality (GM, I, 10). Morality is motivated by
a negation of life and it encourages a further: negation of
life. Nietzsche claims that the moral perspective is thus
-anti-natural" and "the enemy of life" (TI, V, 'i). For
Nietzsche, then, the psychological investigation of moral.ity
reveals the implicit evaluations of life that underlie
explicit moral values. Psychology brings the question of the
evaluation of life to the forefront of thE! inquiry into the
origins of morality. Thus Nietzsche's critical science of
psychology begins to raise the question of the value of
morality itself, the question that is central to hi:; lDter
method of genealogy.
2.2.5 History
In Nietzsche's philosophy there is a conjunction of
psychology and history. Nietzsche's critical science of
history, its character and function as a science, requires
further determination. II For example, in the untimely
Meditations he questions the scientific view of history, but
in Human, All Too Human and On the GE'nealogy of Morals he
charges that philosophers do not have enough of il his tor leal
sense. This would seem to indicate a contradiction between two
11 See also section 3.2.4 on ·Wirkliche Ilistor.ie" in
Chapter 3.
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different and divergent positions. However, common to both
positions is the notion that the critical science of history
is a matter of the value of history and the history of values.
As early as the second of the untimely Meditations titled
On the uses and disadvantages of history for life Nietzsche
shows concern for history, or more precisely, "the value of
history" and its role in culture (UM, II, Foreword). For
Nietzsche, history is not a collection of facts
interpretations about the past and historical knowledge is not
instruction in these matters - such history is dead, such
historical knowledge breeds lifelessness and inaction. Rather,
as the title of the essay suggests, history must be studied in
such a way that it "serves life" and enhances our ability to
act (UM, II, Foreword). Nietzsche expresses the difference in
the following manner:
History become pure, sovereign science would be for
mankind a sort of conclusion of life and a settling
of accounts with it. The study of history is
something salutary and fruitful for the future only
as the attendant of a mighty new current of Ii £e,
of an evolVing culture for example, that is to say
only when it is dominated and directed by a higher
force and does not itself dominate and direct (UM/
II, 2).
Thus, for Nietzsche, history is not a science in the sense of
securing objective knowledge about the past, it is a science
driven by and directed towards the force of life. History and
historical knowledge have a role in culture conceived as "a
new and improved physis· or the reshaping of the world (UM/
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II, 10). History is most properly a tool: "employ history for
the purposes of life I" (UM, II, 1).
However, Nietzsche indicates that the employment of
history for the purpose of life is not a straightforward
matter. Not only must we remember things of the past in a
certain way at a particular time so as to stimulate ouroelves
to further activity, we must also forget certain things at a
particular time so that we do not become weighted down by the
burden of the past and we thus feel more free to act (UM, II,
1). Nietzsche states: "This, precisely, is the proposition the
reader is invited to meditate upon: the unhistorical and the
historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an
individual, of a people and of a culture" (UM, II, 1).
Nietzsche's point is that some amount of forgetfulness,
historical blindness, is necessary in order for uo to act with
decisiveness and to recognize what is essential in our
actions. Life must be cured of the -malady of history· (UM,
II, 10). Nonetheless, this raises sticky questions about the
totalitarian implications of Nietzsche's notion of history.12
What, then, is the attitude and approach which we must
bring to history if it is to serve life? Nietzsche
12 In the Introduction to the Untimely Meditiltions, xvi,
J.P. Stern indicates the political danger of Nietzsche's
notion of forgetfulness. This is witnessed, for example, in
the manner it is used by totalitarian regimes to establish
"Year One" or a new national history by obliterating the old
one in the countries where they come to power.
4J
distinguishes three forms of history which correspond to three
aspects of life.
History pertains to the living man in three
respects: it pertains to him as a being who acts
and strives, as a being who preserves and reveres,
as a being who suffers and seeks deliverance. This
threefold relationship corresponds to three species
of history - insofar as it is permissible to
distinguish between a monumental, an antiquarian
and a critical species of history (UM, II, 2).
Howover, before these three forms of history are briefly
defined it is important to emphasize the point that Nietzsche
is muking here. All three activities of the living person are
related and all three species of history are necessary to some
degree for service to life.
Monumental history, for Nietzsche, exhibits the view that
"the great moments in the struggle of the human individual
constitute a chain" and it expresses ~faith in hwnanity~ (UM,
II, 2). He claims that the problem with this species of
history is that, depending on how the chain is interpreted,
the focus on the greatness of the past either leads to a false
optimism about the possibility of progress or deems as
IJnnecessary or impossible any further progress (UM, II, 2). He
himself wants to show there is greatness in the past, but in
such a way that it advances the contemporary struggle for a
renewed culture, as evidenced by his appeal to Attic tragedy
and his call for a return to a tragic age.
Antiquarian history, to Nietzsche, is pious in that it
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preserves and reveres the past for future generations. He
states of the antiquarian: "By tending with care that which
has existed from old, he wants to preserve for those who shu.ll
come into existence after him the conditions under which he
himself came into existence·' (UN, II, 3). In his view, this
species of history degenerates when it becomes too
indiscriminate or too discriminating: either it preserves and
reveres everything from the past equally or it reject:;
everything that is new and evolving which does not fit its
view of the past CUM, II, 3). Such pious history does not
allow for the critique and change of values which Nietzsche
advocates.
Critical history, according to Nietzsche, has elements of
both the other two species of history but avoids their
problems (UM, II, 3). Like monumental history, critictll
history is able to divine the greatness of the past while
fostering action for the present and future which is neither
naively optimistic nor unduly pessimistic. Like antiquarian
history, critical history preserves past forms of life as il
guide for the future while recognizing the value of pr"!sp.ntly
emerging forms of life. In this regard Nietzsche writes:
Here it becomes clear how necessary it is to
mankind to have, beside the monumental ilnd
antiquarian modes of regarding the past, a third
mode, the critical; and this, too, in the service
of life. If he is to live, man must possess and
from time to time employ the strength to break up
and dissolve a part of the past; he: does this by
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bringing it before the tribunal, scrupulously
examining it and finally condemning it (UM, II, 3).
As the passaq(: above suggests, critical history also has the
power of forgetfulness which lifts the burden of too much
past. Critical history is selective with regards to what it
remembers of the past and how it uses the past. Critical
history has an unhistorical element.
According to Nietzsche, history serves life, a particular
fonn of life, only if it provides a unifi.ed vision of the past
which inspires the development of a particular culture or a
new and improved physis. In his view, we should not look to
create a culture that is fre~ for any and every possibility
because a culture with no boundaries is sick. Nietzsche refers
to a ~hygiene of life" which must supervise history (UH, II,
10). Yet he is not advocating complete ignorance - forgetting
is selective process. He does not urge the destruction of
history altogether but the construction of a history which
serves our particular form of life.
In this context Nietzsche claims that life must be cured
of "the malady of history~ and that "the antidote to the
historical is called the unhistorica1 and the
5uprahistorical" (UM, II, 10).
With the word' the unhistorical' I designate that
art and power of forgetting and of enclosing
oneself within a bounded horizon; I call
'suprahistorical' the powers which lead the eye
away from becoming towards that which bestows upon
exis tancs the character of the eternal and stable,
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towards art and religion (UM, II, 10).
Nietzsche contrasts art and religion to science which 5eeks
the historical without a definitive pl:'!rsp0ctivt~ or use Ilml
without a sense of what is eternal in it. Scientific
(positivist or objectivist) knowledge of history is dead. J\n
interpretation inspired by vested interests is rnquired [or.
history to be employed for the purpose of life. Vot we: must
also be aware of what those vested interests and their
evaluations of life are. The study of history must be carried
on with a view to values and the value of history illicif. 'I'his
is critical history,
Nietzsche identifies the touchstone from wh lch all
historical interpretations are to be made when he Htates: "It
is not justice which here sits in judgement; it is even less
mercy which pronounces the verdict; it is life alone, thilt
dark, driving power that insatiably thirsts for itself' (UM,
II, 3). Yet the question arises as to who detnrmincs what
"life' is in any given case und thus what remains and whilt
passes away, to which Nietzsche answers: "To sum up, history
is written by the experienced and superior man" (llM, II, 6).
Thus Nietzsche suggests that critical history is critlcal
precisely because it serves life best and that experienced and
superior men detennine how it does 50, However, neither "life"
nor "experience" and "superiority" are definitive enough to
ground Nietzsche's claim to a critical science of hlstory. Y!'!t
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il lack of ground is essential to Nietzsche's philosophy. This
cJspcct of his critical science of history is problematic.
At first glance, Nietzsche's view in the Untimely
Meditations that we suffer from too much history appears to
directly contradict his view in Human, All Too Human that the
fall,ily failing of all philosophers is their lack of historical
sellse (!fI', '-J. How8ver, the apparent contradiction can be
partially dissolved. Nietzsche's position in the earlier work
is not that history itself is a problem - indeed, it is a
necessary component of the development of a new culture, but
that too much history or not enough of the right kind of
histaJ:y for a particular group of people is detrimental to
their ability to recognize themselves for who they are and to
u:;e that recognition as the basis for action. When he writes
in the later work concerning the need for historical
phih'sophi.zing he claims that a more modest and particularized
sens£" r;t J:i.;;tory is required so that we can see things as they
are (HH, 2)
For Nietzsche, the eternal in history is not what is
a..:tually eternal but what is valued as eternal by a particular
group. He refers to the habit of philosophers to attribute the
quality of eternity to things which are still becoming.
All philosophers have the common failing of
starting out from man as he is now and thinking
they can reach their goal through an analysis of
him. They involuntarily think of 'man' as an
aeterna veritas [eternal truth], as something that
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remains constant in the midst of all flull, as iJ
sure measure of things. Everything the philosopher
has declared about man is, however, at bottom no
more than a testimony as to the man of a very
limited period of time... But everything has
become: there are no eternal facts, just as there
are no absolute truths. Consequently, what is
needed from now on is historical philosophizing,
and with it the virtue of modesty (l1lI, 2). IJ
Later Nietzsche states that there is no essentinl or nccess.1I:Y
human nature but that certain habits established over a brief
time have been taken as essential and necessary and he
suggests that if we could see humtlnity over a longer period wo
would see many alterable human qualities (Hll, 41). The eternal
is not a fact, but an interpretation. It is not a thing in and
of itself or an actual quality of things, but an evaluation.
The historical sense. allows us to see our evaluations as just
that - our own particular evaluations.
Rather than ruling out the critical aspect of history
altogether, Nietzsche suggests that history can play a
critical function in the inquiry into the origin of morality.
In his view, the problem is that we have forgotten the history
of morality, we have forgotten that morality even has a
history, so that we eventually and erroneously consider it to
lJ Foucault is obviously influenced by this passage when
he writes: "As the archaeology of our thought easily shows,
man is an invention of recent date. And perhaps one neor.ing
its end." See Michel Foucault, The Order of 'fhings: An
Archaeology of the Human sciences, translation of LtJs Hots ct
les chases, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1970), 3B7. 1
consider Nietzsche's and Foucault's notion of archncology in
the next section.
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he natural and eternal. In Human, All Too Human and On the
Genealogy of Morals he explicitly takes up the task of the
critical history of morality in order to recall its forgotten
origins (1111, 96; GM, I, 2-3, II, 1). Nietzsche's overall
position .....ith regards to the history of morality is that it is
"human, all too human" (HH, 35). Morality is not something
naturally or eternally given by a perfect God but is created
and maintained for particular purposes by humanity with all
its frailty anei failings.
In the second part of Human, All Too Human titled On the
History of the Moral Sensations Nietzsche claims that the
history of morality is the ~history of an error" (HH, 39). He
outlines the stages of the history of morality: (1) actions
are called good or bad depending on their useful or harIllful
consequences, (2) actions are deemed inherently "good" and
"evil" in themselves, (3) the designations of "good" and
"evil" are assigned to the motives of actions, (4) the
predicates "good and "evil" are ascribed to human nature.
Thus one successively makes men accountable for the
effects they produce, then for their actions, then
for their motives, and finally for their nature
(HH, 39).
However, as Nietzsche points out, if we rE,cognize that the
notions of free will and ,:;.::...:ount;!:.bi 1tty, without which
morality could not exist, are errors ·,.,..hi.ch lay at the origin
of morality, then we will see the ti5tOry of morality as the
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history of an error.
One has thereby attained to the knowledge that the
history of moral sensations is the history of an
error, the error of accountability, which rests on
the error of freedom of will (HlI, 39).
Referring specifically to the feeling of free will, on which
the feeling of accountability and guilt, and hence morality,
is based, Nietzsche states: "It is a very changeable thing,
tied to the evolution of morality and culture and perhaps
present only in a relatively brief span Df world-history" (1111,
39). The historical investigation of morality reveals that
morality has a history, a history of an error.
Near the end of the section Nietzsche further outlines
the history of morality with respect to the customs of
communities. To him, morality is not eternal and immutable but
it is linked to particular cultures and it changes in
accordance with them. Nietzsche equates morality with the
customs and traditions, or habits, of a community. He claims
that morality is nothing other than custom mistaken for
something natural.
To be moral, to act in accordance with custom, to
be ethical means to practJ.....~ obedience towards a
law or tradition established from of old ... lie is
called "good" who does what is customary as if by
nature (HH, 96).
In this context he states that what morality values as "goad"
is what a community values as "good for something" or useful
to itself (HH, 96). C';.\stom and tradition are the basis of
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morality. Directing his conunents at Kant, he writes:
'Egoistic' and 'unegoistic' is not the fundamental
anti-thesis which has led man to make the
distinction between 'in accordance with custom' and
'in defiance of custom', bet....een good and evil, but
adherence to a tradition, a law, and severance from
it. How the tradition has arisen is here a matter
of indifference, and has in any event nothing to do
with good and evil or any kind of categorical
imperative; it is above all directed at the
preservation of a community, a people (HR, 96).u
Nietzsche claims that morality does not come to a community
from external and eternal sources, but is developed in and by
a community to serve its own particular purpose, usually
preservation. The history of morality shows that morality is
not free from interested parties but is always at the service
of some other purpose. It reveals the other evaluations at the
heart of morftl values.
In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche moves his
historical analysis of morality a step further. He repeats his
criticism about philosophers' lack of the historical sense:
-As is the hallowed custom with philosophers, the thinking of
all of them is by nature unhistorical- (GH, I, 2). He recounts
the basic position of the historians of morality in a critical
~Orl9inally~ - .~o they decree- "one approved
unegoistic actiolls and called them good from the
U Rorty develops a similar notion of morality and
conununity. See Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony, and
solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 58-
59; cited hereafter as CIS.
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point of view of those to whom they were done, that
is to say those to whom they were useful; later one
forgot how this approval originated and, simply
because unegoistic actions were alwilY~ habitually
praised as good, one also felt them to be good - ilS
if they were something good in themselves· (GM, r,
2) .
This is more or less the position Nietzsche himself outlines
earlier. However, as the passage above sugges ts, Nietzsche now
seeks to emphasize the importance of the perspective [rol\l
which the history of morality is undertaken. Par him, the
history of the judgemen~ "good" should not come from those to
whom "fJoodness" was shown, the weak and less powerful, but
from the "good" themselves, the strong and powerful, the noble
(GM, I, 2). Morality is not essentially related to the
egoistic-unegoistic dualism or the utility in preserving a
community because this relationship only holds from the point
of view of one perspective on morality, that of the weak and
less powerful (GM, I, 2). Therefore, according to Nietzsche,
the historical inquiry into the origins of morality must be
directed against the weak -:l.nd less powerful since they are tho
originators of moral interpretations of life, but it must
arise from the perspective of the strong and powerful. 'l'ho
critique and overcoming of morality must come from the nabla,
since they have a more affirmative attitude towards life.l',
l~ This points to the critical function of Dionysian
tragedy and its aesthetic and anti-moral perspoctive. I
discuss this at length in Chapter 5.
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2.2.6 Archaeology
With the first line of his Preface to Daybreak Nietzsche
announces his archaeology through various related metaphors:
"In this book you will discover a 'subterranean man' at work,
one who tunnels and mines and undermines" (D, Preface, 1).
Attention must be given to the manner in which the word
"mines" is extended and amplified by the word "undennines" to
indicate the critical character and function of archaeology_
Nietzsche gives further indication of the intention of
archaeology _
I descended into the depths, I tunnelled into the
foundations, I conunenced an investigation and
digging out of an ancient faith, one upon which we
philosophers have for a couple of millennia been
accustomed to build as if upon the firmest
foundations - and have continued to do so even
though every building hitherto erected on them has
fallen down: I conunenced to undermine our faith in
morality (D, Preface, 2).
Nietzsche digs out the buried artifacts and monuments of
morality, but not because of theoretical interest about past
morality or pious reverence for past morality_ Rather, he
uncovers them to completely destroy them. He is not interested
in clearing away the ruins of moral systems so that he can
salvage and refurbish old onp.s OF construct new ones closer to
the designs and intentions Ot their founders. He is not simply
pointing out where we have gone wrong in relation to the truth
of morality, he wants to put an end altogether to morality as
it has been known because it is an error_ Nietzsche'S avowed
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intention is to undermine morality without offering another in
its place. The extent of his success is debatable. 16
Nietzsche wants to undermine not only the foundations oC
morality but also the faith in morality. 110 critici~es Kant
for trying, given the shortcomings of morality, to ground it
securely rather than reject it outright (D, Preface, 3). In
fact he claims that Kant is actually a pessimist about the
efficacy of morality in the face of the imrnoralism of nature
and history which contradicted it, but he did not have the
wherewithal to completely reject his faith in morality (D,
Preface, 3). According to Nietzsche, even if we reject
particular moral propositions or moral systems we may still
exhibit a "metaphysical need" for morality as such. Despite
the fall of every morality that we have erected, our faith in
the project of erecting morality persists. Nietzsche makes it
his task to undermine that faith.
Nietzsche also provides a formula and goal for his
archaeological project: "the self-sublimation of morality" or
the self-overcom.i.ng of morality (D, Preface, 4), He states
later in On the Genealogy of Morals: "All great things bring
about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming"
(GM, III, 27), The honesty that morality requires of us
16 The question about Nietzsche's position with respect
to morality, whether he overcomes it or is inscribed within
it, begins to arise more urgently in terms of his relation to
nihilism, as emerges in Chapter 4.
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ilctually calls us to do away with morality and our need for
morality. Archaeology, as the undermining of the faith in
morality, is meant to help bring about the self-overcoming of
morality. However, the success of Nietzsche's archaeological
endeavour remains under question. 11
Heidegger points out that the Greek word "arche M is the
etymological root for archaeology and means "principle" and
"to begin" in a manner that suggests standing at the beginning
and ruling over all that comes after (N:II, 187). He
indicates, rightly, especially where Nietzsche is concerned,
that reference to arche as beginning or ruling principle Mwill
make sense only if we simultaneously determine that of which
and for which we are seeking the arche" (N:II, 187). According
to Nietzsche, the question of origins is neither objective nor
subjective but perspectival, neither neutral nor benign but
interested and value-laden. The origins of morality as well as
the question of the origins of morality come from particular
attitudes towards life. For him, the archaeological question
of the origins of morality involves critically investigating
the evaluation of life that informs morality.
In Heidegger's view, the question about the arche of
being is the essence of a "fundamental metaphysical position M
17 Nietzsche's ethic of honesty and truthfulness survives
in his philosophy despite his inquiry, critique and overcoming
of morality. In fact, in his view this ethic is the very basis
of the overcoming of morality, as emerges in Chapter 6.
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(N:II, 184). For him, the inquiry into the nature of beings
starts with physics but always calls forth metaphysics in that
our understanding of life summons us to further investigate
its origin and rUling principle beyond it (N:II, 189). In this
context Heidegger claims that Nietzsche's philosophy does not
overcome metaphysics but is in fact the culmination of
metaphysics. The extent to which this mayor may not be the
case requires further discussion, but it is important to see
how Nietzsche's archaeological concern with origins raises the
question about his position in relation to metllphysics.
However, Foucault indicates that Nietzsche's arch,1cology
is a critical science in which the very notion of origin as a
pure beginning or essential source is itself under question.
Foucault is influenced by Niet2sche with respect to aWilreneSS
of the historicity of human nature and morality. Foucault's
Nietzschean archaeology indicates that archaeology is involved
in the critical investigation of the history of cultural forms
in a particular sense. In The Archaeology of Kno....ledge he
claims that his own work focuses on the discontinuity that
comprises the supposed continuity in the history and structure
of thought. In order to conceive of this discontinuity he uses
concepts like rupture, break and mutation, threshold and
transformation, displacement and redistribution, and theroby
challenges the notion of origin as pure beginning or essential
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source .10 Gi'len the relationship between Nietzsche and
E'OUCllult, this demonstrates that archaeology does not search
for origins (archc) uncritically. To see Nietzsche's work
reflected in Foucault's work suggests, against Heidegger, the
possibility of considering archaeology in a manner that
resists placing it within the tradition of metaphysics. This
has further implications for the interpretations of
Nietzsche's genealogical method and his project of overcoming
metaphysical morality which are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4
respectively.l~
1ft See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and
7the Discourse on Language, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith, (NeW
York: Random House, Inc., 1972), 3-17, especially 4-5.
l~ See sections 3.2 and 3.3 for Foucault's and Deleuze's
interpretations of Nietzsche's genealogical questioning of
origins in a manner that challenges the notion of pure
beginning. See also sections 4.3 and 4.4 for the discussion of
Nietzsche in terms of his position with regards to
metaphysical morality or nihilism.
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CHAPTER 3. GENEALOGY
NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF 'l'BE ORIGINS OJ! MOIU\Ll'l"{
3. 1 Nietzsche's Genealogy
With Nietzsche's movement from his other critical
sciences towards his method of genealogy comes a COL:r0sponding
shift in his project. In The Will to Power h13 writes:
The inquiry into the origin of our evaluations clnd
tablets of the good is in no way identical with a
critique of them, as is so often believ13d: even
though the insight into some pudenda odgo
[shameful origin] certainly brings with it a
feeling of diminution in value of the thing that
originated thus and prepares the way to a critical
mood and attitude toward it (WP, 254).
The previous discussion and the passage above indicate that
the inquiry into the origins of morality helps us recognize
that those origins are nothing virtuous or glorious in
themselves and thus it leads to a critical perspective on
them. Nietzsche's sciences have an implicit: criti.cal
perspective but it is not until he formulates his genealogical
method that this critical perspective becomes explicit ilnd
essential to his project. However, while the inquiry into the
origins of morality and the critique of the origins of
morality are not identical, they are not entirely distinct
either. They are intimately related in that the former
prepares for the latter and the latter presupposes the former.
Nietzsche'S sciences are a necessary prior stagQ in the
development of his genealogy. 1
Nietzsche clarifies the relationship between inquiry and
critique in On tho Genealogy of Morals. He contrasts but
nonetheless connects his earlier concern with the origin of
morality with his later concern with value of morality,
claiming that his concern with origins is prcl.irninary to his
concern with value. Referring to Human, All TOG Human and
D,lybreak in terms of his psycholog;'{;al-historical
investigations, he writes:
Even then my real concern was something much more
important than hypothesis-mongering, whether my own
or other peoples's, on the origin of morality (or
more precisely: the latter concerned me solely for
the sake of a goal to which it was only one means
among many). What ....as at stake was the value of
morality (CM, Preface, 5).
In The will to Power, from a note dated 1885-1886, Nietzsche
asks ~ ·What are our evaluations and moral tables really
worth?- and ·What is the meaning of the act of valuation?~
(lfP, 254). In the three essays that comprise On the Genealogy
of Morals, written later in 1887, he focuses on the meaning of
moral evaluations, moral sensations and concepts, and moral
ideals. In all three essays his concern is not just with the
origins of morality but with the value of morality. He
I Furthermore, I claim that Nietzsche's genealogy is a
part of the larger tasks of his overcoming of morality defined
as nihilism and his revaluation of values, which in turn are
stages in his preparation for the rebirth of tragedy in an
aesthetic and anti-moral realm.
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expresses the matter in the following way:
Let us articulate this nE!1o' demand: we need a
critique of moral values, the value of these values
themselves must be first called into question - ilnd
for that there is needed a knowledgc of the
conditions and circumstances in which thcy l]cew,
under which they evolved and changed (morality ilS
consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tactu[fecie,
as illness, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison),
a knowledge of a kind, that has nevec yet existed
or even been desired. One has taken the value of
these ~values~ as given, as factual, as beyond illl
question; one has hitherto never doubted or
hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing "the
good man~ to be of greater value than "tho ovil
man, ~ of greater value in the sonse of fucthorillCj
the advancement and prosperity of man in gencr.al
(the future of man included). But what if tho
reverse were true? (GM, Preface, 6).~
The critique of morality first requires the kind of
investigation characteristic of other methods of inquiry,
espacially psychology and history. The critique of morillity
also requires that the value of moral values be questioned.
Indeed, for Nietzsche, the v~ry nature of his critique is such
questioning. We must not take morality and its significilnce
for granted. We must at least entertain the possibility that
what we value may not be what is actually valuable for
J However, in the Editor's Introduction, 4, Walter
Kaufmann warns against seeing Nietzsche as simply rever~ing
the tenns of morality (i.e. considering what is supposedly
"good" as "evil"). Rather, he rightly sees On tho Gencillogy of
Morals as a supplement to Beyond Good ilnd Ev..i.l and a further
attempt to get beyond "the faith in opposite values" thaL
characterizes metaphysit:al morality. Nonetheless, the ~H1CCOSS
of Nietzsche's endeavour in terms of the revaluation of Vil1UC~
can be questioned, as I indicate further in section 4.3 lind
4.4 of Chapter 4.
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t:<lmanity. Only when ''''02 recognize morality's value or lack of
v<1!ue, or more precisely the type of value it has or advances,
can we even hop"! to overcome morality and move towards a realm
that is "'beyond good and evil" or beyond all moral evaluations
of li fe.
Nietzsche'S genealogy is important to his attempt to
overcome metaphysical morality defined as nihilism and
revaluate all values in order to offer an aesthetic and anti-
moral perspective through tragedy, as becomes clear later.
However, Foucaul t' sand Deleuze' 5 interpretation of
Nietzsche's genealogy is discussed first in order to clarify
its character and function. They both provide valuable insight
into his genealogy in terms of the question of origins and the
question of vDlues respectively.
3.2 l~oucilult: 'l'he Question of Origins
In Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth Alan Sheridan
indicDtes that Nietzsche is a presence in much of Foucault's
work. lie considers the relation between Nietzsche and Foucault
Ds it pertains to the development from archaeology to
genealogy:
It may be argued that Nietzsche is so all-pervasive
in L' archeologie dl.l savior (The Archaeology of
Knowledge), so subterranean, that it requires no
sign-posting. Certainly what strikes the reader of
'Nietzsche, la genealogie, 1 'histoire' [-Nietzsche,
G@nealogy, History-) is how closely Foucault' s
description of Nietzschean genealogy applies to his
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own archaeology. Yet there is one element in the
genealogy - and it is the most fundamental one -
that remains at an implicit level in the
archaeology.l
Sheridan claims that, for Nietzsche and Foucault, pow0r is the
fundamental element which, ....hile implicit in archaeology,
becomes explicit in genealogy (NF, 115). Poucault denies he
was the first to raise the question of power in the analysis
of discourse and instead attributes that honour to Niet~sche
(MF, 115). He sees, through Nietzsche, the significance of
power and thus moves from archaeology to genealogy.
It is now clear why Foucault never again uses the
term archaeology, or any other of the 'panoply of
terms' so laboriously elaborated in L'archaologie
du savoir [The Archaeology of KnOWledge]. 'rhis new
realization of the role of power in discourse was
so important to Foucault that he felt impelled to
abandon altogether the terIllS he had fashioned for
himself and to adopt, unashamedly, the Njet'lschean
term 'genealogy' (MF, 116).
According to Sheridan, the movement from archaeology to
genealogy occurs when power becomes the central term of:
analysis. Foucault is quoted as stating that, for him,
Nietzschean genealogy is the analysi3 of power: "Nietzsche is
the philosopher of powe17, but he managed to think power
without confining himself within a politIcal theory to do 80"
(MF, 116).
While the notion of power is important in under~t1.lndinfJ
1 Alan Sheridan, Michel FOUCilult: The will to'i'ruth, (New
York: Routledge, 1980), 115; cited hereafter D.!-: Mr.
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the Nietzschean-Foucauldian movement from archaeology to
gcnealogy, the distinctive feature of Foucault's analysis of
gcnealogy is his focus on the notion of origins. Foucault's
essay "Nietzsche, GBnealogy, History» is a detailed and dense
expression of his indebtedness to Nietzsche and his
interpretation of Ni.etzsche's notions of genealogy and
history. This essay is Foucault'S analysis of genealogy as it
pertains to the question of origins. He states:
Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the
lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might
compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar;
on the contrary, it rejects the meta-historical
deployment of ideal significations and indefinite
teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for
-origins" (LCP, 140).~
Genealogy is usually considered as the inve::>tigation of
origins, even in Nietzsche's case, so Foucault' 5 last
statement in the passage above is bound to be baffling. Yet
["oucault is indicating that in genealogy it is precisely the
notion of origins that is under question. FoI. genealogy,
origins, considered as essential and pure beginnings, do not
• Michel Foucault, MNietzsche, Genealogy, History" in
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: selected Essays and
Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard
and Sherry Simon, (New York: Cornell university Press, 1977),
HOi cited hereafter as LCP. For an example of Foucault's own
later "genealogical" method, especially with respect to power,
sec also Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures" in power/Knowledge:
Selected Interviews and Other writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin
Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and
Kate Soper, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1980); cited
hereafter as PK.
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exist, so it cannot ever search for them. Foucault
demonstrates that Nietzsche's criticisms of Paul Ree I.Ind the
English psychologists in On the Genealogy of 'locals are based
on his denial of an unbroken line of historical development
with regards to morality, something he himself appreciates in
The Archaeology of Knowledge (LCP, 139). Rather, geneillogy
attempts to preserve the uniqueness of multiple and
multifarious origins and histories by avoiding the reduction
of their particularity and singularity under a totality or
finality. Genealogy does not simply and unproblematically
trace back through history to origins because both are is a
matter of intricate intersections and interferences. ~
Foucault clarifies his point about genealogy'S approach
to origins through an analysis of (mainly) three German ....ords
- Ursprung, Herkunft, Entstehung - all of which are loosoly
translated as "origin" but which also have different.
particular senses and implications for genealogy. Foucilult
claims that Nietzsche first uses these terms interchangeably
in earlier works like Human, All Too Human and 'I'he Gay Science
but later attempts to distinguish them in On the Genea logy of
Morals (LCP, 140-141). Ursprung means "origin" or beginning in
5 In this manner Nietzsche can be seen as escilping thl"!
kind of metaphysical thinking that Heidegger attributes to
him. As with his archaeology, Nietzsche'S genealogy is <1
critical method which challenges the notion of origins (iJrch6)
as a pure beginning or ruling principle. See sec tion 2.2. fi Ln
Chapter 2.
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the strict sense which Nietzsche criticizes, while Herkunft
means "descent" or heritage and entstehung means "emergence"
or 1.Ir151ng in the senses with which Nietzsche defines his
genealogical critique of origins. Foucault also demonstrates
the manner in which genealogy challenges the notions of
history by analyzing the opposition between "wirkliche
Historie" (~real history" or "true history") and traditional
history. Through extended quotations, the precise meaning of
each of these terms is discussed in order to reveal the
nature, function and implications of Nietzsche's genealogy
with respect to the question of origins.
3.2.1 Ursprung
Foucault defines Ursprung as ·origins· negatively in
0: Jer to demonstrate that Nietzsche's genealogy is not
concerned with origins in the way we usually consider them
because it places the very notion of origins under question.
Why does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the
origins (Ursprung), at least on those occasions
when he is truly a genealogist? First, because it
is an attempt to capture the exact essence of
things, their purest possibilities, and their
carefUlly protected identities, because this search
assumes the existence of immobile forms that
precede the external world of accident and
successi.on. This search is directed to "that which
is aLrearly there," the image of a primordial truth
fully ac.equate to its nature, and it necessitates
the r~moval of every mask to ultimately disclose
its identity. However, if the genealogist refuses
to extnnd his faith in metaphysics, if he listens
to hist.ory, he finds that there is "something
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altogether different" behind things: not a timele::;s
essential secret, but the secret that they have no
essence or that their essence was fabricated in a
piecemeal fashion from alien forms ... What is found
at the historical beginning of things is not the
inviolable identity of their origin; it is the
dissension of other things. It is dispar.ity ...
History also teaches how to laugh at the
solemnities of the origin, The lofty origin is no
more than "a metaphysical extension which arises
from the belief that things are most precious and
essential at the moment of birth" (LCP, 142-143).
Two main related points come to the forefront in this passago:
(a) ol:igins are not the true and essential sources behind
supposedly faulty historical developments, (b) origins a["e
nothing special or precious in themselves compared to
historical developments. Foucaul t points ou t how the search
for origins as Ursprung is related to "the faith in opposite
values" which characterizes metaphysics (BGE, 2).
Comparatively, the genealogist denies this opposition <.lOd
refuses to extend faith in metaphysics. Foucault's rejection
of the distinction between true identity (origins) and false
masks (developments) is similar to Nietzsche's rejection of
the distinction between "real world" the ~apparent world~ in
a part of Twilight of the Idols titled How the 'Rca1 Wodrl' at
last Became a Myth (TI, IV). Nietzsche destroys both rcal
world and apparent world: "We have abolished the real worl.d:
what world is left? the apparent world perhaps? .. But no!
with the real world we have also abolished tile appiJrcllt world"
(1'1, 40-41). He does not simply ["everse the orucr or
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significance of dichotomous terms b~cause he rejects the
dichotomy itself by denying the dialectical logic of binary
opposites. He does not establish a new kind of origin or
locilte it in a different place becau::u he questions the notion
of origins itself. For Nietzsche, origins are not primordial
or unitary but multiple and multifarious combinations of other
things. As combinations of other things, they are not really
origins at all in the usual sense. Nietzsche considers origins
as nothing special or precious in themselves because the
twisting and intertwining histories of morality are much more
important and worthy of interest to him.
Foucault also defines the nature and function of
genealogy with respect to the origins of morality:
A genealogy of values, morality, asceticism, and
knowledge will never confuse itself with a quest
for their ·origins,· will never neglect as
inaccessible the vicissitudes of history. On the
contrary, it will cultivate the details and
accidents thi!.t accompany every beginning; it will
be scrupulously attentive to their petty malice; it
will await their emergence, once urunasked, as the
face of the other (LCP, 144)
'rhus, Nietzsche's genealogy pr.ovides a critique of morality by
rejecting the faith that moral values arise from true and
essential origins and only later become faulty through
development. He claims that to understand morality and its
value one must not look to origins as such but to the factors
that comprise its development. He questions the value of the
origins of morality and so questions the value of morality
6B
itself. Nietzsche's genealogy, as part of his attempt to
overcome metaphysical morality and its faith in opposite
values, to get "beyond good and evil" und moral
interpretations, can be understood in term:; of hi.s rejecti.on
of origins as Ursprung.
3.2.2 Berkunft
Foucault distinguishes Herkunft defined as "descent" from
Ursprung or origins and demonstrates that, for genealogy, the
tracing of descent is more adequate than the search for
origins. He writes:
Herkunft is the equivalent of stock or doscent; it
is the ancient affiliation to a group, sustained by
the bond of blood, tradition, or social class. '1'he
analysis of Harkunft often involves a consideration
of race or social type. But the traits it attempts
to identify are not the exclusive generic
characteristics of an indivic'Jill, il sentiment, or
an idea which permits us to qualify them as "Greek~
or "English"; rather, it seeks the subtle,
singUlar, and subindividual marks that might
possibly intersect in them to form a network that
is difficult to unravel ... Where the soul pretends
unification or the self fabricates a coherent
unity, the genealogist sets out to study tho
beginning - numberless beginnings whose faint
traces and hints of colour are readily seen by an
historical eye. The analysis of descent permits the
dissociation of the self, its recognition and
displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a
profusion of lost events. 1\n examination of
descent also permits the discovery, under the
unique aspect of a trait or a concept, of tho
myriad events through which - thanks to which,
against which - they were formed. Genealogy does
not pretend to go back in time to restore an
unbroken continuity that operates beyond the
dispersion of forgotten things; its duty is not to
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demonstrate that the past actively exists in the
present, that it continues secretly to animate the
present, having imposed a predetermined form to all
its vicissitudes. Genealogy does not resemble the
evolution of a species and does not map the destiny
of a people. On the contrary, to follow the complex
course of descent is to maintain passing events in
their proper dispersion; it is to identify the
accidents, the minute deviations - or conversely,
the complex reversals - the errors, the false
appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave
birth to those things that continue to exist and
have value for us; it is to discover that truth or
being do not lie at the root of what we know and
what we are, but at the exteriority of accidents
(LCP, 145-146).
According to Foucault, Herkunft or descent challenges the
notion of Ursprung or origins because it is the rejection of
unitary and essential beginnings and developments. When
Nietzsche's genealogy points out a descent or a family history
through the recognition of a trait, it is not that of an
unbroken continuity. If a common family trait is recognized at
all, it is in order to demonstrate how that trait is dispersed
differently throughout family members. This is the case in On
tIle Genealogy of Morals with Nietzsche's analysis of the
manners in which the trait of the "ascetic ideal" is realized
differently in various members of culture - for example, the
artist, the saint, the priest, the philosopher, the scientist,
etc. (GM, III, 1).6
6 Wittgenstein '5 notion of "famj Iy r::'.::Iemblance" among
language games is helpful here. He points out that
similarities in a family may not be distributed similarly:
some members may have the same eye colour but not the same
hair colour and neither of them may have the same temperament.
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A descent takes many twists and turns, new lociltions and
relationships, like emigration and man:iagc. A family
history suffers many forces which shape ilnd shutter it, like
birth and death. Descent and family history aHect liS who!ic
descent and family history they are. Our self-imugo often
changes and multiplies when we learn something either
honourable or vile about our ancestors. We have multiple self-
images because we have multiple descents and family histories,
our descent and family histories are comprised of multiple
factors.
Foucault states that Nietzsche often likens I1crkunft or
descent to Erbshaft or heritage. However, he warns that, like
descent, heritage is nat something decided once and for all
nor something we receive fully formed from which we can make
and maintain ourselves. Our heritage can also di:;rupt und
disperse our carefully produced and protected self-idenU.ties.
"Nevertheless, we should nat be deceived into thinking that
this heritage is an acquisition, a possession that grows and
solidifies; rather, it is an unstable assemblage of fiwlts,
Thus he attempts to show, in the example of languiHjC gl.lmcs,
that •..:hile all games can be called games, there is nothing
r::ommon or essential to all games since some use boards lind
other require balls or some are solitary and other requi.res
two or more players. He also gives the example of a thread: no
one fibre runs through the entire length but it is comprised
of overlapping fibres of various lengths. Sec Ludwig
Wittgenstein, PhiJ.osophical Investigations, trans. G.B.M.
Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., 195B), 65-
70.
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fissures, and heterogenous layers that threaten the fragile
inheritor from within or from underneath- (Lep, 146).
Genealogy, as the tracing of descent and heritage, questions
the notions of origins and history and thereby questions the
v1llidity of the present. It challenges our notions of what we
are and what we value. It calls us to reconsider how we have
become ourselves and how we have come to hold our values. This
is why genealogy is such a difficult task.
Foucault also defines Herkunft or descent, and thus
genealogy, in terms of the body when he writes:
Finally, descent attaches itself to the body. It
inscribes itself in the nervous system, in
temperament, in the digestive apparatus; it appears
in faulty respiration, in improper diets, in the
dehabilitated and prostrate body of those whose
ancestors committed errors... The body - and
everything that touches it: diet, climate, and soil
- is the domain of the Herkunft. The body manifests
the stigmata of past experience and also gives rise
to desires, failings and errors ... The body is the
inscribed surface of events (traced by language and
dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated
Self (adopting the illusion of a substanti~l
unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration.
Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus
situated within the articulation of the body and
history. Its task is to expose a body totally
imprinted by history and the process of history'S
destruction of the body (Lep, 147-148).
As noted earlier, in The Gay Sci.:!nce and other works Nietzsche
is concerned with the body and all that pertains to it.
Foucault reveals the relationship Nietzsche maintains between
his earlier sciences of physics and physiology and his later
method of genealogy: these sciences are never rejected
12
completely because they are reinterpreted within genealogy.
However, Foucault also defines descent in terms of the body
because he wishes to avoid the notion of the substantial
subject or subjectivity. The body or the individual, as
opposed to the subject, is constructed and destructed by its
descent or history, the relations of power that milke it the
body or individual that it is. Genealogy is meant to
investigate these processes. This is precisely Foucault' 5
project in his own "genealogical" work. Ilis interpretation oE
Nietzsche's genealogy in terms of the relationship between
descent and the body, while elucidating Nietzsche's geneillogy,
nonetheless reflects his own growing interest in the body and
power. 7
3.2.3 Entstehung
Foucault suggests that the notion of Entstellung 01:"
"emergence" is not as central to Nietzsche' 5 genealogy as the
distinction between Ursprung and Herkunft. Yet he illso
indicates that Entstehung belongs with Herkunft such that both
together help define Nietzschr,'s genealogy as the challenge t.o
the search for origins or Ursprung. He writ.es:
Entstehung designates emergence, the moment of
7 Foucault's focus on the body and power reflects his
similarity to Deleuze's analysis of genealogy in terms oE the
relation of forces and the will to power I as becomes clear
later in this chapter.
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arising. It stands as the principle and the
singular law of an apparition. As it is wrong to
search for descent in an uninterrupted continuity,
we should avoid thinking of emergence as a final
term of an historical development; the eye was not
always intended for contemplation, and punishment
has had other purposes than setting an example.
These developments may appear as a culmination, but
they are merely the current episodes in a series of
sUbjugations: the eye initially responded to the
requirements of hunting and warfare; and punishment
has been subjected, throughout its history, to a
variety of needs - revenge, excluding an aggressor,
compensating a victim, creating fear. In placing
present needs at the origin, the metaphysician
would convince us of an obscure purpose that seeks
its realization at the moment it arises. Genealogy,
however, seeks to reestablish the various systems
of subjection: not the anticipatory power of
meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations
(LCP,148).
Genealogical analysis, specifically of punishment, can be seen
in Nietzsche's work, particularly in On the Genealogy of
Morals (GM, II, 4-6, 8-14), Referring to the many uses to
which punishment is put, Nietzsche states: "it is clear that
punishment is overdetermined" (GM, II, 14). Punishment does
not have any unitary or essential origin because it emerges in
many manners and stages throughout its development. Through
Nietzsche's work the same is demonstrated to be the case with
other notions in morality: rights, justice, good and evil,
good and bad, and so on. Genealogy attempts to tease out the
mul tiple origins and histories of moral sensations and
concepts.
After drawing parallels between Herkunft and Entstehung,
Foucault's analysis takes a distinctive turn when he defines
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emergence in terms of forces: "Emergence is always produced
through a particular stage of forces.. Emergence is thus tho
entry of forces; it is their eruption" (LeF, 148-149). 'I'hu
definition of emergence in terms of forces relies on the
relationship between descent and the body. 'l'his is the sunse
in which Nietzsche I sand FOllcaul t' s genealogy can be
considered as an analysis of power. This analysis also says ;Hi
much about Nietzsche as it does about Foucault, and calls up
similarities to Deleuze' s interpretation of genealogy in terms
of the relation of forces and the will to power."
3.2.4 ~Wirkliche Historie"
In the last half of his essay Foucault discusses
Nietzsche'S notion of history from Untimely Meditation,!; to On
the Genealogy of Morals. He demonstrates that Nietzsche
defines genealogy in terms of Herkunft and Entstehung as the
critique of origins by analyzing the manner in which
"wirkliche Historie" ("real history" or "true history")
8 The Nietzschean-Foucauldian notion of Entstchung or.
emergence defined as "entry" and ~eruption" as well as "moment
of arising~ and "singular law of an apparition" is strikingly
similar to Heidegger's notion of Ereignis or event. variousl.y
translated as "happening" and "occurrence" as well i.lli
~disclosure of appropriation~ and "Appropriation" in hili
works. See Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art"
in Poetry, Language I Thought, trans. Albert Hofs tadter, (New
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1971); cited hereafter
as PLT. See also Martin Heidegger, "'rime and Beiny" in On
Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (New York: Harpor. f.,
Row, Publishers, Inc., 1972); cited hereufter as 'l'D.
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t.:haJl.~ng8s the traditional notion of history as a continuous
development (LCP, 152). Foucal~lt writes of the need for this
type of historiCill sensibility in the following manner:
Historical meaning becc-leles a dimension of
"wirkli~h;'J Historie" to the extent that it places
'~ithin a process of development everything
c()nsid~red immortal in man. We believe that
(':-'e.1.inys are immutable, but every sentiment,
particularly the noblest and most disinterested,
has a history (LCP, 153).
This is similar to Nietzsche's position in Human, All Too
ffuntilll with respect h is call for historical and modest
philosophiZing and the rejection of an essential and eternal
human nature (Hll, 2, 41, 274).
However, when applied to Nietzsche, the term "wirkliche
Historie" or real history seems to be problematic. Nietzsche
rejects the notions of "real world" and "apparent world-
throughol't his philosophy, and we would expect him to reject
thl:l notions of real Or true history and fulse or apparent
history in this sensu too. Yet this is precisely the case with
"wirkliche Historie~ for Nietzsche. It Is not real or true
history in the sense of being objective and factual or
cluiming to know the past better than any other history. At
the same time, it is not false or apJ?arent history either
since it is genuinely historical. It is mare precisely
"effective" history in the sense of being the only form of
history worthy of the name history at all. Foucault points out
that "wi.rkliche Historie~ does not suppose itself to hold a
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position outside of history - unhistorical or suprahist.ocicill
- from which it observes the ~istorlcal p::OCCGs. It calls
attention to its own history while investigating the histor.y
of other things such as morality. Thus ··wirkli.che Ilist.orie~ is
"effective" because it recognizes and reveals its
historicity as well as the historicity of morality, thm;
transcending the dichotomy of real clnd fillse hi!:lt.ory.
Foucault discusses how "wirkliche Historic" destroys the
very basis of traditional history _ by interrupting continuity
with discontinuity, imbUing unity with multlplici.t.y, impeding
totality with singularity.
History becomes "effective" to the degree that it
introduces discontinuity into Our very being - as
it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts,
multiplies our body and sets it against itself.
"Effective" history deprives the scI ( of the
reassuring stability of life and nature, clnd it
will not permit itself to be transported by i.l
voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It
will uproot its traditional foundations and
relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity. '1'his
is because knowledge is not made for understanding;
it is made for cutting. From these obscrvat.ions, we
can grasp the particular traits of historical
meaning as Nietzsche understood it - the sense
which opposes ~wirkliche lli3torle" to tri.lditi.onal
history. The former transposes the relationship
ordinarily established between t.he eruption of an
event and necessilry continuity. An entir.e
historical tradition (t.heological or riltlOllalj 5 t ie)
aims at dissolving the singular event into an jdciJl
continuity - as a teleologlci.ll movement 01:" a
natural process. "Effective" history, however,
deals with events in terms of their most un lqUU
characteristics, their most acute mllnj fe:;tat.ian~
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(LCP, 154).'J
'f'his passilge also serves as a concise a statement of
foucault's own project concerning history in The Archaeology
of Knowledge. As a historical sensibility, "wirkliche
IIistorio.:.. " r;orrespOllds to Nietzsche's critical history and a
heillthy historical, or in his case, unhistorical, attitude
(UM, II, 10). It is simultaneously historical and unhistorical
because the histories it reveals are never continuous,
unitary, or total, but always dispersed, diverse, and partial.
It is effective because it selects and cuts up history and
thus reveals the discontinuity in the continuity, the
multiplicities in unity, the unique singularity of events in
the totality of all events. Nietzsche's notion of ~wirkliche
History" questions the very notion of traditional history
itself.
Foucault indicates that "wirkliche Historie" is a matter
of overcoming metaphysics. Traditional history is at the mercy
of metaphysics which takes an objective perspective on history
and imposes cam:inuity and totality on unique events in
history. "On the other hand, the historical sense can evade
metilphysics and become a privileged instrWllent of genealogy if
it refuses the certainty of absolutes" (LCP, 152-153). Only
"wirklicho Historie" avoids unities and essenc"s and hence
'1 Ileidegger also considers history in terms of epochal
ruptures to emphasize the uniqueness of historical events.
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avoids metaphysics. Only in terms of ~wirkl.i.chc ll-i sLodo" CM\
the historical sense question the notion of hist~ory i tsol[.
Foucault· claims that genealogy is the histo["ic:al Slmse
become "wirkliche Historie" because it does not deal in
continuities, unities or totalities. Genenlogy does not sook
objective facts concerning historical origins ilnd development
because it .'::"ealizes there dr.e no such objective [ilCtS. "'rho
final trait of effective history is its aff i.rmation of
knowledge as perspective~ (LCP, 156). GenE!illogy cxemplifi.{~5
Nietzsche's perspectivism. It stresses that, ] ike till {)tlH~r
knowledge, it too cvmes from a particular perspective when it
offers a critique. It is aware that it does noL originate or
develop from a unified and essential source or beginning in
the tradi tional When genealogy reveals the
discontinuous and multiplicitous origins of morality it
reveals its own discontinuous and multiplicitous origins aR
well. Genealogy demonstrates its own genealogy llnd in th i,1:>
manner it rejects the metaphysical faith in opposite values.
3.3 Deleuze: The Question of Values
Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy is gunr~["iJl1y
recognized as being responsible for the F("0.nch Nictzschu-
Renaissance in the early 1960's. Deleu"l.e provides iln ana]y:,h:
of active forces nnd reactive (urc~s as well us thni r
ambivalent relationship, a critiqlle of di.alncti.cill thinkirHj,
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ilnd <'.Ill hi.gh-spirited advocation of the affirmative figure of
Illonysus. However, the main concern here is with the first two
chilpter.s in which Deleuze interprets Nietzsche's notion of
genealogy in terms of the relation of forces and the will to
power. 10
In the Preface to the English Translation of Nietzsche
and Philosophy Deleuze identifies the general character of
Nietzsche's philosophy when he writes:
Nietzsche's philosophy is organised along two great
axes. The first is concerned with force, with
forces, and fOIllls of general semiology. Phenomena,
things, organisms, societies, consciousness and
spirits are signs, or rather symptoms, and
themselves reflect states of forces. This is the
origin of the conception of the philosopher as
"physiologist and physician" ... The second axis is
concerned with power and forms an ethics and an
ontology ... If it is true that all things reflect a
state of forces then power designates the element,
or rather the differential relationship, of forces
which directly confront one another. 11
However, while Deleuze focuses on forces and power, he alsc
indicates that these are actIJ.ally a matter of values for
Nietzsche. He writes: "Nietzsche snatches thought from the
10 Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche's genealogy is
especially intriguing, at least in the context of this thesis,
because he places it under the rubric of Dionysian tragedy.
for Deleuze, the role of Nietzsche's genealogy as the critique
of morality is central to the overcoming at nihilism through
the revaluation of values and the establishment of an
aesthetic and anti-moral perspective of Dionysian tragedy.
11 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche ,md Philosophy, trans. Hugh
'1'omlinsol1, (New York: Columbia Ulliversity Press, 1983), x-xi;
cited hereafter as NP.
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element of truth and falsity. He turm; it into nn
interpretation and an evaluation, interpl'otation of f:orcc~,
evaluation of power (NP, :xiii). In [act, fo(' both
philosophers, forces and power are inter.protatiolUi and
evaluations, the sources and means for interpretilt ionH and
evaluations.
In The Will to Power Nietzsche discus$es the .cliltionnh.ip
between interpretation, evaluution and the will La power. lie
states:
One may not ask: "who then interprets?" for. the
interpretation itself is a form of the wil \. to
power, exists (but not as a "beino" but iHi il
process, a becoming) as an effect (WP, 556),
The will to power interprets (-it is a question of
interpretation when an organ is constructed): it
defines limits, determines degrcc!>, vilriatJonl:l of
power (hlP, 643).
Value, as interpretation and evaluation, is a function of the
relation of forces and the will to power, an expression of the
relation of forces and the will to power. Nietzscho writ!:!!,;:
The standpoint of "value" is the l:ltilndpoLnt of
conditions of preservation and onhancement for
complex forms of relative life-cJurCltion within the
flux of becoming.
There are no durable ultimate units, no i.Itoms,
no monads: here, too, "beings" ilrQ only int;ro<.1uGucl
by us (from perspective grounds of practicaliLy and
utility)" (WP, 715).
There is nothing essential or unitary about villuos nor tJlJouL
the one who values. They i1re both inter.protations 'lna
evaluations from various perspectives, arising out of the
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rell1tion of forces and the will to power. Morality is only one
5uch value. lIumanity is but one evaluator. This recalls
Nietzsche's 5tatement: "r understand by ·morality· a systell of
eVl1luations that partially coincides with the conditions of a
creature's life* (W'P, 256).
Morality thus involves the physiology of the body. In
this respect a discussion of the relation of forces in terms
of the body prefaces the analysis of the will to power, The
two of these - the relation of forces and the will to power -
belong together. 'l'hey help clarify Deleuze's notion of
Nietzschean genealogy. In all cases the question of value, of
interpreting and evaluating, arises.
3,3.1 The Relation of Forces
Already with Foucault it was seen how genealogy, as an
analysis of descent and emergence, concerns itself with the
body and the relation of forces. Foucault claims that the body
is imprinted and destructed by history and it is the task of
genealogy to expose that imprinting and destruction (LCP, 147-
14 a). This seems to assume that the body is something which
can accept or resist imprinting and destruction, a *medium"
through which the effects of imprinting and destruction can be
expressed and exhibited. For Foucault, to some extent, this is
tl"ue. Yet In The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish,
the three "Volumes of The History of Sexuality and other later
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essays and interviews Foucault attempts to point out that tho
body is not so much there before it is imprinted and
destructed as it is actually ~constructed" by this imprinting
and destruction. The body only exists and is experienced in
the matrix of power-knowledge relations. In an essay titled
"Two Lectures" in Power/Knowledge Foucault Wr:itNl about
individuals and power in the following manner:
The individual is not to be conceivEld as a sort of
elementary nucleus, a primitive aLom, <l multiple
and inert material on which power comes to [as ten
or against which it happens to striko, and in 50
doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it
is already one of the prime effects of power that
certain bodies, certain ges tures, certain
discourses, certain desires, come to be ident ified
and constituted as individuals. 'l'he individual,
that is, is not the vis-a-vis of power; it is, 1
believe, one of its prime efft:lcts. 'rhe individuul
is an effect of power, and at the same timo, or
precisely to the extent to which it is that e[[er:t,
it is the element of its articulation. 'L'he
individual which power has constituted is at the
same time its vehicle (PK, 98).12
This later statement about the constitution of individuals in
and by power seems to bring Foucault closer to Delcuxc than
his earlier statement about the body being imprinted and
destructed by history.
Deleuze expresses his view of the body defined by ilnd ilS
the relation of forces in this manner:
What is the body? We do not define it by saying
that it Is a field of forces, a nutrient medium
fought over by a plurality of forces. Par in [act
12 See also Michel Foucault, "Body/Power" in PK, 55-62.
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there is no ~medium", no field of forces or battle.
Thece is no quantity of reality, all reality is
alread:' quantity of force. There are nothing but
quantities of force in mutual ~relations of
tension". Every force is related to others and
ei ther it obeys or commands. What defines a body is
this relationship between domina.nt and dominated
forces. Every relationship of force constitutes a
body - whether it is chemical, biological, social
or political. Any two forces, being unequal,
constitute a body as soon as they enter into a
relationship (NP, 39-40).
Dcleuze claims that there is no body as such. The body is the
relation of forces which composes it. It is not in the site or
locntion of forces, 1t is the site and location. It is not a
~medium" through which forces operate,it is those forces.
Forces, simply in relating to each other, create a vehicle for
themselves - the body. When the relation of forces ceases to
hold that body ceases to exist. The body is not a substance or
an essence because it is always constituted as the relation of
forces. Rather, it is a virtual construction - real but not
pri.arily material, ideal but not simply formal or logical. u
oeleuze also demonstrates that, for Nietzsche,
considering bodies as the relation of forces is a matter of
recognizing the pluralism and multiplicity of force.
Up to now we have presented things as if different
forces struggled over and took successive
possession of an almost inert object. But the
object itself is force, expression of a force. That
is why there is more or les5 affinity between the
object and the force which takes pos~ession of it.
lJ 'l'he notion of virtuality is clarified in the discussion
of the will to power that follows in the next section.
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There is no object (phenomenon) which iH not
already possessed since in itself it is not an
appearance but the apparition of a force. Evory
force is thus essentially related to another force.
The being of force is plural, it would bo
absolutely absurd to think about forco in the
singular (NP, 5).
According to Deleuze, Nietzsche's not.ion of force is il
principle of his critique of atomism and his pluralistic
philosophy of nature (NP, 6). There are no singuli.lr illonm,
only plural relations. Force is not something unitary u{ which
various relations in bodies are expressions. force itscl f is
multiple, as is its existence as bodies. Delcuzo l:ltatos:
"Being composed of a plurality of irreducible forces the body
is a multiple phenomenon, its unity is that of a mliitipll~
phenomenon, a "unity of domination" (NP, 40).
Deleuze further defines the nature of forcos and bodics
by distinguishing between dominant and dominated forces
active and reactive forces: "In a body the 5upcriol:
dominant forces are known as active and the inferior
dominated forces are known as reactive. Active and roactive
a.re precisely the original qualities which exprcl:ll:l the
relation of force with force" (NP, 40). '1'0 Ul:lO l~out:ilult':;
terminology, bodies become individuals through il. par.ticular
relation of forces. If the relation is mainly o( dominant
forces, the body is individuated as active. If the rcl<.ltion i~
mainly of domina.ted forces, the body is Individuatml
reactive. The quantity of a body'S forces (dominant or
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dominated) determines the quality (active or reactive) of its
individuation. According to Deleuze, the task of genealogy is
to determine the quantitative relation of forces as well as
the qualitative value of the relation of forces.
It is vitally important to recognize here that, according
to Dcleuze, a body is not just a physical or material body, a
body is any relation of forces, including our social and
political institutions. For example, because it is a relation
of forces (such as ressentiment), morality is a body. He is
not idealiz.ing the notion of the body by linking it to things
liko social and political institutions or morality. He is not
concretizing them all by linking them to the notion of the
body and the relation of forces. Rather he challenges both a
pure idealism of values and a brute materialism of values. Yet
Deleuze emphasizes the physiological conditions of values and
the need for a physiology to inquire into them and critique
Lhem. He gives credence to the conception of the philosopher
as ·physiologist and physician- in the sense that Nietzsche
pcoposes. The sign1 ficance of Deleuze' 5 interpretation of
Nietzsche' 5 genealogy is the manner in which he maintains
focus on the conditions of morality with the notion of the
body as the relation of forces.
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3.3.2 The Will to Power
Deleuze offers a warning about Nietzsche's notion of the
will to po\o;er and the question of willing in terms of who or
what wills:
Nietzsche is most misunderstood in relation to thu
question of power. Every time we interpret will to
power as "wanting or seeking power" we encounter
platitudes that have nothing to do with Niet.\':schc· 5
thought ... Power is not what the will wants, but on
the contrary, the one that wants in the will (Nl',
xi) .
This statement must be read in the context of Niet?schc· s
denial of the will and the subject, or the wilful subject. In
The will to Power he states: "There exists neither "spirit,"
nor reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor
will, nor truth: all are fictions that are of no use" (WP,
480). In Beyond Good and Evil he also writes: "Willing BCQmS
to me to be above all something complicated, something that is
a unit only as a word" (BGE, 19). ~'or Nietzsche, willing is a
plurality of sensations and thoughts erroneously consider.ed ali
a single whole. In this regard Deleuze writp.s ilbollt
Nietzsche's pluralism:
Nietzsche denounces the soul, the "ego" and egoism
as the last refuges of atomism. Psychic atomi.sm is
more valid than physical atomism: "In all will it
is absolutely a question of commanding and obeyi.ng,
on the basis of a social structure compm;ed of m"ny
'souls'" (BGE, 19) (NP, 7).
Deleuze points out that Nietzsche's plurali.sm is instrumental
in his denial of the will such that it acts as his crit:iqUfJ or
B7
Schopenhauer's pessimism of the will wherein the only way to
end the suffering caused by the will is to negate the will
(NP, 7). In Nietzsche's view, we cannot be considered wilful
in the first instance because there is no unitary soul from
which to will or with which to will. The "soul" is a plurality
of various souls, the "self~ is comprised of many selves.
Nietzsche states: "My hypothesis: the subject as multiplicity"
(hiP, 490) .1.1
Furthermore, Nietzsche's claim that it is power that
wills in the will to power means that our willing (in whatever
sense we can still be said to will) is but an instance of the
will to power. Hence, we do not will at '3.11 because willing
does not come from us. All that we will, all that we value and
therefore will, is a function of the will to power. De!euze
writes, quoting Nietzsche: "This is why Nietzsche always says
that the will to power is "the primitive affective form~ from
which all other feelings derive. Or better still: "The will to
power is not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos" (VP II
311/WP 635)" (NF, 62). Basically, the will to power does not
mean we want power, but that power wants itself. Power wills
power. 'l'he will to power is the feeling of power which wills
the further extension of the feeling of power, the increase of
U For further reference to Nietzsche' 5 pluralism with
regards to the subject and the will see IfP, 470-492 and BGE,
16-19.
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itself .
At the beginning of the note from The Wi 11 to P01Wl·
d€.f.ining the will to power as pathos Nietzsche "Iso statcB:
-We need "unities" in order to reckon: that does not nl€lill\ we
must suppose that such unities exist" (WP, 635). Slmil"r.ly, he
also states: "Everything that enters consciousnc5H as "unity"
is already tremendously complex: we always have only a
semblance of unity" (WP, 489). These statements urc related to
Nietzsche's pluralism ·?f the will to power. We can U~lC the
will to power as a means of thinking about relatlons DC
forces, but it is not a unified substance or essence that
exists in the manner that we usually understand existent,;e. 'J'he
will to power is not a substantial or essential th i.ng which we
can know and which can unify reality and our knowledge. In hls
essay titled "The Will to Power" Alphonso Lingis write!i:
The will to power is not just power or. (oree, but
Will to Power: always will for more power. It i!i
not an essencej it is neither structure, tQlOll, nor
meaning, but continual sublation of all telos,
transgression of all ends, production of all
concordant and contradictory me"ni.ngs,
interpretations, valuations.. Will to Power Cil!"!
function neither as the reilson that. ilccounts for.
the order of essences, nor as the foundation that
sustains them in befng. IS
Nietzsche states: "Our -knOWing" limits itself to esli.lblishinCj
quantities; but we cannot help feeling these rji.f[c("cnccH in
1$ Alphonso Lingis, "The Will to Power" in 'f'IIC New
Nietzsche: CIJnLd,nporary Styles of InterpretiJtion, ed, Davi.d II.
Allison, {Ne..... York: Dell PUblishing Co., Inc., ln7j, ]<1.
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quantities as quaiities. Quality is a pBl"l;pcctlvc t.1:uth (or
us; not an "in-itself"" (WP, 563). 'I'lle will to po.....er 1,; tlHHl
a matter of perspectivism. \~e never know the will tu pO\<icr
itself, we only feel the signs and symptoms of it itS the
relations of forces. \~e can experience tho Illanifestati.on of
the will to power in a particular relation of for.cos. rn filct,
we must experience it, for "experience" (know lng, tool in'),
Willing, etc) is nothing other than the wlll to power. 'l'he
body, for example, is a sign or symptom of tho will to power.
The body, as quantity and quality of forces, is an expression
of the particular nuance of the will to power '....hi.ch it
embodies and exhibits. It is the task of the genealogist to
point out for us the signs and symptoms of the will to power,
to show us how the will to power rnanif€sts itself ilnd opera to:;
in each relation of forces.
In a section of Nietzsche and Philosophy titled What i:;
the Will to Power? Deleuze attempts to define the :;pccific
manner in which will to power is manifested in the relations
of forces. He begins: "The will to power is thu:> ascribed to
force, but in a very special way: it is both a complement of
force and something internal to it. It is not ascribed to it
as a predicate" (NP, 49). Del€uze then asks how the will to
power can be ascribed to force. 1103 finds the ilnSWE>r in UI{)
notion that forces have an essential ...elation to other [orr::r:H.
"This is what the will to power is: Lhe genca]orJicill clement
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of Corce, both differential and genetic. The will to power is
tho olomont from which derive both the quantitative difference
of related forces and the qU<llity that devolves into each
forco on this relation" (NP, 50). He similarly states:
"Nietz~che's concept of force is therefore that of a force
which is related to another force: in this fonn it is called
will. 'l'he will (will to power) is the differential element of
forcc" (NF, 7). However, while the will to power and the
rclations of forces are intimately connected, a distinction
must be maintained between them. Deleuze writes:
The principle of the qualities of force is the will
to power... But in order to be the source of the
qualities of forces in tIns way, the will to power
must itself have qualiti.es, particularly fluent
ones, even more subtle t,ilan those of force. "What
rules is the entirely !l:.:.Jmentary quality of the will
to power" (vP II 39). These qualities of the will
to power which are immediately related to the
genetic or genealogical element, these fluent,
primordial, and seminal qualitative elements, must
not be confused with the qualities of force (NF,
53).
In 7'he Will to Power Nietzsche writes: "Might not all
quant.ities be signs of qualities?. The reduction of all
qualities is nonsense: what appears is that the
accompanies the other" (IIIF, 564). The relation of forces is a
function of the will to power. Yet we cannot confuse the will
to power with its particular instances and manifestations in
relations of forces or reduce the will to power to the
relation of forces. For Deleuze, as for Nietzsche, the
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simultaneous relation and distinction between the wi.ll l.o
power and the relation of force is evident i.n the tc;-ruinology
used to describe the quality of each: "It i5 thcrc[OI:e
essential to insist on the terms used by Nietzsche; active and
reactive designate the original qualities of: [orce but
affirmative and negative designate the primordiill qUill iUcs of
the will to power w (NP, 53-54).
Nonetheless, it is important to mention, as lIugh
Tomlinson points out, that "element" meiJns both "environment"
and "grounds for existence w in French (NP, HE). llowever., i.t
is not altogether clear how element, environment tlnd ground:;
for existence apply to Deleuze's notion of the will to power.
The passage above suggests that the will to power can be an
element of forces, a cause of their existence iJnd mCi:1ld ng, Lhe
context in which they exist and have meaning, withollt being
something essential and substantial. How can the will to
power, as the element from which the quantity und quality of
forces derive, not be an essential or substantial ground? How
does the will to power "cause" the "effect" of relations of
forces? Does it make sense to refer to a relation of (or.ces iHi
a sign or symptom of the will to power when the will to power
is nothing in and of itself to be signified or represented? In
what manner is the will to power primordial llnd seminal wi.th
respect to forces when it is even more fluent, subtle ilnd
momentary than forces?
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I ~ugg~st that in this regard the ·...ill to pm,er is best
r.:onsidored as a virtual entity. The will to power is that - in
virtlJe~ oC which there are relations of forces such that it is
r~:;ponsiblc. for there being particular relations of forces.
However. it is nothing substantial in itself. As virtual, will
to pmmr is a central aspect of relations of farces, but it is
nonetheless nowhere localizable in any relations of forces.
Deleu:.:c's concern with the will to power can be considered as
one of his characteristic attempts to develop a notion of
"event" Dnd virtuality.16
].3.] Genealogy
While Deleuza' s interpretation of the will to power may
leave some unanswered questions, he is certain of one thing:
the questions can only be answered in the light of the
genealogical perspective. Genealogy is able to reveal the
nature and operation of the will to po\oo'er with respect to the
l:elations of forces because the wi.ll to power is itself the
16 The definition of the will to power as a virtual entity
can be directed towards Deleuze's notion of -event- and his
related notions of multiplicity and singularity,
differentiation and individuation in other of his works as
well. He uses a Nietzschean framework in Nietzsche and
Philosophy, as opposed to a Stoic, Leibnizian or Bergsonian
framework in Tile Logic of Sense, The Fold or Bergsonism.
SimJ.lilrly, Heideggor's notion of Ereignis or "event" as that
which makes happenings or occurrences possible is also virtual
because it is more primordial and seminal but also more fluent
Dnd momentary than any particular happening or occurrence for
which it is responsible.
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genealogical element or environment of the rclcJlia1U; or
forces. The will to power, as the genealogicLll prine:: LpJc, is
the mode of the existence and the value of forces. DclcllZC
writes:
Nietzsche calls the genealogical clemellt 'Jf force
the will to power. Geneulogical means difitJr:nnti.il{
and genetic. The will to power is the diffcrcnti.al
element of forces, that is to say the Ulr!lIlent th,lt
produces the differences in quantity between two or
more forces whose relation is presupposed. 'l'he will
to power is the genetic element of force, that i.s
to say the element that produces the quality due to
each force in the relation (NP, 52-53).
The will to power gives the relation!> of (eccc:) thai r.
existence and value in a particular nlilnner: '''1'he difference in
quantity and the respective qualities of forces in rclatLon to
both derive from the will to power as gencillogjcill clumcnt.
Forces are said to be dominant or domina ted depending on thcd r
difference in quantity. Forces are said to bl.! c:u.:ti.vc or
reactive depending on their difference in quality" (NI', ~3).
The will to power, as the genealogical clement or
environment, is simultaneously responsible [or. Lllc
quantitative existence of particular forces (domjnilnl or
dominated) as well as their qualitative value (acti.vo or
reactive) on the basis of its own evaluation (affirlllative or
negative). With respect to the will to power and tho rclatirJns
of forces, then, to exist is to haVE! value us a quantum 01.
power. Deleuze writes:
The will to power as genealogical element iii thilL
from .....hich senses derive their significance and
values th8ir value ... The signification af. a sense
consists in the quality of the force which is
expressed in a thing: is this force active or
reactive and of ·,.;hat nuancl'!? '.rhe value of a value
consists in the quality of the will to power
expressed in the corresponding thing: is the will
to power affirmative or negative and of what
nuance? .. But a value always has a genealogy on
which the nobility or baseness of what it invites
Un to believe, feel and think depends. Only a
genealogist is able to discover what sort of
baseness can find its expression in one value, what
sort of nobility in another, because only he knows
how to handle the differential element: he is the
master of the critique of values (NP, 54-55).
This is why genealogy is crucial. The question of the '<1ill to
power as the existence and value of forces can only be
entertained by the genealogist bp-cause existence and value are
genealogical matters. For Nietzsche and Deleuze, genealogy is
not just t.he critique of values in terms of the will to power
clnd the reIaT.ions of forces, it is also the critique of the
value of the will to power and the relations of forces
themselves. Genealogy is the name for the existence of values
in and through the will to power as the relations of forces.
Genealogy is able to criticize values because it operates on
the same basis as the values it criticizes - the differential
of thc will to power as the relations of farces. Genealogy, as
the will to power expressed in a particular relation of
forces, has value itself, It is dn evaluation.
To refer to the will to power and the relations of farces
that conotitute something is to refer to what gives it its
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value and the value itself. Thi~ rilbics tho need (or
genealogy: "This is the problem of interpretation: to estin'l.lto
the quality of force that gives meaning to <l gi.ven phenomenon,
or event, and from that to measure the relation of the rorce~
which are present- (NP, 53). This is what we mean when .....e t:illk
about things having a cultural force or influence in society.
This is the manner in which Nietzsche investigates mora t
evaluations such as ressentiment, bad conscionce, CjlJ i.lt ilnd
the ascetic ideal. They are all expross ions 0 f the will to
power. They all want an increase of their will to poweL", ,H\
increase of themselves. The problem is to determine the va luo
and strength of their expression of tho will 1:0 power. ~Ihat:
kind of will to power is operating here? Is it a((icminfj or
negating life? These are questions of valuo. lIow is it
operating? How strong is it? What is needed to OVCrCOI\lO il?
These are questions of force. According to Nietzsche, these
types of question needs to be asked and answered ilnd the
genealogist is best suited to this difficult task.
However, t.hese questions must be asked in il particular
manner and with a particular orientation in geneillol]Y. Oelr:lJt':e
points out that for Nietzsche this means asking about the
senses or meanings of a thing by way of the forces thaI: it iH
and that work in it.
We will never find the sense of something (of il
human, a biological or even physical phcnoml':nonl if
we do not know the force which appropdiltcs the
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thing, which cxploits it, which takes possession of
it or is expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an
appcarance or even an apparition but a sign, a
symptom which find its meaning in an existing force
(tiP, 3).
Vorce gives scnse, force is expressed in sense. In genealogy
th{~ determina tion of force is the interpretation of sense. Yet
it must be emphasized that neither force nor sense is
singular, even with regards to the same thing. Deleuze writes:
The history of a thing, in general, is the
succession of forces which take possession of it
and the co-existence of the forces which struggle
for possession. The same objp.ct, the same
phenomenon, changes sense depending on the force
which appropriates it... Sense is therefore a
complex notion; there is always a plurality of
senses, a constellation, a complex of successions
but also of coexistences which make interpretation
iln art (NP, 3-4).
'I'he same thing can be comprised of many forces at various
times or the Silme time and thus it can have many senses or
meanings through its development or at or-::e. This was already
seen with regards to Nietzsche's analysis of the many uses of
punishment and the multiple manifestations of the ascetic
ideal in On the Genealogy of Morals, but it is also true of
his analysis of morality, religion, science and art throughout
his philosophy. Science, for example, can be the means of
investigating the origins of morality and religion when it is
appropriated by critical and creative forces. It can also be
a modern expression of the ascetic ideal when it is
appropriated by a life-negating and vengefUl force similar to
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that of morality and religion. The case is the samc (or .lrt as
well. Therefore determining force and interprcting scnse or
meaning is never a matter of finding the esscntial nature of
a thing. The genealoqy of morality, then, is nevel' a m<lttcr of
finding the one true origin of morality but of the m;lny
origins that comprise its multiple and multifarious historicR.
Deleuze states: -Nietzsche's philosophy cannot be understood
without taking his essential pluralism into account. 'J'here
is no event, no phenomenon, word or thought which doc~ not
have a multiple sense" (NP, 4). This pluralism is what milkm;
genealogy so difficult.
According to Oeleuze, Nietzsche's conccrn with tho
muHiplicity of force and sense and the pluralism of origins
and histories makes his genealogy a critical philosophy of
values. Deleuze refers to Nietzsche's critical philosophy in
terms of the crucial intersection of origins and values such
that '<Ie recognize that values have origins and origins have
values.
Critical philosophy has two inseparable moment::;:
the referring back of all things and any kind of
origin to values, but also the referring back of
these values to something which is, as it were,
their origin and determines their value (NP, 2).
Genealogy is not only concerned with values, it is itself
value-laden. It seeks to avoid indifforencQ or disinterest, to
make a difference in values ilnd provoke interest in valueR,
With respect te the critical aspect of the gencdlogiclll
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cr.itiqUQ of values, Deleuze briefly mentions Nietzsche's
criticlsms of Kant and the utilitarians in Beyond Good and
F:vil. Kant is criticized because he on1y criticizes values on
the basis of other established values and so he does not fully
engage in critique while the utilitarians are criticized
beC<1USC when they criticize, if they criticize at all, they
base their criticism on ~abjective facts" and the calculus of
plciJsure and pain (NP, 2).
Nietzsche attacks both the "high" idea of
foundation which leaves values indifferent to their
own origin and the idea of a simple causal
derivation or smooth beginning which suggests an
indifferent origin for values. Nietzsche creates
the new concept of genealogy. The philosopher is a
genealogist rather than a Kantian tribunal judge or
a utilitarian mechani.c ... Nietzsche substitutes the
pathos of difference or distance (the differential
element) for both the Kantian principle of
universality and the principle of resemblance dear
to the utilitarians (NP, 2).
Kant and the utilitarians presuppose a singular stable origin
and a continuous development of moral values without ever
elucidating them. They have little to say about the historical
origin and development of moral values because theirs is a
n\ore logical or formal, rather than historical, project.
Nietzsche, as well as Foucault and Deleuze after him,
challenges the indifferent and disinterested notions of
origins and values.
Genealogy means both the value of origin and the
origin of values. Genealogy is as opposed to
absolute values as it is to relative or utilitarian
ones. Genealogy signifies the differential element
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of values from which their v<lluc itl'clf den-ives.
Genealogy thus means origin of birth, but <1150
difference and distance in the ori~lin (NP, 7.).
This relates to foucault's notion of descent and emergence liS
well as Deleuze' s notion of the mul tiplicity of [oree iHlll
sense. Values never have a singular origin or il continuous
development. They all exist at different distances [rom an
unstable origin, they all have different relutlon5hip~ La it,
they all have different histories. Genealogy, ilS <.:rit[.<.:il1
philosophy, is a matter of recognizing plural ism. -\'hlls
genealogy is the critique of origins and vil1L:es in <1 SP0.CJill
sense: the questioning of the very notions of origi.n and va,luo
themselves through the questioning of the origin of valuus <.lnd
the value of origins.
Values are symptoms or signs of evaluations. Genealogy
helps us to recognize that values are creiJted, not eternal. or:
immutable, by focusing on the more basic evaluat.ionfl [r.om
which values spring. It demonstrates that vulues iJr.o
expressions of rihurnan, all too human" evaluations of life.
However, this focus on the human dimension does not suggest
that morality is a product of a substantial subject; rather,
the notions of morality and subjectivity are both [unctions of:
the will to power. Genealogy points out that all values and
those who value are created by and as particular instiJncen of
will to power or forms of life. Deleuze ·Nrites:
The problem of critique is that of the villue of.
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"<',)lues, of the evaluation from which their value
arises, thus the problem of their creation.
Evaluation is defined as the differential element
of corresponding values, an element which is both
critical and creative. Evaluations, in essence, are
not values hut ways of being, modes of existence of
those who judge and evaluate, serving as principles
for the values on the basis of which they jUdge.
This is why we always have the beliefs, feelings,
and thoughts that we deserve given our way of being
or our style of life. There are things that can
only be said, felt or conceived, values which can
only be adhered to, on the condition of 6base"
evaluation, "base" living and thinking. This is the
crucial point; high and low, nobla and base, are
not values but represent the differential element
from which the value of values themselves derive
(NP, 1-2).
According to Nietzsche, evaluations or genealogical elements
are responsible for other more obvious values. For example,
moral values arc expressions of another deeper level of a
negative "basc 6 or "low· e'/aluation of life. Similarly,
Christians have feelings of guilt and bad conscience as well
as concepts of sin and salvation because they first have a
perspective which denies life in which guilt and bad
conscience as wall as sin and salvation are sensible or
meaningful. Prom another evaluative perspective which afficns
life, such as Dionysian tragedy, Christian-moral feelings and
concepts would be nonsensical or meaningless. 17
According to Deleuze' s interpretation, Nietzsche' s
11 llowever, this may not be completely accurate because.
even wi th respect to Dionysian tragedy, Nietzsche ha.. recourse
to the ethic of honesty and truthfulness as wall as the notion
of the redemption of existence, both Christian-moral notions.
r discuss this in Chapters 5 and 6.
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genealogy is critical ilS ",'ell as croative. 'l'hrCllluh it~;
critique of values it creates vahl05. GenealoC)y dem0I15tl"iltm;
how it creates values itself by cdiling ill.:tcntion to it:!; own
evaluations. It demonstrates that all position:;, incllldilH) iL~;
own, create values by and as particular inst,-llIr:Ul' of wi 1.1 Lo
power. Critique is creatlvQ.
The noble and the vulgar, the hiC):l iJ I1d tho low -
this is the truly geneillogiciI.L ilwl !:l"i-ticill
e).ement. But, understood in this WilY, critique il'>
at its most positive. The differcntiill eICIll{~l11. i:l
both a critique of the value of values ilnd th,~
positive element of a creation. 1'11i5 why ccitiqllu
is never conceived by Nietzsche as a rei/ction huL
as an action. Nietzsche contrasts the i1ctivi.l.y of
critique with revenge, grudge or rcsscmt.iment (N/',
2-3) .
This aspect of Deleuze's interprctution 01, Nif;t:'.l'>ch'~·s
genealogy is significant because it indicatcs thaI: Ni.ct'l.~ch\)·:".
genealogical critique of morality is not si.mply negativo or:
reactive, which would make it a function or thu r:cvungu 01_'
res sentiment which it challenges. Rather f goncalogy i.s
positive and active, a critique which is <.Il!;o crOill.ivo.
Oeleuze writes:
Critique is " not a re-act.ion of rc-mJntil/lf1nt uuL
the active expression of a way of oxistcncu, illlack
and not revenge, the natural aggression of iJ way of
being... This way of being i:; thi.lt 01' tho
philosopher precisely bl'.!cause hl'.! intend5 ·.... icld LlllJ
differential element as cr.Ltic: iJnd creator ilnd
therefore as a hammer (NP, 3).
Deleuze's refer8nce to philosophizing ~Iith a hiHllmet" nJc;ll.l~
the subti.tle of Nietzsche's Twilight of the [dol!1 whi.ch if;
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ulso opr.. ns ';lith a statement of the ~revilluation of values"
('1'), For.eword). Deleuzo's focus on the critical and creative
iJ:-;pect of g~nealogy also points to Nietzsche's attempt to
overcome metaphysical morality defined as nihilism and effect
i:I revaluation of values. Both activities are critical and
creilti.ve. The following chapter turns tCi the discussion of the
Nietzsche's critical and creative overcoming of metaphysical
m()cillity through il revaluation of values.
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cnAPTEH 4. NIHILISM
NIETZSCHE'S EXPERIENCE !\NO OVERCOMING QIo' NIIIII,ISM
4. ~ Metaphysical Morality as Nihilism
In Chapters 2 and 3 I discussed Nietzsche's philosophy in
terms of the inquiry into the origins of morality (SCiences)
and the critique of the origins of morality (genealogy). 1t 1s
clear that these two activities cannot be separated since oDch
implies and involves the other. The first demonstrates I~hilt
morality does indeed have an origin and history, that it is
not eternal or immutable but arises in and through cortiJin
evaluations of life. The second questions the very notions or
origin and history in sl.'ch a way as to suggest that the orlgin
and history of morality is manifold, that it is not essnntial
unified but is constructed from discontinuous clements.
Nietzsche' 5 sciences and genealogy miJinly look to the
past in terms of origins and history of morality, but they ilce
not without concern for the future of morality either. noth or
these are stages in Nietzsche's larger project of tho
overcoming of nihilism through the revaluation of values. '1'hi:;
is indicat<'ld by his archaeological formula of "th~ s01£-
sublimation of morality" as well as his genealogical claim
that "all great things bring about their own destruction
through an act of self-ovez'"coming" (D, Preface, 4; GM, Ill,
27). In Nietzsche's view, morality as nihilism ovurcomes
itself. Yet he is not satisfied to be a passive spectator
'Hiltching the slow death agony of his ancient enemy; he
ilctively participates in its dying. With respect to the
overcoming of morality, Nietzsche goes beyond the devaluation
of values occurring in his time to a revaluation of: values
emerging in the future. For him, the imperatives of honesty
and truthfulness, the only ethical vestiges he retains, calls
us to rid ourselves of the very lie and falsity of morality.l
'l'hroughout the following discussion I use the rather
redundant term ~metaphysical morality" in order to refer to
Nietzsche's claim that metaphysics is the foundation of
morality in western culture. Metaphysical morality is based on
"the faith in opposite values" such as being-becoming, real-
apparent, truth-falsity or good-evil (BGE, 2). Nietzsche's
phrase "beyond good and evil" refers to his attempt to avoid
the opposition of values in order to overcome metaphysical
morality, as emerges later.
According to Nietzsche, metaphysical morality and
nihilism are synonymous. The very values that metaphysical
morality posits and seeks to establish make it nihilistic. It
values a Ureal ~ world of truth and being over this "apparent"
I See especially GS, 357; GM, III, 27,' EH, IV, 3; WP, 1,
3. Nietzsche's ethic of honesty and truthfulness raises
qUl:!stions about the nature of his overcoming of nihilism and
revaluation of values, as emerges throughout this chapter. For
further discussion see Chapter 6.
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wo:cld of falsity and becoming, a dualism which is appealed 1:0
for the validation of the distinction between good ilnd evil.
Yet this valuation eventually and rlccI'H:;$arily collapses
because of its inherent error in supposing two such worlds,
and consequently this collapse leaves us with the feeling thilt
there is no value to existence at all. 'fhesc arc the states of
nihilism in the most general terms, as is clarified L'.lter.
Thus the overcoming of metaphysical morality as the
supposition of two worlds and the values "good" and "QviP is
the overcoming of nihilism. Throughout this discussion the
term nihilisrri designates metaphysical moral ity as well as
metaphysics and morality.
4.2 Nietzsche' 5 Experience of Nihilism
In the Preface to The Will to Power Nietzsche states:
"What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I
describe what is coming, whdt can no longer come diCfcr:-cntly:
the advent of nihilism (WP, Preface, 2). According to
Nietzsche, the overcoming of nihilism presupposes nihilism
itself as its precondition. He writes:
For one should make no mistake about the meaning of
the title that this gospel of the future wants to
bear. "The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluntion
of Values" - in this formulation a countermovement
finds expression, regarding both principle and
task; a movement that in some future will take the
place of this perfect nihilism - but prosupposes
it, logically and psychologically, and certainly
can only come after and out of it. For why has th8
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advent of nihilism become necessary? Because the
value!; we have had hi'[,he.rto thus draw their final
consequence; because nihilism represents the
ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and
ideals - because we must experience nihilism before
we can find out what value these ·values" really
had. - We require, sometime, new values (WP,
preface,4).
Nihilism is caused by the rise and fall of the very values
which are considered to be the highest values. We must
experience them 60 that we will know what is to be overcome
and how it is to be overcome. That is, we must experience
nihilism as valuation and devaluation if we are to overcome
nihilism through revaluation. Only because there is an initial
valuation and subsequent devaluation of highest values can
there necessarily be a revaluation of values on the basis of
altogether new types of values. For Nietzsche, morality as
nihilism is first required if we are to overcome it. The
overcoming of morality as nihilism occurs because the honesty
and truthfulness that morality cultivates brings us to
overcome it (GS, 357; GM, III, 27; EH, IV, 3; WP, 1, 3).
4.2.1 The Nature of Nihilism
What is the nature of nihilism and what is its
significance?1 Nietzsche's philosophy concerning nihilism and
~ Though Nietzsche identifies various forms of nihilism,
his attempt to analyze its nature seems to involve him in
essentialism. 'I'his is especially the case with Heidegger, as
emerges later.
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his own position with respect to it are ambiguous due to the
nature of nihilism itself. Nietzsche has many ways of defining
nihilism and it is not always clear which definition he is
using at any given time. He states: "What does nlhjlism mean?
That the highest values devalue themselves. 'l'he aim is
lacking; "why?" finds no answer" (WP, 2). This is his 11\0st:
succinct definition of nihilism, expressing the
meaninglessness that we associate with it, but it is not hi ..
most comprehensive nor final definition of nihilism. lie also
writes: "Radical nihilism is the conviction of nn absolute
untenability of existence when it comes to the highest vulues
one recognizes; plus the realization that we lack the least
right to posit a beyond or an in-itself of things that might
be "divine" or morality incarnate" (WP, 3). It is importnnt to
note the "plus" here: it is one thing to say that our highest
values have collapsed, it is another to say in addition to
this that we should no longer posit any similar values to
replace them.
Nietzsche considers nihilism to possess (at least) a dual
nature. The nihilism Nietzsche sees around him is one in wh.ich
people know that Christian-moral values are devalued and they
keep replacing them with other values like State or Sc ience,
always unsuccessfully. This leads to a weak pessimism ,ue.!
romantic resignation from life. The nihilism Nietzsche heril,lds
is one in which people accept the collapse of Christian-mocal
loa
values LIS a liberation and learn to live •.....ithout any absolute
vulues '....hile still affirming the value of life. This is an
expression of a strong pessim:sm and a classical or heroic
ilttitude to life. Nietzsche further outlines the distinction
between weak und strong pessimism within nihilism with the
distinction between passive and active forms of nihilism.
A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of
the spirit: as active nihilism.
B. Nihilism as decline and recession of the
power of the spirit: as passive nihilism (WP, 22).
1'1lssive nihilism merely reacts to the devaluation of highest
vlllues, usually with the stop-gap measure of replacing them
with more values of the same sort and to the same effect.
Active nihilism goes beyond this devaluation to a revaluation
by participating in the destruction of highest values so that
it can recreate the values that have been despised by
morality. Whereas passive nihilism is a feeling of weakness
and loss, active nihilism is a feeling of strength and
liberation. In this context Nietzsche writes I
Nihilism as a normal condition.
It can be a sign of strength: the spirit may
have grown so strong that previous goals
("convictions," articles of faith) have become
incommensurate (for a faith generally expresses the
constraint of conditions of existence, submission
to the authority of circUJl\stances under which one
flourishes, grows, gains power. Or a sign of the
lack of strength to posit for oneself,
productively, a goal, a why, a faith (WP, 23).
Nietzsche a1:>o cites pessimism as -a preliminary form of
nihilism" but also distinguishes between "pessimism
109
strength" and ·pessimism as decline~ (WP, 9-10),
Nietzsche's characterization of nihilism is based on the
distinction~ between strength and weakness, active and
reactive, negative and affirmative, well as the
distinctions between romantic and classical, incomplete .:tnd
complete, devaluation and revaluation, as emerges throughout
this discussion. For him, the movement from weak or passivo
nihilism to strong and active nihilism is a matter of being
able to provide one's own valu!:::,:. TO overcome nihilism,
Nietzsche takes it further than he finds it so that incomplete
and romantic nihilism becomes complete and classical nihilism.
He does not confront or counter nihilism with something other
than nihilism, he pushes it to its limit or conclusion in
order to overcome it. The movement from devaluation to
revaluation is a matter of positing a new principle of
valuation and new values which affirm life. 'fhis is in
accordance with what he states in Twilight of the IdolG:
"Formula of my happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a
goal ... " (TI, I, 44).
4.2.2 The Stages of Nihilism
In order to understand the nature of nihilism and
determine how nihilism is to be overcome (if indeed it eeln be
overcome), we must ask a few more questions. What causes
nihilism? How does it develop? Why does it develop at all? In
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a passage I quote at length, as does Heidegger (N:rv, 24-26),
Nietzsche identifies three psychological states of nihilism:
Nihilism as a psychological state will have to
be reached, first, when we have sought a "meaning"
in all events that is not there: so the seeker
eventually becomes discouraged. Nihilism, then, is
the recognition of the long waste of strength, the
agony of the "in vain," insecurity, the lack of any
opportunity to recover and to regain composure -
being ashamed in front of oneself, as if one had
deceived oneself all too long. - This meaning could
have been: the "fUlfillment" of some highest
ethical canon in all events, the moral world order;
or the growth of love and harmony in the
intercourse of beings; or the gradual approximation
of a state of universal happiness; or even the
development towards a state of universal
annihilation - any goal at least constitutes some
meaning. What all these notions have in common is
that something is to be achieved through the
process - and now one realizes that becoming aims
at nothing and achieves nothing. Thus,
disappointment regarding an alleged aim of becoming
as a cause of nihilism: whether regarding a
specific aim or, universalized, the realization
that all previous hypotheses about aims that
concern the whole "evolution" are inadequate (man
no longer the collaborator, let alone the center,
of becoming).
Nihilism as a psychological state is reached,
secondly, when one has posited a totality, a
systematization, indeed any organization in all
events, and underneath all events, and a soul that
longs to admire and revere has wallowed in the idea
of some supreme form of domination and
administration (-if the soul be that of a logician,
complete consistency and real dialectic are quite
sufficient to reconcile it to everything). Some
sort of unity, some form of "monism"; this faith
suffices to give man a deep feeling of standing in
the context of, and being dependent on, some whole
that is infinitely superior to him, and sees
himself as a mode of the deity. - "The well-being
of the universal demands the devolution of the
individual" - but behold, there is no such
universal. At bottom, man has lost the faith in his
own villue when no infinitely valuable whole works
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through him; I.e., he conceived such 8 whole in
order to be able to believe in his own value.
Nihilism as psychological state hao yet il
third and last form. Given these two insights, that
becoming has no goal and that underneath all
becoming there is no grand unity in which the
individual could immerse himself completely as in
an element of supreme value, an escape remains: to
pass sentence on this whole world of becoming 8S 8
deception and to invent a world beyond it, 8 true
world. But as soon as man finds out how th8t WOrld
is fabricated solely from psychological needs, and
how he has absolutely no right to it, the last form
of nihilism comes into being: it includes disbelief
in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any
belief in a true world. flaving reached this
standpoint, one grants the reality of becoming as
the only reality, forbids oneself every kind of
clandestine access to afterworlds and false
divinities - but cannot endure this world though
one does not want to deny it.
What has happened, at bottom? 'l'hCl! feeling of
valuelessness was reached with the realization th8t
the overall character of existence m8Y not be
interpreted by means of the concept of -ai.m, - the
concept of "unity," or the concept of "truth."
Existence has no goal or endi any comprehensi.ve
unity in the plurality of events is lacking: the
character of existence is not "true,· is false, One
simply lacks any reason for convincing oneself
thayt there is it true world. Briefly: the
categories "aim," "unity, - -being," which WCl used
to project some value into the world - we pullout
again; so the world looks valueless (WP, 12A).J
According to Nietzsche, nihilism passes through these three
psychological states, They appear to follow one after the
other and yet they are all interrelated. In this regard
Heidegger states: "We can easily see that the thcCl!c state~ of
) Nietzsche'S account of nihilism in this note, dated
November 1887-March 1888, is similar to IIow the ·RClal World'
at last Became a Myth in Twilight of the Idols, written
shortly afterwards in June-September 1888,
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nihilism designated sustain an inner relation to one another
i.lnd together constitute '1 particular movementj that is to say,
history~ (N:IV, 35).4
(1) Initially, we posit an -aim" or purpose in the world
of becoming in order t.o give it meaning and value. We later
come to recognize that teleologies of becoming are false self-
deceptions. Our disappointment also involves our awareness of
our modest pasi tlon in the world of becoming.
(2) Similarly, we posit a "unity" or totality to all
events which lies beyond ourselves. This requires the
devaluation of ourselves, but acts as the basis for the
valuation of ourselves (Le., we are only valuable to the
extent that we are part of a larger whole). Yet we realize
that this is also false. In this instance we not only consider
the world to be meaningless, we also consider ourselves who
depend on the meaningfulness of the world to be meaningless.
(3) Once both of these attempts to give meaning and value
to the world of becoming through the concepts of -aim- and
-unity- fail, we invent a -true- world of ftbeing- beyond this
world. Here the focus shifts as this world is actively
devalued in order to place value on a world beyond. However,
this too becomes untenable and we no longer believe in any
~ Heidegger' s statement is to be read in light of his
claim that the entire history of metaphysics and the West
itself is the history of nihilism (N:rv, 35).
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otherworldly values. We therefore accept that becoming ill the
only reality. It is hard to endure this perspective but it is
all we have left if we do not want to deny everything.
Nietzsche's psychological characterization of nihili.slu is
helpful in indicating the basic movement of nihilism and its
effects: the rise and fall of absolute and otherworldly
values, the btJlief and disbelief in a true world beyond this
sensuous world, the inconclusive search for meaning ilnd the
feeling of the valuelessness of existence and ourselves.
Nietzsche describes the sickness that gives risa to
metaphysics and morality or metaphysical morality defined as
nihilism. Nietzsche directs his attack agaillst Platonism and
Christianity, against the invention of the dualism between a
true or "real world" ("being") and a false or "apparent world"
(-becoming"). For him, nihilism begins at this point of
initial valuation of highest values, Yet he clclim~ thclt
nihilism must go through the stages of devaluation Dnd
revaluation of highest values as well. Significantly, in light
of his own philosophy concerning the will to power and the
eternal recurrence, he indicates that nihilism leads to tho
position wherein one affinns the aimless becoming of. this
sensuous world as the only tenable basis for meaning and value
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of existence.'
Ho.....ever, Nietzsche's characteric:ation of nihilism is
rather. unclear in its purely psychological form, While he
d~monstrates a movement from "aim" to "unity" and finally to
truth" as failed attempts to give meaning to existence, the
states he identifies all seem to merge with one another, This
udds to the already considerable ambiguity surrounding
nihilism and hinders a full understanding of the various
histaricul stages of nihilism. Nietzsche may help to clarify
the psychological basis of nihilism, but it is also important
to understand nihilism as a historical process. Even though
Nietzsche Singles out Platonism and Christianity as the
inauguration of nihil ism, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche does
not identify any historical fonns that corresp::md to the
stuges of nihilism in history or as history (N:IV, 35).
Overall, Nietzsche is not interested in such chronological
detail because he is concerned with nihilism as the movement
of western history. Yet, to clarify the subtle movements of
nihilism, I suggest the following outline of the stages of
nihilism, based on Nietzsche's and Heidegger' 5 analysis I (1)
Initial Nihilism, (2) Incomplete Nihilism, P) Complete
Nihilism. This outHne also has the benefit of leading
~ I discuss the affirmation of the will to POW~l: and the
~ternal recurrence as the means of overcoming of nihilism in
Chapter 5,
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d3,rectly to the question of Nietzsche's po5itiol\ with rOHpccl
to nihilism, whether or not he overcomos it.
(1) Initial Nihilism. At this stage the highest Vallll]S
are established, inaugurating the reign a f absolute iII1U
otherworldly values. In Nietzsche's view, tllis is actually II
devaluation of what is really valuable - life, becoming, thill
sensuous world - but it is considered as the bH(]innillfj o[ lhr!
highest values. The initial stage of nihilism cor.rc:;ponds lO
t:he distinction between -re<ll world" <lnd "apparellt wor.Itl" and
the esteeming of the former at the expense o[ the latter..
Platonism and Christianity both helped to initiilte II
nihilistic mode of evaluation which sought out. and (OUIlt!
values in an otherworldly realm. Nietzsche claims thilt
nihilism is not caused by a kind of distress 1 ike .1n
existential dread or depression, it is rooted in a p.lrticulolr
interpretation of life - -the Christian-moral one- (tiP, IJ.
His identification of nihilism with Christian morality is
central to both Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-ChC'i~t (rr,
III, 6; AC, 6). Thus, for Nietzsche, nihilism docs nOl
designate only the peculiar anxiety of the modern <I(]O, it iH
the motive force of the entire history of the WC!;t iJnd III J
other stages are a consequence of this first stuge.
(2) Incomplete Nihilism. This is tho stago in which tho
highest values themselves become devalued. It i:-; tho [or.m of
nihilism Nietzsche describes as e:<isting in the moder.n iHJO <.It
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the time of his writing. ~Incomplete nihilism; its forms: we
live in the midst of it. Attempts to escape nihilism without
ce .... illuating villues so fac: they produce the opposite, make the
problem morc acute~ (WOP, 28). The logic and history of
nihilism itself bcings this movement: since the highest values
£Ire f£llse, it is only a matter of time before they are seen as
the lies that they are (WP, 3). We become disenchanted and
lose faith in the highest values. In response to this
devaluation people attempt to revise the Christian-moral
values which are collapsing or replace them with similar
values, al'Nays unsuccessfully. Nietzsche criticizes the manner
in which Christian-moral values are continually rebuilt and
buttressed to increasingly reflect some notion of a true
Christian morality. Kant comes to mind (D, Preface, 3).
Nietzsche also criticizes State and Science as examples of
replacement values which are supposedly of this world but are
of the same order as absolute and othentorldly values. The
untenability of both these attempts leads to the feeling of
the meaninglessness of existence.
These are all cases of a passive or reactive nihilism, a
pt:lssimism of wedkness, in which we become resigned to the
meaninglessness cof existence. Simply because our values become
devalued oc the basis of our values becomes devalued, we think
thoro is no meaning at all. This false conclusion is a result
of OUI:" view that we are the measure of value, that what we
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value is inherently valuable and what we do not value i.s
indeed valueless. It is a function of tho ~Ilypcrbolic n<,ivc'to
of man·' (WP, 12). "Nihilism represents a pathologlcal
transitional stage (what is pathological is t.he trcmendouli
generalization, the inference that there if; no meaning at
all)" (WP, 13).
(3) Complete Nihilism. This is the stage of nlhiHlilll
Nietzsche heralds, ~the advent of nihilism" as complete or
consummated nihilism. He states: "Main pr.oposition. [low
complete nihilism is the necessary consequence of: the ideals
entertained hitherto·' (WP, 28). In his view, complete nihilism
pushes incomplete nihilism to its logical conclusion. In it
people become so nihilistic that they refrain [r.om import lng
any values into the world at all. 'I'his stage of nihilism il:i
similar to the end of the third psychological state outlined
earlier in which we accept that the only value this sensuous
world hali is that of its own becoming. Nietzsche writes: "'l'ho
most extreme form of nihilism would be the vie..... that cvary
belief, every considering-something-true, is necessarily false
because there simply is no true world. Thus: a perspectival
appearance whose origin lies in us (in so far i.l~ .....8
continually need a narrower, abbreviated, simplified wodd). -
That it is the measure of strElngth to what extent wn Ciln
admit to .:lurselves, without perishing, the merely iJpparcnL
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charilctcr, the necessity of lies" (WP, 15),6
Complete nihilism marks the transition from passive or
reactive nihilism to active nihilism. It does not wait for
highest values to be devalued, it s~eks them out and devalues
them itself. "Nihilism does not only contemplate the "in
vainl" nor is it the belief that everything deserves to
periah: one helps to destroy" (WP, 24). At this stage nihilism
is both negative and positive. Complete nihilism is a
pessimism of strength because it considers all values hitherto
as valueless but it is not resigned to meaninglessness, it
embraces and encourages the lack of meaning in order to
establish a now principle from which it can create altogether
new meaning. Complete nihilism is actively destructive and
creative. With respect to the revaluation of values, complete
nihilism encompasses destructive No-saying and looks towards
creative Yes-saying.
'rhus complete nihilism is integral to Nietzsche's overall
project of the overcoming of nihilism throul,jh the revaluation
of values. Complete nihilism is a counter-nihilism with
respect to the nihilism of previously established values. It
is the stage in which what is truly valuable - life, becoming,
I, Here it can be seen how art, "in which precisely the
lie is sanctified and the will to deception has a good
conscience" (GM, III, 25), is the countermovement to nihilism
because its illusory character shows the world itself to be a
realm of illusions. This role of is the focus of Chapter 5.
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this sensuous world - becomes valued again in terms a f the
will to power. It points to the need for avery person to
establish their own values which are not absolute ilnd
otherworldly values but particular values which rennet their
particular perspectives or conditions (hiP, 715).
4.3 Heidegger: The Question of overcoming Nihilism
Before the revaluation of values can be considered,
however, the questions arise most urgently as to whethor
Nietzsche successfully overcomes nihilism and whet.her his
approach even allows for the possibility of overcoming
nihilism. Nietzsche calls himself "the first perfect nihilist
of Europe" and claims that he has "lived through the whole of
nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself" (hiP,
Preface, 3). Has he lived nihilism to the end, left it behind
and outside himself? Has he overcome nihilism or is he
implicated somewhere in its logic and history? Nietzsche
suggests that we must experie."1.ce nihilism before we can
overcome it. Yet what is not clear is how thG! experience of
valuation and devaluation ca,l give us il foothold to turn the
tide towards revaluation. How does the inexorablo log i.c and
history of nihilism actually bring about the possibility of
its own overcoming? Does it not also hold out the possibility
that it could get more difficult to overcome? Nietzsche iH
aware that, as an illness, nihilism could very well kill the
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patient, in this case '...estern culture. These are the very
questions Heidegger asks and addresses: "In Nietzsche's
mctaphy::;ic:3, which for the first time experiences and thinks
nihi1.ism CIS such, is nihilism overcome or is it not?" (N:IV,
200) .
According to Heidegger, Nie"tzsche' s envisioning and
enacting of his overcoming of nihilism is still a movement of
nihilism itself. To him, Nietzsche's project of overcoming
nihilism occurs within the parameters of nihilism and is in
fact the "ultimate entanglement in nihilism" and "fulfillment
of nihilism proper" (N:rv, 203-204). He claims that
Nietzsche's focus on value and the will to power means that he
attempts to overcome nihilism as a nihilist (N:rv, 203-204).
Furthermore, in his view, Nietzsche does not experience the
genuine or authr::ntic essence of nihilism so he cannot overcome
nihili.sm. In lig~t of Heidegger's analysis and critique of
Nietzsche, we must consider Nietzsche's position with regards
to nihilism,
Yet Heidegger's analysis and critique is itself fraught
with difficulties, specifically with regards to his definition
of nihilistic metaphysics as the neglect and withdrawal of
Being and his definition of the will to power as a subjective
principle. Given his definitions, it seems as if neither he
himself nor anyone can overcome nihilism. While his insightful
analysis must nevertheless be taken seriously, his critique
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does not completely undermine or discredit Ni.etzsche's
project. Therefore, for purposes of the following discussion,
I use his analysis to help clarify Nietzsche's notion of
nihilism but I do not stand with his critique of Nietzschc's
own nihilism.
4.3.1 Metaphysics and Nihilism
Particularly in Volume IV of Nietzsche, simply titled
Nihilism, and in the essay titled «'rhe Word of Nietzsche: "God
Is Dead"" Heidegger raises the question of Nietzsche's
relation to nihilism. More precisely, in light of Heidcgger's
peculiar manner of stating philosophical problems, he
"attempts to point the way towards the place from whi.ch it may
be possible someday ask the question concerning the cssence of
nihilism. ,,7 Thus, at the outset, he implies that Nietzsche
does not pose the question of the essence of nihilism
properly. In this light he claims outright that Niet%~che hilS
a fundamental position in metaphysics such that he corresponds
to its final stage and its greatest "inessentiality" (Q'f, 53).
7 Martin Heidegger, "The word of Nietzsche: ~God i11
Dead"" in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Es:;ayfJ,
trans. William Lovitt, (New York: Harper & Row, publishers,
Inc., 1977), 53; cited hereafter as OT. This essay is Rimilar
to his analysis of Nietzsche's relation to nihilism in Volume
IV of Nietzsche, especially ~art Two. However, lIeidegger'R
manner of stating the problem here suggests that, even as ,JfI
avowed anti-essentialist, he lapses into essential i.st
language. Throughout the following discussion his appeill 1.0
essentiali:;m should be noted.
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'l'his is his way of saying that Nietzsche represents the
culmination of metaphysics defined as nihilism.
Heidegger centres his essay around the phrase "God is
dead- as spoken by the madman in The Gay Science (GS, 125).
According to him, this phrase is Nietzsche's inter~retationof
nihilism (QT, 57). This is correct only insofar as nihiliSm is
defined as the devaluation of highest values. He ou"tlines
Nietzsche's position with respect to nihilism in terms of the
countermovement to metaphysics and the opposition to
Platonism, but he also claims immediately thereafter that
Nietzsche's position with respect to nihilism involves
entanglement in metaphysics rather than an overcoming of
metaphysics. He writes:
The pronouncement "God is dead- means: The
supersensory world is without effective power. It
bestows no life. Metaphysics, i.e., for Nietzsche
Western philosophy understood as Platonism, is at
an end. Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as
the countermovement to metaphysics, and that means
for him a movement in opposition to Platonism.
Nevertheless, as a mere countermovement it
necessarily remains, as does everything "anti,"
held fast in the essence of that over against which
it moves. Nietzsche's countermovement against
metaphysics is, as the mere turning upside down of
metaphysics, an inextricable entanglement in
metaphysics, in such a way, indeed, that
metaphysics is cut off from its essence and, as
metaphysics, is never able to think its own
essence. Therefore, what actually happens in
metaphysics and as metaphysics itself remains
hidden by metaphysics and for metaphysics (QT, 61).
In Nietzsche Heidegger also writes:
Metaphysics as metaphysics is nihilism proper. The
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essence of nihilism is historically as metaphysics,
and the metaphysics of Plato is no less nihilistic
than that of Nietzsche. In the former, the essence
of nihilism is merely concealed; in the latter, it
comes completely to appearance. Nonetheless, .Lt.
never shows its true face, either on the bilsis of
or within metaphysics (N:IV, 205).
Heidegger's identification of nihilism as metaphysics and its
inevitable COllapse, specifically in terms of the
establishment of the distinction between the sensory and
supersensory worlds and the subsequent collapse of this
distinction (Le., the rise and fall of Platonism), is helpful
in clarifying Nietzsche's interpretation of nihilism. Yet
Heide']ger's indication that such a view of nihili"m renders
impossible the overcoming of nihilism because it depends on
the structures of metaphysics suggests tha t Nietzsche's
position with respect to nihilism may be unclear.
For Nietzsche and Heidegger, the historical movement of
nihilism from initial to incomplete to complete nihilism is
defined as the inauguration and end of meta.physics. Jleideggec
writes: ~The end of metaphysics discloses itsel f as the
collapse of the reign of the transcendent and the ~ ideal" that
sprang from it. But the end of metaphysics does not Olean the
cessation of history. It is the beginning of a serious concer.n
with that "event": "God is dead."~ (N:IV, 5). Both Nietzsche
and Heidegger claim that nihilism is not simply ilO
intellectual attitude towards life which we can or cannot
adopt. Nihilism is the very force of history which bc»,t's all
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of us along.
Nihilism is a historical movement, and not just any
view or doctrine advocated by someone or other.
Nihilism moves history after the manner of a
fundamental ongoing event that is scarcely
recognized in the destining of the Western peoples.
Hence nihilism is also not simply one intellectual
current that, along with others, with Christendom,
with humanism, and with the Enlightenment - also
comes to the fore within Western history. Nihilism,
thought in its essence, is, rather, the fundamental
movement of the history of the West (OT, 62).1
However, while Nietzsche and Heidegger share this fundamental
insight about nihilism and metaphysics, Nietzsche sees himself
as overcoming nihilism through the revaluation of values and
Hcidcgger sees him as still caught up in the historical
movement of nihilism because the revaluation of values is its
culmination (N:IV, 6). Indeed, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche
still thinks nihilistically and metaphysically so he can never
overcome them, only bring them to their conclusion. ·we have
said, however, that Nietzsche' 5 metaphysics is nihilism
proper. This implies not only that Nietzsche's nihilism does
not overcome nihilism but also that it can never overcome it"
(N:rv, 203). The physician is also sick with the illness so
any diagnosis he offers mistakenly increases the illness. 9
" See also "Nihilism as History" (N:IV, 52-57).
~ We could very well ask about Heidegger's own position
with respect to nihilism and metaphysics since it is not clear
where he himself stands in their historical movement. If
nihilistic metaphysics is the fundamental movement of western
philosophy, then how can he, as a western philosopher, be sure
that he has gone beyond it? Heidegger writes, perhaps
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We can better understand Heidegger' scans ideriJ tion of
Nietzsche's position within nihilism and metaphysics when we
detennine his own notion of nihilistic metaphysics. Heidegger
begins his essay concerning Nietzsc.'1.e ilnd nihilistic
metaphysics with a standard definition of. metaphysics: "In
what follows, metaphysics is thought as the truth of what is
as such in its entirety, and not as the doctrine of <lny
particular thinker" (QT, 54). Metaphysics thinks in terms of
wholes and totalities or the fundamental characteristic of
reality. The metaphysics of any particular time also defines
the characteristic of that time and offers it the opportunity
to know itself, Heidegger writes: ~The truth of being as a
whole has long been called metaphysics. Every era, e',Jery human
epoch, is sustained by some metaphysics and is placed thereby
in a definite relation to being as whole and also to itself:
(N:IV, 5) .10
However, in Heidegger's case, the definition of
metaphysics must be made even more specific. For him,
petulantly: "To think Being without beings means: to think
Being without regard to metilphysics. Yet a regard for
metaphysics still prevails even in the intention to overcome
metaphysics. Therefore, our task is to cease all overcoming,
and leave metaphysics to itself" (TB , 24). Is Heidegger
abandoning the difficult task of overcoming metaphysics? Can
he simply leave metaphysics to itself and expect to be done
with it?
10 This suggests, despite Heidegger's claim that he goes
beyond metaphysics, that he involves himself in a metaphysical
totality.
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metaphysics is thinking Being in terms of the presence of
beings (TB, 2, 24). It forgets Being itself in favour of
particular beings. He states: "Unmindful of Being and its own
truth, Western thinking has since its beginning continually
been thinking what is in being as :;: 1ch" (QT, 104). In
lIeidegger's view, metaphysics in its present form is a
misguided manner of thinking because it asks the wrong kinds
of questions. He proposes a new kind of thinking guided by new
kinds of questions. "What is? We do not ask concerning this or
that particular being, but rather we ask concerning the Being
of whatever is. More especially we are asking what is
happening to Being" (QT, 102). According to Heidegger, we must
ask ques tions in such a way as to make new problems arise or
make things appear problematic for the first time.
Heidegger suggests that by redirecting our questions
about nihilism we may recognize the genuine or authentic
essence of nihilism and we may even put ourselves in a
position from which we can overcome nihilism. He claims,
specifically with respect to nihilism, that we mistake its
appearances or consequences for its essence and thus we push
ourselves further into it (QT, 65). Echoing Nietzsche's
initial definition of nihilism as the devaluation of the
highest values, Heidegger first states: ""Nihilism" is the
increasingly dominant truth that all prior aims of being have
become superfluous" (N:IV, 5). However, he also raises the
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question of the essence of nihilism, which is also the
question of the essence of metaphysics, in thp. light of Being.
"What is happening to Being? Nothing is happening to Being"
(QT, 104).
The word ~nihilismfl indicates that nihil (Nothing)
is, and is essentially, that which it names.
Nihilism means: Nothing is befalling everything and
in every respect... Hence nihilism means that
Nothing is befalling whatever is as such, in its
entirety. But whatever is, is what it is and how it
is from out of Being. Assuming that every "is" lies
in Being, the essence of nihilism consists in the
fact that Nothing is befalling Being itself (O'l',
110-111) .
According to Heidegger, nothing happens to Being or nothing
befalls Being because we do not ask the questions that:. put:. us
into contact with Being. Metaphysics is nihilistic because
Being remains unthought in it (QT, 110). In other words,
metaphysics thinks nothing of Being, does not consider Being
worthy of thinking about. This neglect of and withdrawal frOln
Being is what Heidegger means by the genuine or authentic
essence of nihilism which is at the heart of metaphysics as
opposed to its mere appearances or consequences in various
metaphysical doctrines. The different forms of nihili.stic
metaphysics spring from its essential nihilistic neglect o(
and withdrawal from Being.
According to Heidegger, metaphysics and the overcomi.ng Df
metaphysics are inherently nihilistic because in neither case
is Being itself considered. In the first instance, metaphysi.cs
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mistaKl.'nly assumes that it thinks the Being of Being when it
only thinks about the Being of beings and so it falsely
assumes that it answers all questions about the Being of
Being. Yet any sight it lllay catch of Being is accidental and
aberrant. Metaphysics neglects and withdraws from Being and
metaphysics does not even realize that this has occurred. Such
is the genuine and authentic €ssence of nihilism in
metaphysics. In the second instance, the overcoming of
metaphysics is the silencing of any further questions about
the l3e1ngs of beings whatsoever such that questions about the
Being of Being cannot even be asked. It leaves nothing
think about Being and leaves no chance to catch sight of
Being, even by accident or aberration. The overcoming of
metaphysics is genuinely and authentically nihilistic.
4.2.2 Nietzsche and Nihilism
How does Heidegger's notion of nihilistic metaphysics
rela··e to Nietzschp. specifically? It may be obvious that
Heidegger would claim Nietzsche does not think .Being as such,
but why and how he considers this to occur may remain unclear.
lIeidegger focuses on Nietzsche' 5 notion of the will to power
as it is articulated in his work as value or "point-of-view"
and he sees this as the basis of Nietzsche's metaphysics. He
states: "The grounding principle of the metaphysics of the
will to power is a value-principle~ (OT, 86). For Heidegger,
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given that metaphysics thinks in terms of the whole ilnd
totality of beings, this metaphysics affects the notion o(
Being such that ~Being has been transformed into a value" (Q'I',
102). Nietzsche considers the revaluation of values t!Il:UlllJh
the will to power as the means to the overcoming o( n1hi 1 i !>11\.
However, Heidegger claims that the emphasis on value,
particularly in terms of the will to power, i.s actual I y .Ill
expression of the height of nihilism because it completes the
neglect of and withdrawal from Being as Being. lie writes:
If, however, value does not let Being be I\eing,
does not let it be what it is as Bei.ng itself, th..'n
this supposed overcoming is above ~ll the
consummation of nihilism. For now nihili.sm not only
does not think Being itself, but this not-thinkirHj
of being clothes itself in the illu~i.on that i L
does think Being in the most exalted mcJllncr, in
that it esteem.!" Being as "alue, so thi.lt atl
questions concerning being becomc illHJ rcmi! in
superfluous (QT, 104-105).
Similarly, in Nietzsche he writes:
Consequently, Nietzsche's metaphysLcs Ls not iln
overcoming of nihilism. It is the ultimate
entanglement in nihilism. Through value thi.nking i.n
terms of will to power, it of course continues tu
acknowledge beings as SUCh. But, by tyLng it:'iclf to
an interpretation af Being i.lS V<ll.UO i.L
simultaneously binds itsclf to the impo:-;si.bil.i.Ly 01
even casting an inqUiring glance at Bclnt] as Beincj
(N:IV, 203).
Thus, for Heidegger, Nietzsche r':'iJresonts the hei(jht of
nihilistic metaphysics because he does not only avoid cJJlking
questions about the Being of Being but he also r.ules ouL l.tw
possibility of even asking any such questions aL all.
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fillsically, Ileidegger's critique of Nietzsche is that he
thinks Being in terms of beings, specifically as values and
the will to po....er, but not Being as such, Therefore, in his
vic.... , Uietzsche follo....s an iJlready nihilistic metaphysics
further down its misdirected path to its final end. For
Ileidogger, valuative thought is the logical conclusion of
metaphysics, the essence of metaphysics. ~Valuative thought
played this part in Nietzsche's thought because Nietzsche
thought metilphysic.:Jlly, on the path of the history of
metaphysics" (N:IV, 22-23),
Nietzsche knew and experienced nihilism because he
himself thought nihilistical!y. Nietzsche's own
concept of nihilism is itself nihilistic.
consequently, in spite of all his insights, he
could not recognize the hidden essence of nihilism,
because right from the outset, solely on the basis
of valuative thought, he conceived of nihilism as
the devaluation of the uppermost values. Nietzsche
had to conceive of nihilism that way because in
remaining on the path and ....ithin the realm of
Western metaphysics, he thought it to its
conclusion (N:IV, 22).
lIeidegger's critique has serious repercussions for Nietzsche's
avowed attempt to overcome nihilism and metaphysics. To him,
Nietzsche thinks nihilistlcally and metaphysically so he can
never overcome them. Like Nietzsche, he is aware that nihilism
must be experienced if it is to be overcome. Against
Nietzsche, he claims that the consideration of nihilism only
in terms of values (valuation, devaluation and revaluation) is
not t.he experience of nihilism, at least not its genuine and
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authentic essence, so he cannot possibly overcome it:..
Heidegger refers to thi!:i raltt.:r of nihilism in terms oE noing.
But if the essence of nihilism is the tlistory in
which there is nothing to Being i ts01 f, thon
neither can the ess~nce of nihilism be experienced
and thought as long as in thinking and for thinking
there is indeed nothing to Being itself (N:IV,
203).
According to Heidegger, Nietzsche's own position within
nihilism, the neglect and withdrawal of Being, means that he
cannot experience or overcome it properly.
Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche's position in nihilism
with regards to valuative thought and will to power has yet
another dimension. For him, Nietzsche's nihilism which puts
emphasis on valuation through the will to power and ther.eby
emphasizes human subjectiVity. He claims that Nietzsche makes
"man M the standard of eXl'erience.
When he thinks the material, lifeless wo:=ld on thl:!
basis of IT,an and according to human drives, then he
is really giving a "'human" interpretation of the
living and historical world. We begin to suspect
how decisively valuative thinking, as the recleaning
of all beings according to the basic '1alue of will
to power, already has at its essential foundation
this fact, that in general the being as such is
interpreted after the fashion of human Being, <lnu
not only that the interpretation is fulfilled
"through" man (N:IV, 8S).
Heidegger demonstrates that this mode of inter.pretation hilS <1
long history in metaphysics: Protagoras says "Man is the
measure of all things" while Descartes states "I think,
therefore I am" but both take the subject as the foundation o(
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truth (N:IV, 86). Nietzsche continues and completes the
history of metaphysics by emphasizing sUbjectivity as willing.
"In the sUbjectness of the subject, will comes to appearance
as the essence of subjectness. Modern metaphysics, as the
metaphysics of subjectness, thinks the Being of that which is
in the sense of will" (QT, 88). For Heidegger, metaphysics
asks the question of Being not only in teJ:Tl1s of beings, which
is bad enough, hut particularly in terms of human beings,
which is worse still. Heidegger sees Nietzsche as the
culmination of the history of metaphysics which gives priority
to the perspective of humanity by emphasizing willing. For
him, Nietzsche's "anthropomorphism" is highest expression of
the principle of nihilistic metaphysics (N:IV, 87).
However, in Heidegger's view, the subjectivity and
willing that is the culmination of anthropomorphism or
nihilistic metaphysics is not just any subjectivity and
willing, it is specifically the will to power. Heidegger
claims that Nietzsche's anthropomorphism is of a special
quality because of its focus on the will to power. He writes:
In order to grasp Nietzsche's philosophy as
metaphysics and to circumscribe its place in the
history of metaphysics, it is not enough to explain
historiologically a few of his fundamental concepts
as being "metaphysical." We must grasp Nietzsche's
philosophy as the metaphysics of subjectivity. What
was said concerning the expression "metaphysics of
will to power" is also valid for the phrase
"metaphysics of SUbjectivity" (N:IV, 147).
Heidegger then combines these two expressions or phrases
133
concerning subjectivity and the will to power and states:
Nietzsche's metaphysics, a,ld with it the essential
ground of "classical nihilism," may now be more
clearly delineated as a metaphysics of tile absolute
sUbjectivity of will to power (N:IV, 147).
The subjectivity of will to power is the core of Nietzsche's
metaphysical anthropomorphism and classical or complete
nihilism. It is represented by the figure of the overman. 'l'ho
overman expresses itself by valuation through the will to
power. Heidegger writes: ""Overman~ is man who is man from out
of the reality determined through the will to power, and for
that reality. Man whose essence is that essence which is
willing, i.e., ready, from out of the will to power 1s
overman~ (QT, 96). Thus, for Heidegger, the overman 1:'1 the
culmination of nihilistic metaphysics.
In Heidegger's view, nihilistic metaphysics detrimentCllly
affects our relationship to the earth and to Being itself. '1'0
him, it leads to a scientific-technological attitude of the
subject's domination over the objectified earth thilt further
widens the distance between human beings and the truth of
Being. Heidegger gives an account of the relationship between
subjectivity and objectivity in nihilistic metaphysics.
All consciousness of things and of beings ilS a
whole is referred back to the self-consciousness of
the human subject as the unshakable ground of £Ill
certainty. The reality of the real is defined in
later terms as objectivity, as something that is
conceived by and for the subject thilt is thrown and
stands over and ag3.inst it. The reality of the rcal
is representedness through and for the representing
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subject (N:IV, B6).
For lIeidegger, metaphysics is inherently representational (TB,
56). He calls attention to the double operation of the
subject's representing: -It belongs to subjectness, as the
primary determination of its essence, that the representing
subject makes itself sure of itself - and that means makes
itself sure continually also of what it represents - as a
particular something" (QT, BB). However, to him, the subject's
representing of itself and its world through knowledge is a
matter of securing certainty and correctness rather than
properly situating itself in the truth of Being. He writeS:
Correctness consists now in the arranging of
everything that is to be represented, according to
the standard that is posited in the claim to
knowledge of the representing res cogitans sive
mens (thinking thing]. This claim moves toward the
secureness that consists in this, that everything
to be represented and representing itself are
driven together into the clarity and lucidity of
the mathematical idea and there assembled (P.8, 89).
He also states: "The operational and model character of
representational-calculative thinking becomes dominant" (PB,
58-59). The human subject, in order to be certain about the
world, dominates the world. For Heidegger, this marks the "end
of philosophy" or, to use terms that have been used all along,
the culmination of nihilistic metaphysics (TB, 55-56).
Philosophy is ending in the present age. It has
found its place in the sciRntific attitude of
socially i'l.ctive humanity. Bl.,t the fundamental
character::'stic of this scientific attitude is its
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cybernetic, that is, technological char<lcter ... 'I'he
end of philosophy proves to be the triumph of the
manipulable arrangement of a scientific-
technological world and of the social order proper
to thi~ world (TB, 59).
It is not the ~end~ such that philosophy is over or no longer
....hat it ....as. It is the -end" such that philosophy reaches its
final state and its real moth.-ation becomes apparent.
Heidegger recognizes the culmination of nihilistic metaphysics
in the empirical science of anthropology which makes even
humanity the object of a science (TB, 57}. Heidegger <lIsa
claims that "the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of Il
scientific-technological world" is the essence of metaphysics
(TB, 59).u
Heidegger makes his critique more specific with respect
to Nietzsche's anthropoJDOrphism or nihilistic metaphysic:;. lie
claims that with Nietzsche the world appears as an assaulted
object of technology through human willing.
Man enters into insurrection. The world changes
11 Heidegger's essay on Nietzsche's metaphysical nihilism
ilnd its detrimental effect On the relationship between
humanity and Being appears in Thp. Question concerning
Technology among others such as the title essay, "The Age of
the World Picture" ,\Od "Science and Reflection~ in which he
analyzes the shortcomings of science and technology with
respect to Being. Furthermore, in the essays "'l'he origin of
the Work of Art" and "The Thing- in Poetry, Lc3nguago, 'l'hougllt
Heidegger considers the manners in which propositional
thinking in terms of subjects and predicates and conceptui!l
thinking in terms of unities assault "the thingly element or:
things- as well as the manner in which science, in light of
the atom bomb, conceals and forgets -the thingness of a thi.ng"
(PLT, 22-26, 165-171).
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into object. In this revolutionary
objectification of everything that is, the earth,
that:. which first of all must be put at the disposal
of representing and setting forth, moves into the
midst of human positing and analyzing. The earth
itself can show i.tself only as the object of an
assault, an assault that, in human willing,
establishes itself as unconditional
objectification. Nature appears everywhere
because willed from out of the essence of Being -
as the object of technology (QT, 100).
According to Heidegger, by representing and willing the earth,
humans put themselves over and against the earth. For hint,
willing is a process of obje~tifying and subjecting, or
dominating, what is other. With respect to Nietzsche's
nihilistic metaphysics, this domination is a result of the
will to power. ~The struggle for domination over the earth is
in its historical essence already the result of the fact that
whatever is as such is appearing in the mode of will to power
without yet being recognized or without being understood at
all as that will ~ (QT, 101). Thus, for Heidegger, Nietzsche' s
will to power is the highest expression of nihilistic
metaphysics for two reasons. Firstly, it necessarily leads to
a domination of the earth which comes from and continues a
distancing from the truth of Being. Secondly, it is unable to
see itself as this domination of the earth and this distancing
from the truth of Being, so it cannot even change its course.
Heidegger claims that the of nihilistic
metilphysics can only be altered or arrested through the task
of thinking. He writes: "Perhaps there is a thinking which is
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more sober than the irresistible race of rationalization alld
the sweeping character of cybernetics. Presumably it is thi!>
sweeping quality which is extremely irrational" ('J'H, 72). In
the last line of his ess.Jy on Nietzsche':::; nihilism, written
some twenty years before his essilY on the Elnd of philosophy
and the task of thinking, he states: "Thinking begins only
when we have come to know that reason, glorif ied for
centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary of t.hought" (01',
112). using Nietzsche to surpass Nietzsche himself, lleideggct'
calls attention to the madman who still seeks God (Q1', 111-
122). He means to say that only if we still seek neing call we
can ask after it and hear its response. For this the rat.ional
and scientific thinking that demands demonstrable proof and
the domination of the earth must be replaced by a poetic and
artistic thinking that puts us in the presence of the truth of
Being. For this we need to overcome nihilistic metaphysic~l and
begin "another beginning. "ll
12 Otto Poggeler, Martin fleidegqer's Path of 1'hinking,
trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber, (Atlantic
Highlands: Humanities Press Internat.ionill, Inc., 1990), 153.
Poggeler offers a clear outline of Heidegger's critique o(
Nietzsche's nihilistic metaphysics.
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'1 _3 _3 h Response to Ileidegger
Wh ile I consider Heidegger' s analysis of nihilism to be
extremely insightful for the discussion of Nietzsche's notion
of nihilism, I want to respond to his critique of Nietzsche's
position with regard to nihilism by indicating two of its
weilkncsses. First, Heidegger' s notion of nihilistic
metaphysics as the neglect and withdrawal of Being is rather
idiosyncratic and self-serving_ Second, Heidegger's portrayal
of Nietzsche's philosophy of will to power is in some respects
a cilricature. I suggest instead that Niet:.::sche's revaluation
of values can be considered as the overcoming of nihilism
because it prepares the way for a new thinking beyond nihilism
which avoids the domination of subjectivity over the earth and
affirms an aesthetic attitude towards the tragic unity of all
existence.
For all Heidegger's contribution to contemporary
philosophy, particularly in the terms of how we now consider
the history of philosophy itself, I think he defines
nihilistic metaphysics in an idiosyncratic manner that sets up
his own project all too perfectly. He outlines an inexorable
logic and history of nihilistic metaphysics such that all
philosophers from Plato to Nietzsche are borne along its
misdirected path. He seems to save the glorious task of
overcoming nihilistic metaphysics and startint] "another
beginning~ of thinking for himself. Yet it is not clear how
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Heidegger can escape the logic and history of nihilistic
metaphysics. He himself cannot satisfy his own criteria. 1~0l:
example, in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of 'l'hinking"
he demonstrates his own unfinished struggle in ovcrcollilng
nihilistic metaphysics and thinking differently.
It may very well be that Heidegger' s project of
overcoming nihilistic metaphysics, as he defines it, is
impossible, We cannot but think metaphysically or think Being
in terms of beings. We cannot but think metaphorically or
think something which is otherwise inexpressible in terms of
its similarity to something else. To think metaphysically is
to think metaphorically. Yet this need not mean we think
nihilictically. Metaphysics and metaphors may be our only ways
of thinking about Being. We think metaphysically and
metaphorically, especially when it comes to the fundamental
characteristic of existence. For example, both in religious
ceremonies and theological reflections the expressions "God is
good~ or "God is the Light of the World" are uttered. In both
examples a metaphor is expressed that compare!; God or the
Supreme Being to something experienced on the level o[ beings,
such as goodness or light. This notion of the metaphysical-
metaphorical nature of human thinking is not so far from the
one Heidegger himself presents. He often approaches humanity
from an aesthetic perspective with the model of the wor.k of.
art. He focuses on H6lderlin's phrase ·'poetically man dWQlls~
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in order to call attention to the poetic nature of language
and lifa. ll
I agree with Heidegger that the enemy of thinking is
rigid rationalism and positivism defined as nihilism, but I
disagree with his claim that Nietzsche is such a nihilistic
enemy. In Volume IV of Nietzsche he neglects the constructive
acsthetic dimension of Nietzsche's work in order to formulate
<l criticism of Nietzsche's position in relation to nihilistic
mctaphysics, but in Volume I of Nietzsche he comes closer to
the spirit of Nietzsche's work when he considers art in terms
of the will to power and the countermovement to nihilism.
Though he ultimately criticizes Nietzsche's aesthetics as
being nihilistic, he himself suggests that Nietzsche points
the way to a new aesthetic manner of thinking which may
possibly lead to the overcoming of nihilism (N:I, 161), For
Nietzsche, art is the most familiar configuration of the will
to power and the countermovement to nihilism, especially when
it is expressed in the grand style of Dionysian tragedy (N:I,
126). Why does Heidegger abandon this important aspect of
IJ See Martin Heidegger, " ... Poetically Man Dwells ... - in
Poetry, Language, Thought. See also in the same text MWhat are
Poets For?" for his account of the role of poets in the
destitute time of nihilism as well as "Language" and -Building
Dwelling Thinking M for his reflections on the manner in which
poetry relates us to the world and Being. All these essays
give evidence of Heidegger's aesthetic attitude towards
existence.
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Nietzsche's work in his critique of nihilislll?l~
Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche is cert,d.1l1y ana
of the most authoritative and exhaustive. I!owever, with
respect to the subjectivity of will to power a"u its role in
the scientific-technological attitude, his interpretation
approaches caricature. Heidegger claims that the will is
inseparable from a willing subject, especially for Ni.atzsche.
He misses the manners in which Nietzsche differs from previous
philosophers and their notions of subjectivity because he
attempts to place Nietzsche at the end of a long line of
philosophers responsible for the fateful articulation of the
Willing subject. Nietzsche'S notion of will is not that of
subjectivity as developed by Descartes or Kilnt since he
rejects all notions of a Willing SUbject. Nietzsche i3 greatly
influenced by Schopenhauer who can be seen as developing a
notion of the will which is not subject-centereu. lie
eventually objects to what he considers Schopcnhilucr' s
resigned pessimism of the will which claims the only WiJY to
escape the suffering caused by the will is to stop willing,
though he retains Schopenhauer's sense that the primal [orce
of life in the world is will. For Nietzsche, this primi.ll force
14 Given the similarities between Niet:t,sche's ilnd
Heidegger's notions of art and their shared high regard for
it, the basis for Heidegger' s critique a E Nietzsche' li
aesthetics as nihilistic is still unclear. However, I return
to Heidegger in order to introduce Nietzsche'S notions of iJrt.
and tragedy in Chapter s.
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of life is called the will to power. It accounts for the
nature of the world as will rather than the nature of willing
subject. It is cosmological rather than subjective.
Heidegqcr sees Nietzsche's philosophy as the culmination
of nihilistic metaphysics which posits the domination of human
subjectivity over and against an objectified earth. However,
NiEltzsche's perspectivism, which is essential to his focus on
valuation through will to power, expressly rejects the notions
of subjectivity and objectivity (WP, 481). There is no
essential and unitary human ~subject· which dominates and
there is no objective or objectified earth which is dominated
because there are always only the multiple perspectival
interpretations of the will to power. Nietzsche criticizes the
"hyperbolic naivete" which leads humanity to take itself as
Lhe primary standard of value (WP, 12). By focusing on the
perspectival interpretations of will to power, Nietzsche seeks
to avoid and arrest the tendency towards subjectivity and
objectification in modern philosophy which he criticizes. His
notion ~)f the will to power helps us recognize that we have no
legitimate metaphysical foundation for imposing our values on
others or the earth as if they were absolute. l5
I) However, for Ofelia Schutte, this touches on a central
tension in Nietzsche's work: his attempt to establish an order
of rank or a standard of measure for values mitigates his
perspectivism. She also charges that he retains the structure
of eltploitation and domination, most explicitly in his
distinction of higher and lower human beings as masters and
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For Nietzsche, the will to power does nol: involve il
subject·s exploi ting others or dominating the earth. 'l'he w ~ 1.1
to power is that which wills and the incre<'ltic of power. iB what
it wills. To Nietzsche, in this sense the will to powp.r i$ the
fundamental character of growth in terms of .the pn~servatioll
and enhancement of life, which mayor may not include hUlnanity
as ite highest form. Nietzsche's rejection o[ whilt he
considers a nihilistic two-world hierarchical Ulh1lism could
lead to an ethos wherein we develop an attitude o[ stewardship
towards the earth, as when he entreats us 1:0 ., rewil in true to
the earth" (Z, Prologue, 3). It could be argued, 19nor.ing for.
the moment Nietzsche's advocacy of slavery and the order o[
rank, that the nihilistic spirit of revenge or- CU.'J!;enL i/1tenl:
against existence which Nietzsche seeks to avoid Llntl overcome
is at work in the exploitation of others or the dominiltion of
the earth. 16
slaves as well as his advocation of the right of the strong to
rule the weak, and condemns him not only for his justHici.ltion
of authoritarian political regimes but also for his nihil ism.
See Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche without MiWkli,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984),
16 The overcoming of ressentiment is discussed 1i1tO" i.n
this chapter with respect to the revaluation of value!> ilnu
again in Chapter 5 in terms of the tragic redemption of.
existence.
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4.4 'l'he Revaluation of values
Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche is not completely
countered by my brief response, but my intention is to provide
a position from which to consider the revalufltion of values as
the overcoming of nihilism. Near the end of his life,
particularly during his writing of X-",ilight of the Idols and
Tho Anti-Christ in 1888, Nietzsche begins to refer t'.) his task
as the "revaluation of values" (TI, Foreword). Thrr)ughout The
Anti-Christ he sets himself in opposition to Christianity and
Christians rather than to Christ. He defines his task
specifically in terms of the Renaissance which sought the
"revaluation of Christian values" so that opposing "noble
values· could be victorious once again (AC, 61). He also
mentions th.. manner in which the time is calculated from the
fateful first day of Christianity and he proposes instead that
time now be marked from the last day of Christianity, which he
designates as the day he finished writing his condemning book
(AC, 62). Niat~.sche names The Anti-christ as the first part of
his planned but unfinished four-part series which he titled
The Revaluatioll of Values (EH, T, 2ff).
One of the best sources for understanding Nietzsche's
notion of the revaluation of values is Ecce Homo, also written
in IBBB. He reinterprets his entire philosophical career as
the revaluation of values so that almost every book he wrote
is recast in those terms. Nietzsche writes:
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Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for
an act of supreme examination on the part of
humanity, become flesh and qenius in me. It is my
fate that I have to be the first decent human
being; that I know myself to stand in opposition to
the mendaciousness of millennia. - I was the first
to discover the truth by being the first to
experience lies as lies - smellinq them out. - My
genius is in my nostrils (ER, IV, 1).
We should also call attention to Nietzsche's sense of ·taste·
(with all its duplicitous meanings) as well as his nutrition,
diet and digestion of "maraline-free virtue" (EH, II, 1). We
must not forget Nietzsche's eyes and ears either. In 'fwiliglit
of the Idols he reters to his '''evil eye' for this world" and
his 'evil ear' which listens when the hammer blows "soulld out
idols· {TI, Foreword). 'I'hese are the kinds of metaphors
Nietzsche uses when he claims that he opposes ·the
mendaciousness of millennia - or the propensity to falsity in
the history of the West. He seeks out the false idols of
morality. Already in Human, All Too Human Nietzsche claims
that -the history of the moral sensations is the history of an
error" and that -/lorality is an official lie" (11I1, 39, 40).
His inquiry and critique of lIlorality is what he means by
discovering the truth by experiencing -lies as lies·
experiencing nihilism. Nietzsche oveJ:comcs morality
nihilism through the revaluation of values. 17
17 Nietzsche' B attack on "lies as lics" refers to hi!!
ethic of honesty and truthfulness in terms of the overcoming
of Christian morality as nihilism through the revaluation of
values.
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Nietzsche's revaluation of values is his critique of
idolatry and its effects on evaluations of life. He analyzes
humanity's need to create idols which supposedly give this
sensuous world its true value and meaning but which actually
place vDlue and meaning in an other world to the denigration
Dnd deniDl of this world. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche returns to On
the Genealogy of Morals to reinterpret Human, All Too Human in
terms of the revaluation of values which challenges humanity's
"metaphysical need" for morality (EH, H, 6). As was noted
earlier, this metaphysical need and switch of evaluations is
the basis of morality. Nietzsche destroys the dualism of "true
world" and "apparent world" and declines to erect any more
such metaphysical idols:
No new idols are erected by me; let 1:he old ones
learn what feet of clay mean. Overthrowing idols
(my word for "ideals") -that comes closer to being
part of my craft. One has deprived reality of its
value, its meaning, its truthfulness, to precisely
the extent to which one has mendaciously invented
an ideal world.
The "true world" and the "apparent world" -
that means: the mendaciously invented world and
reality.
The lie of the ideal has so far been the curse
on reality; on account of it, mankind itself has
become mendacious and false down to its most
fundamental instincts - to the point of worshipping
the opposi te values of those which alone would
guarantee its health, its future, thE! lofty right
to its future {EH, Prc£~r:p, ::!~.
Nietzsche claims that he does not seek to pro".ride new idols
through his revaluation of values. For him, idols operate on
the basis of the lie of an ideal world and the revaluation
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attempts to overcome this lie by returning the value to those
values which have been devalued by morality. They arQ not new
values as such, but values that regain their vitality and
power in our culture once morality is overcome. The values
Nietzsche proposes instead of idols are the ancient (pre-
moral) "immoral" or anti-moral values which affirm this
sensuous world.
According to Nietzsche, the revaluation of values
signals a deeper change in one's perspective and attitude to
life. This is demonstrated in Nietzsche's critique of
Christianity in The Anti-Christ. lie attempts to destroy the
nihilistic values established in our culture and re-estilblish
noble values in their place. He opposes Christianity's
ressentiment morality with his noble morality (lie, 24).
Echoing schopenhauer to some extent, Nietzsche defines life as
the will to power or "the instinct for growth" (AC, 6). In his
view, "decadence values" or nihilistic values, embodied in the
figure of the Christian God, are contrary to this instinct (or
growth and are thus a Mcontradiction of life" (AC, 18).
Nietzsche considers decadence or nihilistic Yillues as those
base values that esteem another ideal world beyond this
sensuous world with glorious words but mean "nothingness" and
are "hostile to life" (AC, 7). They come from a negation of
life in this sensuous world and encourage further Huch
negation, therefore they are an expression of we'lkness and
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decline in the will to power, a wish for what is harmful to
life (AC, 6). By way of contrast, Nietzsche considers noble
valuQs as an expression of strength and an ascending will to
power. 'rhey not only reactively preserve life, they also
actively enhance it (AC, 17). Noble values are an affirmation
of all aspects of life. 11
However, while Nietzsche' 5 critique is certainly
vitriolic, it is not supposed to be vengeful. He claims that
the decadence and nihilistic values of Christian morality come
from the instinct of revenge or ressentiment against life (AC,
24). The revaluation of values, if it is to overcome Christian
morality, must therefore avoid ressentiment through the spirit
of affirmation. The revaluation of values is opposed to
established values, but it is not so out of ressentiment,
because one of the established values it is against is
ressentiment. Indeed, one of the basic aspects of revaluation
is the overcoming of ressentiment. The revaluation of values
seeks to overcome nihilistic res sentiment and its expression
through Christian morality 1n order to lead the way to
developing affirmative modes of evaluating which can create
affirmative values.
Nietzsche clarifies this point in Ecce Homo. He
\d For Nietzsche, noble and affirmative values are tragic
Values which accept the unity of all aspects of life in te)';llS
of the will to power and the eternal recurrence, as becomes
clear later in Chapter 5.
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criticizes Christian morality's decadence and nihilistic
values as being motivated by a revenge against lifo and he
intimates the need for a revaluation of this initial
Christian-moral valuation or devaluation.
Indeed, this is my insight: the teachers, the
leaders of humanity, theologians all of them, wore
also, all of them, decadents: henee the revalufltion
of all values into hostility to life, henca
morality -
Definition of morality: Morality - t.he
idiosyncrasy of decadents, with the ulterior motive
of revenging oneself against life - successfully
(EH, IV, 7).
Christian morality is the first revaluation of values, which
means it is the devaluation of what is truly valuable - ~life"
in this sensuous world of becoming. Nietzsche's revaluation of
values, as seen by him, is the revaluation of a revaluation of
values, or the re-revaluation of values.
However, if Nietzsche's revaluation of values is to be a
true revaluation, then it must come from other motivations
.besides ressentimont or it remains under the influence oC
nihilism without overcoming it.l~ Thus, in the same sense
that one can question Heidegger's own position in nihilistic
metaphysics while he is involved in an on-going critique of
it, one can question Nietzsche's own ressentiment as he
criticizf=s it. Nietzsche imputes the spirit of revenge to
19 The question concerning Nietzsche's overcomi ng o(
nihilism arises here in terms of whether or not Nict:t.sche
overcomes ressentiment.
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those he attilcks and claims exception for himself, but could
this not be a tactic of revenge itself? Nietzsche defines
rcssentiment in a particular sense as the vengeful negation of
life through the supposition of a two-world hierarchical
dUillism which considers the world beyond more important than
this world. Defined in this manner, he avoids ressentiment
through his affirnation of life in this sensuous world.
Nonetheless, does his definition of ressentiment serve his own
needs? That is, are there aspects of ressentiment that
Nietzsche does not point out because he himself is guilty of
them? Indication that Nietzsche escapes ressentiment may come
with further consideration of the affirmative and anti-
dialectical nature of the revaluation of values to follow.
The question also arises whether ressentiment is an
essential and unavoidable aspect of Christian morality. How
does Nietzsche establish his claim in light of Christianity's
surpassing of the Old Testament ethic of prohibition ("Thou
shalt not. .. "j with the New Testament ethic of inclusion and
acceptance (~Love thy neighbor ... ")? Instead he indicates that
Christianity is based on pity which fosters the preservation
of weakness and thus runs counter to the instinct of life for
the enhancement of strength (AC, 7). However, Christianity
need not involve a vengeful negation of life. Christianity can
also be experienced as a joy in life. Thus it may be possible
to argue that Nietzsche undennines some aspects of
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Christianity such as its claim that the true world beyond this
world is more important, but not other aspects such as its
focus on love and joy. 10
Furthermore, if we consider the revaluation of values <:IS
a re-revaluation of values, are we not considering it as a
dialectic and hence in a manner that Niet~::;che intends to
avoid? In Tl.rilight of the Idols and 'I'he Will to Power he
criticizes dialectical thought for its decadence ilnd
ressentiment (TI, II, 5-7; IVP, 432-433). For him, dialectic
involves the metaphysical faith in opposite values .:md the
supposition of a totality under which all indil'idual instances
are subsumed. According to Nietzsche, the revaluation of
values is not dialectical. In Ecce Homo he writes:
For the task of a revaluation of values
capacities may have been needed than have ever
dwelt together in a single individual - above all,
even contrary cap2cities that had to be kept from
disturbing, destroying each other. An order u frank
among these capacities; distance; thp. art of
separating without setting against one ",nother; to
mix nothing, to ~reconcile" noth tng; i: t;7cmendous
variety that is nevertheless the GppOS ite of chaos
- this was the precondition, the Ion'], sncret work
and artistry of my instinct (EH, II, 9).
The main capacity Nietzsche describes here, tl'8 one that all
others circulate around, is the capacity to resist dialectics.
He wants to distinguish between different things without
10 Nietzsche's characterization of his ethic of honesty
and truthfulness also suggests that he is not completely
beyond the influence of Christian morality. See GS, 357; GM,
III, 27; EH, IV, 3, WP, 1, 3.
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cstilblishing binary oppositions. He wants to demonstrate how
things relate without proposing reconciliations which
obliterate the particularity and specificity of the things
that are related. The revaluiltion of values 1s thus meant to
be non-dialectical.
Deleuze claims that Nietzsche's philosophy is non-
dialectical. 21 This is specifically the case with the
revaluation of values. It opposes negation with affirmation.
It is not of the same spirit as ressentiment. Deleuze points
out the distincti.on between affirmation and negation in order
to indicate the distinction between revaluation and dialectic.
For the speculative element of negation, opposition
or contradiction Nietzsche substitutes the
practical element of difference, the object of
affirmation and enjoyment... Nietzsche' s ~yes" is
opposed to the "dialectical "no"; affirmation to
dialectical negation; difference to dialectical
contradiction; joy, enjoyment, to dialectical
labour; lightness, dance, to dialectical
responsibilities... "While every noble morality
develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself,
slave morality from the outset says No to what is
'outside', what is 'different', what is 'not
itself' and this No is its creative deed" (GM I 10
p. 36) . This is why Nietzsche presents the
dialectic as the speculation of the pleb, as the
way of thinking of the slave: the abstract thought
of contradiction then prevails over the concrete
feeling of positive difference, reaction over
action, revenge and ressentiment take the place of
21 Deleuze defines Nietzsche's philosophy (and his own)
as primarily anti-Hegelian (NF, 8). Deleuze's analysis of
Nietzsche's philosophy as affirmative non-dialectical is the
subject of the entire last chapter of his book, but for the
purposes of this discussion I restrict my references to his
initial focus in his first chapter.
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aggression (NF, 9-10).
The revaluation of values certainly involves the negation of
established values, but it is only the secondary result of the
primary affirmation of difference. The revaluation of values,
rather than being a negation of a negation that produces an
affirmation which will be later negated, is a matter of
affirmation itself negating negations and thereby putting an
end to all negation. The revaluation of values does not follow
the dialectical logic of negation. Deleuze writes in terms of
forces:
The negative is not present in the essence as that
from which force draws its activity: on the
contrary it is a result of activity, of the
existence of an active force and the affirmation of
its difference. The negative is a product of
existence itself: the aggression necessarily linked
to an active existence, the aggression of an
affirmation (NP, 9).
Considered as a force, the revaluation of values is not a
reaction to established values but an action against them. The
revaluation does not define itself derivatively with respect
to established values, it affirms its difference from them .nnd
aggressively confronts them on its own terms. Action .nnd
affirmation, not reaction ",nd negation, .nre primary. In
Nietzsche's revaluation of values, No-saying and destroying is
a part of the larger projp.ct of Yes-saying and creating,
emerges later .
However, Nietzsche also describes the revaluation of
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values as tho ability to "reverse perspectives" (Eff, I, 1). If
we take reversal here to mean an appeal to dialectical
thought, it appears to contradict Nietzsche's attempt to
escape dialectics, If we attend to Nietzsche's precise words,
however, the contradiction is seen as only apparent. For h.im,
perspectives are reversed. Values are not reversed in some
sort of dialectical switch, they are revalued, which is
another matter. That is, perspectives are reversed, values are
revalued. By reversing perspectives, by moving from a base
perspective to a noble perspective or from a negating to
affirming attitude to life, values can be revalued, The same
perspective or attitude that provides values to begin with
cannot be the basis of their revaluation. For example, a base
perspective condemns us to decadent and weak values while a
noble perspective enables us to create heroic and powerful
values.
Deleuze's distinction between evaluations which are more
primordial and values which are the obvious signs and symptoms
of evaluations is helpful in this matter (NP, 1-2),
Evaluations are another way of speaking about perspectives or
attitudes. Evaluations are reversed such that there is a
movement from base evaluations to noble evaluations. Values
are not reversed such that what is considered good becomes
evil and what is considered evil becomes good. The reversal of
evaluations leads to the revaluation of values: base
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evaluations must be overcome by noble evaluations first so
that the moral values of -good and evil- can be replaced with
the inunoral or anti-moral values of "good and bad" afterwards.
Nietzsche knows he cannot simply declare a new s~t of values
without some fundamental change in the mode of evaluation or
will to power from which they derive their force. Nietzsche's
entire philosophy can be seen as an attempt to reverse
nihilistic modes of evaluation or will to power so that a
revaluation of values can occur.
Deleuze also indicates that Nietzsche's philosophy is
both critical and creative. Nietzsche writcs about the
creative aspect of the revaluation of values in reference to
Daybreak:
"There are so many dawns that have not yet glowed"
- this Indian inscription marks the opening of this
book. Where does its author seek that new morning,
that as yet undiscovered tender red that marks the
beginning of another day - ah, a whole series, a
whole new world of days? In a revaluation of
values, in a liberation from all moral values, in
saying Yes to and having confidence in all that has
hitherto been forbidden, despised, and damned. 'l'his
Yes-saying book pours out its light, its love, its
tenderness upon ever so many wicked things; it
gives back to them their "soul," a good conscience,
the lofty right and privilege of ex.istence.
Morality is not attacked, it is merely no longer in
the picture (EH, 0, I).
Yet Nietzsche also writes about the critical or negative and
destructive part of the revaluation of values in reference to
Beyond Good and evil:
The task for the years that followed now w<!s
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indicated as clearly as possible. After the Yes-
saying part of my task had been solved, the turn
had come for the No-saying, No-doing part: the
revaluation of our values so far, the great war -
conjuring up a day of decision. This included the
slow search for those related to me, those who,
prompted by strength, would offer me their hands
for destroying (EH, 8, 1).
However, Nietzsche's Yes-saying is never really Msolved" or
COncluded when he begins his No-saying. After No-saying
through the critical aspect of revaluation, he again returns
to Yes-saying through the creative aspect of revaluation. In
fact, the two belong together and operate simultaneously. The
No-saying of his critique of morality and the Yes-saying of
his attempt to create new "immoral" or anti-moral values are
inseparable, they can only be separated arbitrarily and to the
detriment of understanding Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche's
No-saying and Yes-saying are interrelated, they give meaning
to each other. The notion of their interrelationship is
supported by his reference to Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z, II,
"Of Self-Overcoming") in Ecce Homo:
"And whoever wants to be a creator in good and
evil, must first be an annihilator and break
values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the
greatest goodness: but this is - being creative"
(EH, IV, 2).
Later Nietzsche states: "negating and destroying are
conditions of saying Yes" (Eff, IV, 4). The ability to say Yes
and to create carries with it the ability to say No and to
destroy, but destruction passes into creation.
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However, despite the creative aspect of the revaluation
of values, it must be remembered that Nietzsche claims he docs
not erect any further Christian-moral idols (Elf, Preface, 2J.
Rather, he intends to undermine the foundational faith in
Christian morality (D, Preface, 2) .~~ Nietzsche's revaluation
is meant to go "beyond good and evil" and other Chris\:.ian-
moral values. Through revaluation the nihilistic perspective
or evaluation of life is negated and with it the condition of
possibility for Christian-moral values. 'let the revaluation of
values is not the double negation of dialectics. Nietzsche's
negation of the negation of life, his overcoming of nihilism
and ressentiment, comes from an affirmation of life.
Ultimately, the revaluation of values seeks to return the
value of what has been devalued in Christian morality. It is
a movement from decadence and nihilistic values to noble and
affirmative values. Nietzsche does not actually create values
at all. Rather, he recalls classical Greek values that arc
considered "immoral" or anti-moral so that pre-Christian and
pre-moral values become post-Christian and post-moral values.
Thin is the role of the revaluation of values in the
overcoming of nihilism.
22 However, Nietzsche proposes an ethic of honesty and
truthfulness which is fostered by Christian morality but
becomes the foundation for its very overcoming. See GS, ]57;
GM, III, 27; EH, IV, 3; WP, 1, 3. See also Chapter 6 [or
further discussion of this theme.
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CHAPTER 5. TRAGEDY
NIE'l'ZSCHE'S AESTHETIC REVALUATION OF VALUES
5. 1 Art and t.hc Revaluation of Values
In this chapter I suggest that art, specifically tragedy,
is the vehicle of Nietzsche's revaluation of values and his
attempt to establish a realm "beyond good and evil ,. or beyond
Christian morality and its nihilistic evaluations of
existence. For Nietzsche, the will to power and the eternal
recurrence are the principles for the revaluation of values
which considers life and the world in terms of unlimited
becoming. Art is paradigmatic of the will to power and so it
plays a decisive role in the revaluation of values. In
particular, tragedy is able to express the tragic thought of
the eternal recurrence which contributes to the revaluation of
values. In this manner Nietzsche establishes an aesthetic and
anti-moral affirmation of existence.
I have already indicated the manner in which Heidegger
considers Nietzsche's phllosophy to be the consummation of
nihilism. However, Heidegger' s interpretation in Volumes I and
III of Nietzsche also can be used to consider Nietzsche's
philosophy as the overcoming of nihilism through the
revaluation of values centred on art. Heidegger criticizes as
nihilistic much of what his analysis reveals about Nietzsche's
aesthetics, but I use his analysis at cross purposes to his
criticism. In this chapter I appeal to lIeidcg9cr's
interpretation of Nietzsche in order to introduce Nietzsche' s
notion of art in general before I examine Nietzsche's early
and later r.otions of tragedy specifically. I use this indirect
approach because insightful interpreters like Heidegger, no
matter how critical they ultimately are, allow us clearer
access to Nietzsche's philosophy.
Heidegger claims that the notion of value is essential to
Nietzsche's philosophy. For NietzscJle, positing value:::; is a
matter of determining the "perspectives~ or "conditions" of
preservation and enhancement which make life possible (WP,
715; N:III, 16). In his view, "truth" is merely a valuation
such that the "truth" of anything is an expression of the
value we invest in it. Nietzsche claims that truth is the
~estimation of value" (WP, 507; N:III, 33). Nietzsche
circumvents the opposition of "real world" and "apparent
world" or truth and falsity by claiming that they arc
valuations (WP, 507; N:III, 62). He states; "Truth is the kind
of error without which a certain species of life could not
live. The value for life is ultimately decisive" (WP, 493).
Stated bluntly, truth is falsity. More precisely, .. truth~ is
an illusion necessary for life. As part of his overcoming o(
nihilism, Nietzsche rejects the opposition of truth and
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falsity in favour of value Be the primary concern of life. 1
Heidegger indicates that knowledge is a matter of
valuation for Nietzsche. He discusses Nietzsche's notion of
knowledge as the schematizing of chaos in light of our
practical needs. He refers to Nietzsche's statement in The
will to Power: "Not to "know" but to schematize - to impose
upon chaos as much regula:t:ity and form as our practical needs
require" (WP, 515; N:III, 70). The order and regularity we
give to the chaos of the world depends on what we value, our
practical needs or our perspectives and conditions of life.
This emphasizes the manner in which the estimation of value is
required for human life. We need horizons to be able to live
at all. Echoing his own phHT!.omenological and hermeneutical
thinking, Heidegger writes: "Forming horizons belongs to the
inner essence of living beings themselves. Initially, horizon
simply means setting limits to the unfolding occurrence of
life with a view to stabilizing the onrushing and 0ppressing
torrent" (N:III, 86). This notion of knowledge recalls
Nietzsche's view about the need to give ourselves and our
culture healthy boundaries, particularly as it is presented in
the Untimely Heditations when he admires the Greeks' c.;:'ility
to "organize the chaos" around them in accordance with their
1 When Deleuze claims that "Nietzsche snatches thought
from the element of truth and falsity" he has in mind
Nietzsche's focus on valuation (NP, xiii).
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real needs (UM, II, 101.~
Heidegger attempts to define Nietzsche's notion of chaos
in order to explain Nietzsche's notion of knowledge as
schematiz!ng. Reid~gger refers to chaos in terms of life as <l
body and as bodying, the principle and character of eve[:ything
that lives (N:III, 79). That is, chaos is the basis of all
that comes into and passes out of finite existence. Chaos is
"~the world" as a whole, the inexhaustible, urgent, and
unmastered abundance of self-creation and self-destruction-
(N:III, 82). Heidegger indicates that Nietzsche's notion of
chaos is not empiricist or idealist. Chaos is not just a
random field of phenomena which receives order only throllgh
our senses or mind. It may first appear to us as such but it
really has an order of its own. Heidegger writes:
We may thus gather that for Nietzsche "chaos·
speaks as a name that does not signify some
arbitrary jumble in the field of sensations,
perhaps no jumble at all. Chaos is the name for
bodying life, life as bodying writ large. Noe does
Nietzsche mean by chaos what is tangled as such in
its confusion, the unordered, arising from the
removal of all order; rather, ch<loS is what urges,
flows, and is animated, whose order is concealed,
whose law we do not descry straightaway. chaos is
the name for a peculiar preliminary projection of
the world as a whole and for the governance of that
world (N:I!I, 80).
Chaos first appears as the illusion of confusion, then as the
2 See sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 of Chapter 2 for iJ more
thorough discussion of this topic in tenns of physics and
history .
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illusion of something known or schematized, or more precisely,
as valued. However, it al....ays already has an order or la.... on
which valuations of it are based. For Nietzsche, the ....ill to
power is the law of chaos in accordance with which we must
estimate the value of chaos. Thus the will to power is both
the principle of life and the world and the principle of the
valuations (Mtruth" and Mknowledge~l of life and the world.
According to Heidegger, to refer to life and the world as
chaos is to call attention to the becoming of life and the
world. Nietzsche claims that becoming or flux rather than
being or fixity is the truth of existence, but truth in the
sense of the estimation of highest value. Truth, as an
absolute and immobile bQlief about Ufe and the world, is an
illusion because life and the world themselves are becoming or
in flux. Yet to claim that life and the world are becoming is
not to claim a truth about them. Our ~truths" about the
becoming of life and the world are always only illusions,
albeit necessary illusions, that enable us to exist (N:III,
64). Heidegger writes:
;:s it - in truth - a becoming world? Nietzsche
indeed affirms this question and says that the
',wrld is - ~in truthMI - a Mbecoming Mworld ... Yet
he not only affirms the world as a world of
Mbecon/ing,· he also knows that this affirmation, as
an inteqJretation of the world, is a valuation
(N:III, 6Sj.
'ro say that life and the world are becoming is not to make a
claim about the truth of life and the world, but to estimate
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their value from the perspective of becoming itsolf. f'or
Nietzsche, life and the world are worth more considered o1S
becoming or superabundant creation and destruction tho1n
..,,,msidered as being or stability and stasis.
Heidegger thus maintains that neither ~truth~ nor
~knowledge~ are of highest value for Nietzsche. They cannot be
the means by which we estimate the value of life and the world
as becoming. Instead, that evaluative role is given to art.
Thus the thinking that as revaluation of all values
strives for a new valuation also includes the
positing of the highest value" If truth cannot be
the highest value, that highest value must be yet
above truth, that is, in the sense of the
traditional concept of truth; it must be nearer ilnd
more in accordance with true beings, that is, with
what becomes. The highest value is art, in
contradistinction from knowledge and truth. It docs
not copy what is at hand, does not explain matters
in terms of beings at hand. But art transfigures
life, moves it into higher, as yet unlived,
possibilities (N:TrI, 81).
The chaos and becoming that is characteristic of life and the
world can only be fully experienced through art and as art:
~Thus art is creative experience of what becomes, of life
itself~ (N:TTr, 82).
Art, says Nietzsche, is worth more than truth" This
means that it comes closer to what is actual, what:.
becomes, to ·life,~ than what is true, what has
been fixed and immobilized" Art ventures and wins
chaos, the concealed, self-overflowing, unmastcred
superabundance of life (N:III, 82).
By saying "art comes closer to what is actual" lIeidcggcr is
not saying that art is a
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accurate reprC!sentat:.ion of:
reality but that art better embodies the becoming of life and
the world. Art is most like life and the world: the
overflowing and unmastered superabundance of will to power.
Art not only expresses the becoming of the will to power, it
is a partic:.ular and paradigmatic instance of the becoming of
the will to power.)
Heidegger turns to The will to Power, specifically Part
IV of Book Three = principles of a New Evaluation titled "The
Will to Power as Art" {whiCh is also the title of the volume
I of his Nietzsche}, to indicate the manner in which art is
related to the will to power and is involved in the
revaluation of values. Heidegger intends to make clear "why an
interpretation of the nucleus of will to power must begin
precisely here, .....ith art" (N:r, 67). At the beginning he
outlines, following Nietzsche, the form his reflections take:
We repeat: the being of an artist is the most
perspicuous mode of life. Life is for us the most
familiar form of Being. The innermost essence of
Being is will to power. In the being of the artist
we encounter the most perspicuous and most familiar
mode of will to power. Since it is a matter of
illuminating the Being of beings, mediation on art
has in this regard decisive priority (N:I, 70).
If we consider that the will to power is the principle of life
J In Volumes I and III of Nietzsche Heidegger displays an
unequalled sensitivity to Nietzsche's notion of art as a
configuration of the will to power. This is also shown in the
manner in which he develops his own analysis of art as
Ereignis or event in terms of happening and occurrence. See
the essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" in Poetry, Language,
Thought.
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and the world as becoming and that art is the closest
expression and experience of that principle, then we can
understand why Heidegger first considers art to be so decisive
for the revaluation of values.
Heidegger encapsulates the essence of Nietzsche's
conception of art in five statements that he derives mainly
from notes 794-797 and others in The Will to Power. For
Nietzsche, the artist gives us a privileged glimpse into the
nature of existence as will to power: ~The phenomenon "artist"
is still the most transparent: - to see through it to the
basic instincts of power, nature, etc. I" (WP, 769). ueidegger
draws out two related statements about Nietzsche's notion of
art from this note: "1. Art is the most perspicuous and
familiar configuration of will to power; 2. Art must be
grasped in terms of the artist" (N:I, 71). Yet lIeidegger
realizes that this focus on the artist as such does not
consider art as a whole, In this regard he considers another
of Nietzsche's notes: "The work of art where it appears
without an artist, e,g., as body, as organization (prussian
officer corps, Jesuit order). To what extent the artist is
only a preliminary stage. The world as a work of art that
gives birth to itself" (WP, 796). This leads Heidegger to make
his third statement, "3. According to the expanded concept of
artist, art is the basic occurrence of all beings; to the
extent that they are, beings are self-creating, cre<lted~ (N:!,
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72). 'l'hus, like Nietzsche, Heidegger expands the notion of
artist to include existence itself. For Nietzsche, existence
is both artist and art work - it is self-creating and created.
'l'hc artist is a paradigm of existence as artist and art works
serve to show the nature of the existence as art work. Art, as
Cln expression and embodiment of the will to power, reveals the
nature of existence as art and the will to power.
Heidegger refers to both The Birth of Tragedy and The
Will to Power to demonstrate that Nietzsche reserves a
privileged position for art because of its "metaphysical
activity" (N:I, 72). Yet Nietzsche's notion of the
metaphysical activity of art opposes metaphysics considered as
nihilism because the will to power which it embodies and
expresses is the principle for the revaluation of values.
Heidegger writes of art in terms of the will to power the
revaluation of values:
Art, thought in the broadest sense as the creative,
constitutes the basic character of beings.
Accordingly, art in the narrower sense is that
activity in which creation emerges for itself and
becomes most perspicuous; it is not merely one
configuration of will to power among others but the
supreme configuration. Will to power becomes
genuinely visible in terms of art and as art. But
will to power is the ground upon which all
valuation in the future is to stand. It is the
principle of the new valuation, as opposed to the
prior one which was dominated ry religion,
morality, and philosophy. If will to power
therefore finds its supreme configuration in art,
the positing of the new relation of will to power
must proceed from art. Since the new vt".luation is a
revaluation of the prior one, however, opposition
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and upheaval arise from art (N:I, 72).
The identification of art with the will to power and the
revaluation of values means that art opposes decadence and
nihilistic values. He states: "Our religion, morality, and
philosophy a.re decadence forms of man. The countermovement:
.art" (WP, 794). In this context Heidegger proposes his fourth
statement: "4. Art is the distinctive counter"movement to
nihilism" (N:r, 73). By affirming the value of this world of
appearance and illusion, art counteracts the nihilism which
denies this world any value in favour of another world of
truth. The opposition between art and nihilism is cast in
terms of the oppositions between senSuous and supersensuous,
illusion and truth, becoming and being. Heidegger writes:
Art is the will to semblance as the sensuous. But
concerning such will Nietzsche SiJYs (XIV, 369):
~The will to semblance, to illusion, to deception,
to Becoming and change is deeper, more
·metaphysical,' than the will to truth, to reality,
to Being." The true is meant here in Plato's sense,
as being in itself, the Ideas, the superscnsuous.
The will to the sensuous world and to its richness
is for Nietzsche, on the contrary, the will to ....hilt
~metaphysics" seeks. Hence the .... ill to the sensuous
is metaphysical. That metaphysical will is actual
in art (N:I, 74).
Thus, if art is considered metaphysically at all, it must be
considered as a metaphysical activity of the will to po.....er
which revaluos previous Platonic metaphysics. Rather than a
metaphysics of truth and Being which posits a supersensuo\ls
world, Nietzsche proposes a metaphysics of illusion and
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Becoming or will to power which attends only to the sensuous
world. Art is the vehicle of this metaphysics of will t.o power
ilnd the revaluation of values.
One might expect that when Nietzsche claims "art is
closer to what is actual" or "more 'metaphysical'" he means
art is more true. In a sense this is correct, but it is not so
if by truth we have in mind supersensuous or otherworldly
truth. Art is opposed to this kind of truth because it attends
to the sensuous world. Heidegger clarifies this point:
"Will to truth" here (and with Nietzsche always)
means the will to the "true world" in the sense of
Plato and Christianity, the will to supersensuous,
to being itself. The will to such "true beings" is
in truth a no-saying to our present world,
precisely the one in which art Is at home. Because
this world is the genuinely real and only true
world, Nietzsche can declare with respect to the
relation of art and truth that "art is worth more
than truth" (WM, 853, section IV). That is to say,
the sensuous stands in a higher place and is more
genuine than the supersensuous. In this regard
Nietzsche says, "We have art in order not to perish
from the truth" (WM, 822) (N:I, 74).
In this context Heide9ger's fifth statement echoes Nietzsche's
estimation of the value of art: "5. Art is worth more than the
truth" (N: I, 75). Again, for Nietzsche, It is a matter of
value rather than truth - art is not more true but more
valuable for life than morality, religion and philosophy. He
indicates that art opposes decadence and nihilistic values by
stating that art saves us from truth. Art, which remains in
this sensuous world, makes life possible for us by creating
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beautiful illusions through which we can understand th~ ni1ture
of 8l:istence as becoming or will to power. Given that life in
this sensuous world of becoming or will to power is the
principle for the revaluation of values, art is therefore
worth more than the truth.
According to Heidegger, what characterizes art in (jensrnl
characterizes "the grand style" of tragedy in particular. 'rho
grand style embodies and expresses the lawfulness of chaos and
what is eternal in ceaseless becoming. Heidegger quotes
Nietzsche's statement: "The grand style consists in contempt
for trivial and brief beauty; it is a sense for what is rare
and what lasts long (XIV, 145)" (tl:!, 125). lie also quotes
from the following passage from The Will to Power:
A sense for and delight in nuances (-the roal mark
of modernity), in that which is not general, runs
counter to the drive that delights and excels in
grasping the typical: like the Greek taste of tho
best period. There is an overpowering of the
fullness of life in it; measure becomes master; ilt
bottom there is the calm of the strong soul that
moves slowly and feels repugnance toward what iii
too lively. The general rule, the law, is /lOnourod
and emphasized: the exception, conversoly, is set
aside, the nuance obliterated {WP, 819}.
Art in the grand style expresses through particularl.-:cd
exceptions and nuances of art works the general rule or law of
existence, but in doing so art nu:"lifies the exceptions and
nuances which give the general rule or law expression. '['he
grand style expresses the essence that underlies all passing
phenomena in this sensuous world, but the essence is the
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ceaseless change of existence, unlimited becoming, or in other
words, the will to power. The grand style expresses the
unhistor.ical or suprahistorical which underlies the historical
but is nonetheless historical itself. The grand style seeks
that which is responsible for Becoming and history - the will
to power. For Nietzsche, the gener.al rule or law of existence
is will to power. Art, itself an emblematic embodiment of will
to power, expresses the will to power underlying all
existence.
IIcidegger maintains that the grand style is associated
with the classical or tragic style as opposed to the romantic
or pessimistic style.
What Nietzsche calls the grand style is most
closely approximated by the rigorous style, the
classical style: "The classical style represents
essentially such tranquillity, simplification,
abbreviation, concentration - in the classical type
the supreme feeling of power is concentrated. Slow
to r€lact: a tremendous consciousness, no feeling of
struggle" (WK, 799) (N:r, 125).
In other words, the grand style is characterized by the calm
mast,ery of chaos or becoming rather than the trembling
weakness before it. The grand style exhibits repose throughout
striving and discipline amid abundance.
J\rt in the grand style is the simple tranquillity
resulting from the protective mastery of the
supreme plenitUde of life. To it belongs the
original liberation of life, but one which is
restrained; to it belongs the most terrific
opposition, but in the unity of the simple; to it
belongs the fullness of growth, but with the long
endurance of rare things (NtI, 126).
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The grand style can maintain these tensions bec<lusc it <1r.i~es
from a feeling of power and expresses the feeling of powel'. Tn
this sense it is an expression of measure ilnd general rule, or
more precisely, the order of rank. Heid",gger writ8s:
The grand style is the highest feeling of power..
From that it is clear that if art is a
configuration of will to power, then "art" h~rc is
always grasped in its highest essential nature. '1'ho
word "art" does not designate the concept uf merc
eventuality; it is a concept of rank (N:I, 125).
The grand style affirms the will to power and by doing 50 .it.
establishes a measure or standard with which we can CVillll<Jto
particular perspectives or configurations of tho wi 11 to
power. The grand style, as an embodiment of will to powor.,
provides us with an order of rank for values. 'l'h(~ grand style
exhibits what is so decisive about art. In torms o( his own
concerns, Heidegger states: "Art is not just one flInong a
number of items, activities one engages in and enjoys now i.lnd
then; art places the whole of Dasein in decision and kCGps it
there" (N:I, 125).
Heidegger holds, with Nietzsche, that the e5tabli~hUlellt
of the decisive order of rank through the grand style bc[ Lts
art in its role as the countermovement to nihilism. lie wri.te:.;;
But art as countermovement to nihilism is to lay
the groundwork for establishment of new standards
and values; it is therefore to be rank,
distinction, and decision. If lIrt has it5 proper
essence in the grand style, this now means that
measure and law are confirmed only In th,"
subjugation and containment of chaos and the
rapturous. Such is demanded of the gr.and styl.n as
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the condition of its eMn possibility. Accordingly,
the physiology of art is the basic condition for
art·s being able to be a creative countermovement
(N:I, 126),
'l'he grand style shows that the manner in wr_ich art is a
cot:.ntermovement to nihilism is through its physiology or its
role as the "st.imulant of life" (N:I, 130), However, in
addition to art's characterlzation in terms of countermovement
und physiology, its characteristics of rapture and metaphysics
must also be acknowledged,
Where art is to be grasped in its supr!S!me form, in
terms of the grand style, we must reach back into
the most original states of embodying life, into
physiology, Art as countermovement to nihilism and
art as state of rapture, as object. of physiology
("physics ~ in the broadest sense) and as object of
metaphysics - these aspO"!cts of ar't include rather
than exclude one "nother (N:I, 116).
Even in its rapturous nature, the grand style of art is the
countermovement to the nihilism which posits another
sllpersensuous world, because its rapture is a sublime
tranqUillity amid changing phenomena which does not take us
beyond the sensuou~ world, Even in its metaphysical nature,
art remains physiological, because its metaphysics is
physiology, Art's physiology also has the quality of a
metaphysics. The physiological-metaphysical principle of art
is the will to power, Art overcomes nihilism as long as it
embodies and expresses the physiology and metaphysics of the
will to power which stimulates life. Art overcomes nihilism
bocause its physiological-metaphysical principle of the will
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to power overcomes Christian morality which negates life.
Since art embodies the physiological-metaphysi.-;:11 principle of
the will to power, it overcomes nihilistic Christian-moral
values through the revaluation of vllllues.
5.2 Tl:!\qedy in Nietzsche's Philosophy
Now that the wider context of Nietzsche's aesthetics is
established through Heidegger's intocpretation, i.lttcntion CiJn
be turned to IHetzsche's own notion of tragedy and the manner
in which it contributes to the expression and experience of
the principle for the revaluation of vaiues. So much of
Nietzsche's philosophy, especially that which concerns tho
inquiry into and critique of morality, is a preparation and
education for the rebirth of tragedy from an aesthetic and
anti-moral perspective. Therefore, it is necessary t.o outline
the manner in which tragedy is an integral part of Nietzsche' s
overcoming of nihilism and revalua'.;ion of values which results
from his prior inquiry into and critique of the origins of
morality,
Nietzsche maintains an interest in tragedy throughout hi!';
philosCtphy, even though his focus changes at different period~
of his work. In The Birth of Tragedy and the Untimcly
Meditations he initially expresses great enthusiasm for thn
rebirth of tragedy and its role in the rcvitalj zdtion and
rejuvenation of culture, The first stage of his work (l877.-
174
1£176) is the focus of section 5.3 Df this chapter. In Human,
All TDO /luman and Dilybreilk Nietzsche turns away from tragedy
and begins to attend to the inquiry into and critique of the
origins of morality because he realizes much preparatory work
must be done if there is to be a rebirth of tragedy. The
second stage of his work (1878-1882) is considered in Chapters
2-4. In 'file Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche
again returns to tragedy as an important theme in his
philosophy as it relates to notions of the will to power and
the eternul recurrence. Ecce Homo and various notes from The
will to Power demonstrate that tragedy is never far from his
conside.r::ation of the overcoHing of nihilism through the
revaluation of values. The third stage of his work (1882-1888)
is the focus of section 5.4 of this chapter.
5.3 Nietzsche'S Early Notion of Tragedy
In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche envisions tragedy in
terms of the dynamic interrelation between the Greek gods
Apollo and Dionysus. He recalls how the Greeks considered in
opposition the Apollinian drive to create plastic arts like
::;culpture and painting and the Dionysian drive associated with
nonimagistic arts like music and dance. For him, these two
divine drives and their arts are brought together j.n tragedy
(IJ~', 1). Nietzsche discusses the Apollinian and Dionysian
ilspects of tr.agedy in regards to various pairs of terms, most
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notably, dreams-intoxication and individuation-unity. III 1'110
Birth of Tragedy as well as other .....orks he uses these
distinctions to indicate tragedy's value for li[e and the
manner in which it opposes Christian morality.
5. J.1 Apollo and Dionysus
In order to understand the tension between the "poU inian
and Dionysian tendencies Nietzsche introduces the analogy of
"the separate art worlds of dreams and intoxication" (WJ', 1).
Apollo, the god of dreams, is responsible [or the pin~t.ic
arts: "The beautiful illusion of the dream worlds, in the
creation of which every man is truly an artist, is the
prerequisite of all plastic art~ (BT, 1). However, Nietzsche
goes further to say that, in so far as we are dreamers and
artists, that is to say, creators of illusory worlds, Apollo
rules over hurnan activity in general. This means that we exist
in the realm of illusions or mere appearances. Yet, even a6
dreamers and artists, we have the sensation that we are
experiencing mere appearances (BT, 1). 'rhis sensnt ion is
heightened in certain people.
Philosophical men even have a presentiment that the
reality in which we live and have our being j!; also
mere appearance, and that another, quite diff:oront
reality lies beneath it. Schopenhiluer actu'l J. 1.y
indicates as the criterion of philosophicill abi.lity
the occasional ability to view Mon ilnd things ilH
mere phantoms or dream Images. 'rhus· the
aesthetically sensitive man stands in the SiJm(:
relation to the reality of dreams a:, thn
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philosopher does to the reality of existence; he is
a close and willing observer, for these images
afford him an interpretation of life, and by
reflecting on these processes he trains himself for
life (OT, 1).
'rhus, for Nietzsche, philosophical and aesthetic training
allows us to recognize the reality of art and life as illusory
or merely apparent. Art, as with dreams, allows the sensitive
interpreter access to a further reality beyond the illusions
presented. The notion that Apollinl.<1n illusions prOVide
insight into the reality of Dionysian unity such that dreams
give way to intoxication j.j central to Nietzsche's notion of
tragedy.
In the context of the dream-intoxication distinction,
Nietzsche also discusses the opposition of Apollo and Dionysus
in terms of individuation and recognition of unity of
existence. The Apollinian is concerned with creating
individuated illusions or art works: "we might call Apollo
himself the glorious divine image of the principillJll
individuationis, through whose gestures and eyes all the joy
and wisdom of "illusion," together with its beauty, speak to
us" (BT, 1). Yet this Apollinian principle of individuation is
broken by the Dionysian aspect when the sober dreaming of
Apollo is disrupted by the intoxicating effects of Dionysus
and the illusory art works allow glimpses into the true nature
of existence as a unity.
Under the charm of the Dian} 3ian not only is the
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union between man and man reaffl~'med, but nature
which has become alienated, hostile, or subjugated,
celebrates once more he.t." reconciliation with her
lost son, man ... Now with the gospel of universal
harmony, each one feels himsel f not only lIni ted,
reconciled, and fused with his neighbour, but as
one with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn
aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters
before the mysterious primordial unity (B'l', 1).
Thus the Apollinian drive of art produces individuated <Jet
works but these allow for Dionysian glimpses into the
primordial unity of all life which challenges any attempts at
complete individuation. At the same time, the primordial unity
of all life needs to find expression in individuated art works
if we are to ever glimpse it.
This dynamic interrelationship or tension between
individuation and unity is better seen in the figure of the
artist. Compared to the Apollinian artist working alone to
create 'Narks of art outside and other to himself, the
Dionysian artist affirms a universal identity and becomes the
work of art himself. Nietzsche writes:
In song and in dance man expresses himself ilS <.I
member of a higher communitYi he hilS forgotten ho.....
to walk and speak and is on the Wily to flyi.ng into
the air, dancing ... He is no longer an artist, he
has ber.ome a work of art: in these paroxysms of
intoxication the artistic power of all nature
reveals itself to the highest gratificiltion o[ the
primordial unity (BT, 1).
Whereas the Apollinian represents the height of subjectivi.ty,
the Dionysian represents the obliteration Dnd over.coming of
subjectivity. 'l'here is no subjective "I" since it iH
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surrendered to the primordial unity of life (BT, 5). Nietzsche
explicitly distances himself from Sc.hopenhauer's use of a
subjective-objective criterion in measuring art works,
because, in his view, the subject has no primary place in the
art of tragedy (BT, 5). He states: "Insofar as the subject is
the art tst however, he has already been released from his
individual will, and has become, as it were, the medium
through which the one true existent subject celebrates his
release in appearance" (BT, 5). The dancer and the dance
cannot be isolated from each other: the dancer is created by
the dance just lIS there can be no dance without the dancer. In
this regard Nietzsche's notion of art, especially tragedy, can
be considered as the overcoming of subject-centred philosophy.
For Nietzsche, then, the driving force of tragedy is the
tension between the Apollinian tendency towards illusory and
subjective individuation and the Dionysian recognition of the
true unity which underlies all individuations. This is seen as
thQ tension between the need of music to find expression in
particular appearances and the requirement that music express
an essence beyond them. It can be identified in the united
roles of musician and lyricist and in terms of the functioning
and freezing of the will. In Nietzsche's view, to remain art,
music must appear as will without actually being will and the
lyricist must use emotive images to express the longing of
life while existing in a state of calm contemplation (BT, 6).
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~This is the phenomenon of the lyricist; as Apollinian genius
he interprets music through the image of the will, while he
himself, completely released frol1l the greed of the will, 1:'1
the pure, undimmed eye of the sun" (BT, 6). 'I'he musiciall-
lyricist is both subjective and objective in the sense that he
is both part of the strlving of life and above the striving of
life. Another wo)y of putting this is to say that,
paradoxically, tragic art expresses the striving of all life
but to do so it expresses itself in individuated beauti(ui
illusions as if it were beyond such striving. 'l'r.agedy
expresses the teeming nature of life, but each time it
expresses life in a particular art work: it stills li(e.
Tragedy, like the constancy of the sun, is thus a calm in till.! 1
face of the horror or absurdity of life.
According to Nietzsche, tragedy has a distinct value for
life. Through tragedy we can be aware of the tragic nature o(
existence but still affirm existence. Tragedy producos
beautiful illusions that allow us to glilllpse the tragic unity
of existence in such a manner that we can contemplate i.t
without being consumed by it. This is its value. Tragedy is
necessarily illusory, but this is not to say that it should be
rejected as valueless, because it is precisely its illu~or.y
character which is its value for life. Nietzsche's notion 01
art is implied in his statement; "Truth is il kind of crr.or.
without which a cartain spe~ies of life cc.uld not live. 'I'h<:
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viJIU8 [or life is ultimately decisive" (WP, 493). He writes:
Here, when the danger to his ·...ill is greatest, art
approaches a saving sorcereas, expert at healing.
She alone knows how to turn these nauseous thoughts
about the horror or absurdity of existence into
notions with which one can live: these are the
sublime as the artistic taming of the horrible, and
the comic as the artistic discharge of the nausea
of absurdity (ST, 1).
lIet"e we can begin to understand what Nietzsche means when he
claims that "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that
existence ilnd the world is eternally justified M (BT, 5).~
For Nietzsche, then, the value of tragedy is prOVided by
both at"tistic deities, each working in tension and tandem with
euch other to provide the opportunity for philosophically and
aesthetically sensitive people to glimpse the tragic unity of
existence. rle writes:
I see Apollo as the transfiguring genius of the
principium individuationis through which alone the
redemption in illusion is truly to be obtained;
while by the mystical triumphant cry of Dionysus
the spell of individuation is broken, and the way
lies open to the Mother of Being, to the innermost
heart of things (8T, 16).
However, Nietzsche claims that, while the Apollinian element
is important in enabling us to identify and sympathize with
the charactet"s, the Dionysian element is the most central and
crucial to tragedy.
• I discuss this theme in section 5.3.3 through the
consideration of tragedy as aesthetic and anti-moral and
fuz::thet" in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 through the consideration
of tragedy's opposition and overcoming of Christian morality
de fined as nihilil;m.
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In the total effect of tragedy, tho Dionysidll
predominates once again. Tragedy closes with a
sound which could never come from tho rUillln of
Apollinian art. And thus the Apollinian illusion
reveals itself as what it really is - the veiling
during the performance of the trugedy of the COed
Dionysian effect; but the latter is so powerfuL
that it ends by forcing the Apolliniafl drilma itsol(
into a sphere where it begins t:.o speuk wit.h
Dionysian wisdom and even denies itself and its
Apollinian visibility. Thus the intricate relation
of the Apollinian and the Dionysian in tri.llJody may
really be symbolized by a fraternal union of the
two deities: Dionysus speaks the language 0 (
Apollo; and Apollo, finally the language o(
Dionysus; and so the highest goal of tragedy iJnd of
all art is attained (B7', 21).
Nietzsche states: "The tragir:: myth is to be understood only m;
a symbolization of Dionysian wisdom through IIpollinian
artifices" (BT, 22). Only the Dionysian can milke sense of the
annihilation of individuality. In the strictly i\pollinia/l
realm, the annihilation of individual phenomena i5 a lWily5
terrible, but in the Dionysian realm their annihilation is
joyful because it receives its significance from the unity of
existence (BT, 16). In Apollinian art beauty covers over. the
horrors of life by glorifying ph.enomena, but in Dionysian ar.t
beauty is the expression of the change of phenomena within the
larger law and order of existence (BT, 16). 'l'hu5 Nictl':5ch<J
writes of the Dionysian element of tragedy:
Dionysian art, too, wishes to convince us of the
eternal joy of existence: only we an:: to seek thl.~;
joy not in phenomenon, but behind them. We ar.e to
recognize that all that comes into being must he
ready for a sorrowful end i we are forcod Lo look
into the terrors of the individual existonc() - yet
we are not to become rigid with fcar:
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metaphysical comfort tears us momentarily from the
bustle of changing figures, We are really for a
brief moment primordial being itself, feeling its
raging desire for existence and joy in existence;
the struggle, the pain, the destruction of
phenomena, now appear necessary to us, in view of
the excess of countless forms of existence which
force and push one another into life, in view of
the exuberant fertility of the universal will. We
are pierced by the maddening sting of these pains
just when we have become, as it were, one with the
infinite primordial joy in existence, and when we
anticipate, in Dionysian ecstasy, the
indestructibility and eternity of this joy. In
spite of fear and pity, we are the happy living
beings, not as individuals, but as the one living
being, with whose creative joy we are united (BT,
17) .
Nletzsche's analysis of tragedy focuses on joyfUlness towards
the richness of life which comes and passes away, not fear and
pity and the catharsis achieved through them,
5. J. 2 Tragedy as Anti-Moral
In Nietzsche's view, we understand nothing of tragedy if
we see it as a medium for morality which we devise for our own
human enhancement, Rather, in tragedy we must see ourselves as
art works or artistic images and projections of existence.
For to our humiliation .and exultation, one thing
above all must be clear to us, The entire comedy of
art is neither performed for our betterment or
education nor are we the true authors of this art
world. On the contrary, we may assume that we are
merely images and artistic projections for the true
author, and that we have our highest dignity in our
significance as works of art - for it is only as an
aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world
aloe eternally justified ... Thus all our knowledge
of art is basically quite illusory, because as
knowing beings we are not one and identical with
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that being which, as the sale author and spectator
of this comedy of art, prepares il perpctU<ll
entertairunent for itself. Only iiUlOfar as the
genius in the act of artistic crciltion coalesces
with this primordial artist of the world, docs he
know anything of the eternal essence of ar:-t (D'l',
5) •
As the orgiastic dance forms the dancer, we ar.e mer.cly the
products of the play of existence which does not nocessilri ly
serve our purposes. The recognition of the unity of existence
that tragedy affords us involves our awareness that we at:c
part of the unity of existence and that we do not ourselves
unify existence. Only when we recogniZE! ourselves us ar.t
works, created by existence and creating ourselves, will wc
understand the essence of art most clearly pr.eHented by
tragedy. In this respect he refers to the trilm'ifiguring
capacity of tragedy.
That life is really so tragic would least of all
explain the origin of an art form - assuming th,lt
art is not merely imitation of the reality of
nature but rather a metaphysical supplement of the
reality of nature, placed beside it for its
overcoming. The tragic myth, too, insofar all it
belongs to art at all, participates fully in this
metaphysical intention of art to transfigure. But
what does it transfigure when it present:,; th8 worlll
of appearance in the image of the suf.faring huro?
Least of all the "reality'· of thls wodd of
appearance, for it says to us: ~Look there! Look
closelyl 'I'his is your life, this is the hand on tho
clock of your existence"
(BT, 24).
For Nietzsche, the unity which tragedy allows us to glimpse.:
aids our ability to place ourselves within the artistry of
existence and give ourselves an artist.ic existence. 'l'his i.:-;
,.,
trilgic tr<.lnsfiguration.
tJictzscho emphasi,ws the aesthetic aspect of tragic
trilnsfiguration in order to distance it from Christian-moral
Lntcrpretations. He suggests that we should seek pleasure from
tr,1()0dy in the purely aesthetic realm instead of the moral
rcalm (lJ'l', 24), He repeats his claim that "existence and the
world seem justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon" (BT,
24), 'fhat is, we must e;.cpress the nature of existence in art
works and sce existence as artist and art work because only in
this sense will we consider existence to be justified or
meLln.i.ngful and valuable in its own right as creative and
created. 'I'ragedy is the basis of Nietzsche's "metaphysics of
art" (BT, 24). In this sense we can start to understand the
manner in which Nietzsche envisions art, specifically tragedy,
as the countermovement to nihilistic Christian morality and
the principle for the revaluation of values. Nietzsche
establishes an aesthetic and anti-moral perspective with
regards to existence.
5.4 Nietzsche's Later Notion of Tragedy
In following the movement from Nietzsche's early notion
and later notion of tragedy it must be remembered that between
them lies much of his philosophy on the question of ethics.
'L'hero is however, much overlap among the three stages -
trageclYlt overcoming morality, tragedY2 - in that his notion
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of tragedy in his early work ori.ents his oVllt:comil\<] of
morality and his notion of tragedy in his lilLer wOI:k i:>
prepared by the overcoming of morality. Niet<wcllo'~l notion o(
tragedy remains fairly consistent, though he Cluphi.ls i.i'.0S
certain aspects of it depending on his o'Iilll ell: tl\l~ Umn.
However, in general and especially in hi~i later work, he
considers tragedy as the opposition to <lnd tho oVCI:COlili n~J o[
Christian morality defined as nihilism. He show:> this thr.o\HJh
his sharp distinction between the figures of Dionysus ilnd the
"Crucified" Christ.
5.4.1 Dionysus vernuo the "Crucified"
While in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche cons iders trilgndy
as embodying a tension between its Apollinian cJnd DiollySjilli
elements, the Dionysian is primary nonetheless. IIc sees the
Apollinian creation of individual characters with which WQ CiJn
identify and sympathize as necessary to trilgedy, but he SUUfi
the Dionysian music which gives the tragic myth its (orco in;
the basic element of tragedy. In same of N.ietzscho's lal.er
work the focus on the tension between the l\pollinjiJlI ilnd th(~
Dionysian remains as before. In a note from Th~ Will Lo Power
reminiscent of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzschc wri,l.!.:.'s:
Apallinian-Dionysian. - '{'hero iJn)
conditions in which art appoars in lIIan 1 i.ke iJ [oce"
of nature and disposes of him whether: he ~d.ll or
no: as the compulsion to have 'Ii5ion5 and iJS iJ
compulsion to an orgiastic state. Both r;ondl.!;jnn:l
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are r~hea'["sed in ordinary life, too, but we.-Ikel"; .ill
dreams <'.lnd intoxic<'.ltion (WP, 79(1).
Here the interplay of IIpollinian <'.lnd Diony:;ian el.cment:~ 1\ot
only charact:erizes the art of tragedy but al!>o tilt..! ,ll"t: of
existence. They are the drivir.g force of nilturc. Ni(~lzseh()
also retains the definition of tragedy <:IS the COlllpctin<] dl:ivcl;
to individuation and to unity. He writes:
The word "Dionysian" means: an IItgo to unity,
a reaching out beyond personality, the everyday,
society, reality, across tho abyss of
transitoriness: a passionate-painful ovcrflowiOfJ
into darker, fuller, more floating statos; iltJ
ecstatic affirmation of the total Character o( l.i.(o
as that which remains the same, just ilS powerful,
just as blissful, through all change; t:hc gr.eill
pantheistic sharing of joy <'.lnd BartOW t.hnt
sanctifies and calls good even the most Ll!r.rible
and questionable qualities of lire; the et.er.nal
""'ill to procreation, to fruitfulnc5ti, to
recurrence; the feeling of the necessilry unity of
creation and destruction.~
The word "Apollinian" means: the tlru~ to
perfect self-sufficiency, to the I.ypi.cal.
"individual," to all that simpl..i.fi.C5,
distinguishes, makes strong, clear, unilfl1h i(Juom;,
typical: freedom under the law (h'P, l050).
However, in Nietzsche's later work generally the Apo! lon.ii.lll
begins to disappear and the range of the Dionysian inc.;rcil:HHi
to include the characteristics of both. Tragedy bccomn:; illmml1;
exclusively the domain of Dionysus. Niet-.:schc even bcqin:,; to
call himself "a disciple of the philosopher Pionysu5" (1m,
5 The identification of the Dionysian elernr.mt oC Ll:"il(jedy
with the will to life thl:"ough procreation, the (~l.erntll
recurrence and the unity of creation and destruction h(1Cl)lIIr~:;
clear later in the discussion of Thus Spoku Zarathll!1tril.
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I'r.e[i.lCC, 2; nT, AS, 4)" For these reasons the fo"llowing
discussion of Nietzsche's later notion of tragedy focuses on
Dionysus"
Nietzsche's equation of the aesthetic and the anti-moral,
his strict opposition of art and morality, which was initially
hinted at throughout The Birth of Tragedy, gains an explicit
formulation when he returns to it 14 years later to add a new
pre face to the book"
Perhaps the depth of this antimoral propensity is
best inforred from the careful and hostile silence
with which Christianity is treated throughout the
whole book - Christianity as the most prodigal
elaboration of the moral theme to which humanity
has ever been subjected. In truth, nothing could be
mora opposed to the purely aesthetic interpretation
and justification of the world which are taught in
this book than the Christian teaching, which is,
and wants to be, only moral and which relegates
art, every art, to the realm of lies; with its
absolute standards, beginning with the truthfulness
of God, it negates, jUdges, and damns art. Behind
this mode of thought and valuation, which must be
hostile to art if it is at all genuine, I never
fail to sense a hostility to life - a furious,
veng(!ful antipathy to life itself: for all of life
is based on semblance, art, deception, poi.nts of
view, and the necessity of perspectives and error
(BT, AS, 5).
In light of Nietzsche'S later work, tl'-= distance between
tragedy and Christian-moral interpretations increases even
further. 'l'h0 1\pollinian-Oionysian distinction is replaced by
the Dionysian-Christian distinction. Nietzsche pits Dionysus
ilg'linst Christ ilnd he considers this opposition as the key to
understanding his philosophy and his persona: -Have I been
lB8
understood? - Dionysus versus the Crucj[jedM U:If, IV, 9).
Nietzsche embellishes t.his opposition in 1'hc Itill to Po"",c..'l'.
Dionysus versus the MCrucified": there yOli hilvc the
antithesis. It is not a diHercnce in rel)ilrd t.o
their martyrdom - it is a diffot"cnce in tho mc"ning
of it. Life itself, its eternal fruitfulno!l~ iiml
recurrence, creates torment, destrucLion, the wi 11
to annihilation. In t.hE: other cas!:', suf[erilll) - tho
MCrucified as the innocent ono M _ countH as iln
objection to this life, ali a formula (or itl;
condemnation.- One will see thilt the problem ill
that of the meaning of suffering: whel:hf)l' ,I
Christian meaning or ,1 tragic meilning. In the
former case, it was supposed to be the path to 11
holy existence; in the latter case, bcin(j i:-l
counted as holy enough to justify cvan iJ mon~trous
amount of suffering. The tragic man il[firm:l nvcn
the harshest suffering: he is sufficiently stronlJ,
rich, and capable of deifyinlJ to do so. '['htl
Christian denies even the happiest lot on eurth: he
is sufficiently weak, poor, disinherited to suffer.
from life in whatever form he meets it. 'rho (jod on
the cross is a curse on life, <I signpost to seck
redemption frOID; DionysulJ cut to pieces i:J n
promise of life: it will be eternally cebern i1nd
return again from destruction (WP, 1052).
Nietzsche's opposition of Dionysus and Christ in lerms o[ the
two meanings of suffering makes use of the distinction between
the classical or tragic evaluation of existence ilnd t.he
romantic or pessimistic evaluation of existence wh ich hn
develops throughout his philosophy. The Christiiln-mocul
perspective is associated with romanticism while trilgcdy i:l
associated with classicism. Nietzsche's standard of eVLlluiltinfJ
art - "Is art a consequence of dissatisfaction w.illl reillity?
Or an expression of gratitude for happiness enjoyed"!" and "has
hunger or superabundance become creative hore?" (WI', 815-IH6)
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- <lr.a ti~kQn <I!:i standan]!; for evaluating one's perspective on
ox i.stcncc.
~'or: tllet~sche, the evaluation of art in terms of one's
pcr:spcctivc on existence and the evaluation of one's
perspectives on existence in terms of art becomes focused on
the question of what is considered beautiful. He considers the
viJr:ious manners in which the term "beautiful" is used in order
to detcrmlne the type of values they betray. He suggests that
difr:crcnt art works will be created and called beautiful and
hence different evaluations of existence will be expressed,
depending on whether the perspective comes from a feeling of
power or weakness.
The tragic artist. - It is a question of
strength (of an individual or a people), whether
and where the judgement "beautiful U is applied. The
feeling of plenitude, of dammed-up strength (which
permits one to meet with courage and good-humour
much that makes the weakling shudder) - the feeling
of power applies the judgement "beautiful" even to
things and conditions that the instinct for
impotence could only find hateful and "ugly." The
nos£! for whilt we could still barely deal with if it
confronted us in the flesh - as danger, problem,
tcmpta tion - this determines even our aesthetic
Yes. (~That is beautiful" is an affirmation.)
From this it appears that, broadly speaking, a
preference for questionable and terrifying things
is a symptom of strength; while a taste for the
pretty and dainty belongs to the weak and delicate.
Pleasure in tragedy characterizes strong ages and
natures: their nOll plus ultra is perhaps the divina
corronedia. It is the heroic spirits who say Yes to
themselves in tragic cruelty: they are hard enough
to experience suffering as a pleasure.
Supposing, on the other hand, that the weak
desire to enjoy an art that is not meant for them;
what would they do to make tragedy palatable for
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themselves? They would interpret their own v.llu~
feelings into it; e.g., the ~triumph of the mor"l
....orld-order~ or the doctrine of the ~worthlessn0Hs
of existence~ or the invitation to "rcsignation~ (_
or half-medicinal, half-moral discharges of a((ecls
a la Aristotle). Finally: the <Irt of tliC
terrifying, in so far as it excites the nerves, can
be esteemed by the weak and exhausted il5 il
stimulus: that, ior example, is the rCi1~on
Wagnerian art is esteemed today. It is a sign o(
one's feeling of power and well-being how (ill' Onl!
can acknowledge the t~rrifying and quc:ition<1ble
character of things; and whether one neells some
sort of ·solution" at the end.
This type of artists' pessimism is precisoly
the opposite of that religio-mocoJl pessimium that
suffers from the -corruption" of man and the riddll~
of existence - and by all means craves a solution,
or at least a hope for a solution. 'rhe suf[eri.lllJ,
desperate, self-mistrustful, in a word tho sick,
have at all times had the need of entrancing
visions to endure life (this is the origin o( thlJ
concept ~blessednessM). A related case: the ilrti.stli
of decadence, who fundamentally have a nihilistic
attitude toward life, take refuge in the beauty DC
form - in those select things in which nature hill!
become perfect, in which she is indifferently gccill
and beautiful - (- ~Love of beauty~ Coln therefore
be something other th.an the ability to !:cc the
beautiful, create the beautiful; it Coln be an
expression of the very inability to do so.)
Those imposing artists who let i1 harmony sound
forth from every conflict are those who bestow llpon
things their own power and self-redelllption~ they
express their innermost experience in the symbolislll
of every work of art they produce - their
creativity is gratitude for their existence.
The profundity of tho tragic artist liC"!s in
this, that his aesthetic instinct surveys the moC"u
remote ~onsequences, that he does not hiJ 1 t
shortsightedly at what is closest at hand, that he
affirms the large-scale economy which justifio!; th(!
terrifying, the evil, the questionablc - ilnd marl:
than merely justifies them (WP, 852).
When the term "beautiful" is used in the context o( tragedy,
it becomes a strong affirmation of the whole of exi:;tcncrl,
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l~sp(.·ciiJlly that ~hich is terrifying and questionable. However,
whon the term "bcautiful W is used solely to describe ....hat is
<Jui icate or t.he terrifying and questionable is given a lnoral
inLcrprctation which promotes the resignation from existence,
it is i.l symptom of weakness. These two uses of the aesthetic
tenn -ooautiful- are emblematic of the difference bet....een
~trong or tragic pessimism and weak or Christian-moral
pessimism. MOl:oover, aesthetics becomes the basis of the
evaluation of existence and the evalul!otion of evaluations of
existence.
Accordir.g to Nietzsche, tragedy properly comes from a
reeling of power. The tragic artist must have the strength to
ljivn all aspects of existence a unity without necessitating a
solution beyond existence itself. The justification that
tragedy offers, while it expresses the law of becoming and
change in the sensuous world (the will to power). is itself of
the sensuous world. In this sense tragedy is opposed to weak
and nihilistic Christian morality which posits an otherworldly
solution and justification beyond this sensuous world.
5.4.2 'rragedy versus Nihilism
Nietzsche considers tragedy as the overcoming of nihilism
by opposing the tragic attitude to the Christian-moral
ilttitude. As noted earlier, he defines Christian morality as
nihilism. In a later note from The Will to Power, similar to
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his view in The Birth of Tr,lgedy, he distin9tlishc~; tl'illJ~dy
from any moral interpretation in order to del\l<Jllstrate thaL Lt~
stimulation of life opposes the nihilistic dental ilnd (h.:'clillo
of life.
What is tragic? - On repeated occil!:iiom; [ havo laid
my finger on Aristotle's great misundersLand Lng ill
believing the tragic affects to be two dcprerwivc
affects, terror and pit.y. If he wel'f~ r.ight, tcagedy
would be an art dangerous to Ii (0: aile wou ld !lave
to warn against it as notorious ilnd il public
danger. Art, in other cases the great nt.tll\ulant of
life, would here, in the service o( i.l declining
movement and as it were t.he handmaid of pess LIilLslll,
become harmful to health. 'I'ragody would then
signify a process of disintegration: tim instinct
for life destroying itself through the insti.nct [or
art.. Christicmity, nihilism, 1:r.i.llJLC a(t,
physiological decadence - these would lJo hand in
halld, come into prominence CIt the same time, assi.st
one another forward - downward -'rragcdy wou ld be il
symptom of decline (hiP, 851).
In an earlier note Nietzsche also emphasizes that tragedy hilS
nothing to do with Christian-moral interpretations wh ich see
tragedy as the basis for resignation from this wodd. Ruther,
it is meant to be a st.imulant to life in thi:; world. If iJnd
when tragedy does become mist.akenly associated wi.th Christian
morality, then it must be considered as a sign o( decline ami
disintegration.
I have presented such terrible images to knowledge
that any "Epicurean delight" is out or tho
question. Only Dionysian joy is sufficient: l have
been the first to discover the tragic. 'rhe Grecb;,
thanks to their moralistic superficiality,
misunderstood it. Even resignation is not a lesson
of tragedy, but a misunderstanding of it! Yearning
for nothingness is a denial of the traglc wisdom,
it.s oppositel (WP, 1029).
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"i(.:t~:;chc 0'.1150 distances himself from Schopenhauer's
philo::;ophy of p<:'::5s1mism: "lit the same time I grasped that my
i.nsti.nct ·"cnt into the opposite direction from Schopenhauer's:
toward a justification of life, even at its most terrible,
ilJl\biguous, ilnd mendacious; for this I had the formula
~Djonysii1n" (WP, 1005).
Niet'l,sche attempts to make clear that Dionysian tragedy
<.lnd its aesthetic justification of all aspects of existence is
to be distinguished from Christian morality and its nihilistic
justific1ltion on the basis of another world. For Nietzsche,
urt is the opposite of any philosophy which posits
supersensuous values: ~In the main, I agree more with the
artists than with any philosopher hitherto: they have not lost
the scent of life, they have loved the things of "this world"
- they have loved their senses" (WP, 820). Against the claim
that there is a real world and an apparent world, which is
central to Christian morality, Nietzsche claims that the
apparent world is the real world such that there is only this
sensuous world of illusions. Yet, rather than judge this world
false from the !3tandpoint of the truth of another world, as
Christian morality does, Nietzsche claims that illusions are
the very condition of possibility for life. In this manner he
oppo::Jes nihilism which brings about resignation from this
semmous wl""rld and leaves us with nothing. To Nietzsche, art
is the countermovement to nihilism because it remains focused
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on this sensuous world of illusions.
With respect to art, Nietzsche (ocuses on the v,llut) <)[
illusions in a particular mimlleL". In a nota [rolll 'I'hlJ wi 11 1.0
Power, considered as an early draft for the Pt:c(acc to I-ho now
edition of The Birtll of Tragedy (WP, 8S3ff), ho writll<j:
The conception of the work thilt one cncountlll:l;
in the background of this book is sInguli:lrly gloollly
and unpleasant: no type of pessimi.sm known hi theeto
seems to have attained to thi!, dcgI:oC of
malevolence. The antithesis of a ['cal and an
apparent world is lacking here: there is Only one
world, and this is false, cruel, contradjctoL-Y,
seductive, without meaning A world thus
constituted is the real world, We hi:lve need of liell
in order to live - That lies arc necessary in order
to live is itself part of the terrifying <lnd
questionable character of existQnce.
Metaphysics, morality, religion, science - In
this book these things merit consideration only ilS
various forms of lies: with their help one can have
faith in life, "Life ought to inspire confidence":
the task thus imposed is tremendous. 'ro 501ve Lt,
man must be il liar by nature, he must be above all
an artist. And he is one: metiJphysics, raligi.on,
morality, science - all of them only product!'i of
his will to art, to lie, to flight from "truth," to
negation of ntruth." 'rhis ability itself, thanks to
which he violates reality by means of lies, th1:;
artistic ability of man par excellence - he has in
common with everything that is. He himself is after.
all a piece of reality, truth, nature: how should
he not also be a piece of genius in ly ing I
That the character of existQnce i.s to be
misunderstood -profoundest and supremc l:iC!creL
motive behind all that is virtue, science, piet.y,
artistry. Never to see many things, to sue many
things falsely, to imagine milny things: oh how
shrewd one still is in circumstances in which onc
is furthest from thinking oneself shrowdl {.ovo,
enthusiasm, "God" - So many subtleties of ultimaLu
self-deception, so many seductions to lifo, so much
faith in life I In those moments in which man war;
deceived, in which he duped himself, in which hf)
believes in life: oh how enraptured he h:0.1:;! What
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delight! I'lhat a feeling of power! How much artists'
L.riumph in the feeling of power! - Man has once
ilgain become master of "material" - master of
truth! - And whenever man rejoices, he is always
the same in his rejoicing: he rejoices as an
artist, on joys himself as power, he enjoys the lie
as his form of power (WP, 853, I).
Art i*, opposed to metaphysics, morality, religion and science.
l-l.orc procisely, art subsumes all of them under itself as so
many aspects of thl'! artistry (deception and illusion) of
(!xistencc. All human activity is art considered as the will to
deception and illusion which makes human life possible.
Exbtence i.tself is art in this sense. For Nietz.sche, the
c lulm that the will to deception and illusion underlies
existence is not nihilistic. Rather, the supposition of
anotlH!r true world is nihilistic. Art as the creation of lies
in the realm of illusions overcomes nihili.sm as the misguided
5carch for absolute truth. Referring to The Birth of Tragedy,
Nietzsche writes:
One will see that in this book pessimism, or to
speak more clearly, nihilism, counts as Ktruth."
Out truth does not count as the supreme value, even
less as the supreme power. The will to appearance,
to illusion, to deception, to becoming and change
(to objectified deception) here counts as more
pl:ofound, primeval, "metaphysical" than the will to
truth, to reality, to mere appearance: - the last
is itself merely a form of the will to illusion
(WP, 853, III).
ParadOXically, truth is lie and lie is truth. More precisely,
lies drc more valuable than truth. For Nietzsche, art is a
matter: of creating lies that are more \'aluable than what is
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thought to be true (mctaphysic~, llIo1'ality, J"~l lIJiOIl dlld
science). Yet, il lie can be mOLo or less v.:l1\l<l~~le, dep~ndill'J
on whether it stimulates lifo O~· negatu~; I j re, Ni.ltZGdll)
states: "Ultimately the point is to whilt end .-: liu i~\ Lold"
lAC, 56). He does not consider the deceptive 'lilt.! i 11Ill;0l:Y
character of existence ilnd human ilctivity ilS ~(Jll\cl.hin<J to bu
lamented or counteracted, He delights in l:hl.! "<ll'ti~;ti.c" ndLnl'l!
of life as the overcoming of nihilism. He claims Lhat art: ..w
the will to illusion 0PPOS0S nih.ilism il~ the will to I. r.l1 til ,
Referring to The Birth of Tragedy ilgain, he stales: ~tn LhiH
way the book is even anti-pessimistic: that is, i.1I Lho SmUll)
that it teaches something thilt is stronger than pu~;si.lllimll,
"more divine" than truth: art ... art is worth morc Lh<.lll l.rlll.h"
(WP, 853, IV).
The emphasis on the value of illusions WLLh ["'):;Pf~CI. 1.0
art's overcoming of nihilism calls up ~lmLlilrltjf):; <Iud
differences between Nietzsche and Schiller. 80th shan) UH~
characterization of art as a "beautiful illusion" (!lc/lijntlr
Schein). In On the Aesthetic Education of Milll SchLJ l(~[" r.:laims
that illusions are necessary for existence in thaL Lllf':y (uHl:l)r
the growth of ordered minds and a better sensl.: o( [flat iLy.'·
G Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby ion Frifldrir.:h
Schiller, On the Aesthetic E:ducation of Man, cd. and tram;.
Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. WillOlJghby, (Oxforu) Ox[or,rl
University Fress, 1885), xiii; cited hereil[Lur ilH /II,;. Al I
references are from wilkinson's Dnd Willoughby's or.t:nnsiv(~
introductory commentary.
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lIiet;:~H:hf! '....CJuld agree with this, given his vie'.... that illusions
f1r.f~ l:hc conditions for life and provide us with glimpses into
thn nclture of re<llity. However, Schiller claimG that illusions
arc noccssar'.1 [or existence because they offer consolation,
ccfuJshment and an excuse for living amid suffering (AE,
xiii). lIere Nietzsche disagrees because, for him, the
illusions of tragedy offer only the justification of
suffering, which is not the same as consolation, refreshment
'fragic justification never erases or escapes
:iu[fering. Schiller also claims, due to the gratuitC'us play of
art in which illusions are open to use and abuse as well as
honc:;ty ilnd dishonesty, that Kant':; separation of art and
nlorillity must be maintained (AE, cxviii), Nietzsche's own
opposition between art and morality signals his agreement.
However, Schiller claims that aesthetic education is
indispensable to but not a substitute for morality, thereby
guggesting that art serves morality (AE, cxviii). Nietzsche
disagrees with this, claiming that art not only opposes but
also overcomes morality and indicatil1g that the beautiful
illusions of art cannot be the basi 5 for morality. For
example, he writes in Twilight of the Idols:
L'art pour L'art {Art for art's sake]. _ The
struggle against purpose in art is always a
struggle against the moralizing tendency in art,
against the subordination of art to morality. L'art
pour 1 'art means: 'the devil take moralityl' {TI,
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IX, 2-1).7
In this regard Nietzsche cons idees Schille1-' LIS <l m<)c;ll il;l .lllli
calls him "t.he Morill-'l'rumpetE:c o[ ::Oi.icking<~n ('l'l, IX, 1).
Nietzsche's similarity ilnd dif[L'rnnc(' til :->dd 11<'1" h,'lp~; to
clarify the manner in which he values illusi.ons ilnd .IPP,·ill). Lt>
them in order to overcome Christian morillity del int~d ,ll;
nihilism. "
Tragedy overcomes Christian lIlocality, but it do~:. 'Hl not
with dour seriousness but with iJ sense of deep jOY[lll11llSl; ,Hid
even laughter. In the first section of 'I'lltl G,1y ~(.'i(!/lf:('
Nietzsche indicates that trilgedy shows us that 1,i. f<l i:. wOI"tll
living in spite of and oven because of it:. torri-hln .. nd
que8tionable character (GS, 1). lie cl<.lims Lhill. tho uro,J1.
tragedians must be overwhelmed by "tlla waves of Ilni.lCCollntilhl"
laughter" and through their tragedies reveal tho Gamic tlill.un:
of existence 50 that it never makes us <.lespondont oc cf!siuned
(GS, 1), Tragedy becomes associated with laughter and thCl IJilY
7 However, Nietzsche continues in this pils:-ii.lIJe t.o
indicate that the attempt to free art from moralLty i~ Ll:sI~11
"moral" (in his wider sense). He does not want to t.>voLd iii I
purpose in art, but he is concerned with cJetcrmini.ng iL:.
proper purpose, He still wants to use tcagic <JeL as L111:
stimulus to life (TI, IX, 24). I return to this I.hf!lll" in
Chapter 6,
a Nietzsche' 5 aesthetic ethic of honesty <.lOr! tr:uth fu Inr,:;:;
suggests that he does not completely separ<Jte ar.t iJlld rnflrill il.y
and that he appeals to art for "moral" rCiJ:;olls. 'J'ld:-i Cil i ::r,::
questions about his overcoming of Christ;iiln /IIuraljl.y.
discuss these issues further in Chilptc,: 6.
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scium:o as tho necessities for the preservation of human life
(GS, 1). As an aspect of the gay science, tragedy also opposes
Christ.ian morality. Nietzsche suggests that only after joyful
frivolity and playful innocence towards existence counters the
doadly spir.it of gravity which posits weighty ideals can the
great seriousness begin which is associated with the beginning
o[ tho tragic age (GS, 382).
:1.4.3 'l'ragcdy and Eternal Recurrence
The most significant aspect of Nietzsche·s later notion
o[ tragedy, and what most distinguishes it from his early
notion, is the manner in which it is considered in terms of
the eternal recurrence. The orgiastic Dionysian element of
tragedy is associated with eternal recurrence: "Eternal life,
tho eternal recurrence of life; the future promised in the
past; the triumphant Yes to life beyond death and change; true
life as collective continuation of through procreation,
through the mysteries of sexuality" (TI, X, 4). In The Birth
of 1'ragedy Nietzsche already outlines the relationship between
Dionysus and sexuality, but in Twilight of the Idols he casts
the relationship in the context of the eternal recurrence.
}o'or the eternal joy in creating to exist, for the
will to life eternally to affirm itself, the
'torment of childbirth' must also exist
eternally ... All this is contained in the word
Dionysus: I know of no other exalted symbolism than
this Greek symbolism, the symbolism of the
Dionysian. The profoundest instinct of life, the
200
instinct for the future of IUe, (0[' the eternity
of life, ";'s in this \o,'ord expel'ienced rctigiou~;ly -
the actual road to life, prucreation, iJ:> tho sacred
road ... It was only Christianity, with t"O!;'<JClltim<2nt
against life in its foundations, which made of
sexuality something impure: it threw filth or. the
bGginning, on the prerequisite of our life ('J'I, x,
4).
According to Nietzsche, if the will to life is to ~xiut
eternally, then both the suffering and joyfuL creatLon of
childbirth must exist eternally. The wLll to lifo <15 the
affirmation of suffering and joy is explicLt in childbLrth. [f
we are to affirm the will to life, we must affirm suffering i.IS
well as joy, As the eternal affirmation of t.he will to liCe
through procreation, human sexuality is the eter.nal
affirmation of suffering and joy. Similarly, tragedy (llso
affirms suffering and joy. The tragic vision allows us to sec
suffering not as thE! prevention of joy but as the precondi.tion
of joy. The will to life, con:>idered as the affirmation o(
suffering and joy, is strongest when it is affirmed with il
view to eternity. Tragedy affirms the eternal r~currcnCQ of
the will to life in suffering and joy.
In Thus spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche's fir.st sustai.ned
presentation of the eternal recurrence, he e.lilbo("at"Js tho
eternal interrelationship of joy and suffering in tor.ms of
creation, also with reference to childbirth.
Creation - that is the great redemption fr.oln
suffering, and life's easement. But thill the
crealor may exist, that itself requires suffering
and much transformation.
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Yes, there must be much bitter dying in your
life, you creators I Thus yeu are advocates and
justifiers of all transitoriness.
For the creator himself to be the child new-
born he must also be willing to be the mother and
endure the mother's pain (Z, II, "On the Blissful
Islands") .
Nietzsche claims there is a cycle of joy and suffering through
creation. Joyful creation redeems suffering, but joyful
creation requires suffering. Creation justifies the suffering
associated with the transformation and transitoriness of
change, it places them in the larger order of existence. In
other words, creation necessarily involves destruction which
is always only the precondition and promise of more creation.
Nietzsche sUites: ~negating and destroying are conditions of
saying Yes" (EH, IV, 4). However, we must never remain with
negation and destruction, we must pass into affirmation and
creation; No must become Yes (riP, 1041). The cycle of creation
and destruction, perpetual becoming, is the eternal
Nietzsche's characterization of the eternal
interrelationship between creation and destruction as eternal
recurrence is centred on values. As he enacts it in his own
philosophy through the revaluation of values, he claims that
old values mllst be destroyed before new values can be created
And he who has to be a creator in good and
evil, truly, hilS first to be a destroyer and break
v,llues.
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Thus the greatest evil lies with the Cjrcalel;t.
good: this however, is the crcl.Jtivc good (X, II, Or
Self-Overcoming") ,
Again, creation is primordial - destruction serves creation,
destruction is part of creation. l\ccording to NLC'l;:r.~chn,
evaluation or creation of values is the basis of humall natll!:e
and activity as well as existence,
Man first implanted values into thing5 to
maintain himself - he created tho meaning of
things, a hwnan mo. '1ningt Therefore ho cillis
himself: 'Man', that is: the evaluator.
Evaluation is creation: hear it, you creative
men! valuating is itself the value and jewel of all
valued things,
Only through evaluation is there value: clnd
without evaluation the nut of existence would be
hollow. Hear it, you creative men! (Z, 1, "Of the
Thousand and One Goals·).
The interrelationship betwe'3n the creation and destruction of
values is characteristic of life itself: "And life il~elf told
me this secret: '''Behold,' it said, 'r am that which lJIu:.t
overcome itself again and again.,,'" ( Z, r I, "Of Sol f-
Overcoming"), Nietzsche considers lifo's eternal cruiltion iJnu
destruction of itself, its eternal sel f-overcoming, in tecmH
of the will to power or becoming (Z, II, "Of Self-
Overcoming"). The eternal recurrence of the will to power
means that there is an eternal will to evaluation and tho
creation of values or the eternal will to life. 'l'he otornal
recurrence of the will to power is the nature of existence a:i
unlimited becoming.
Heidegger indicates that in The will to Powoc Niot~:;chn
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distinguishes his notion of the eternal recurrence from the
notion of the "eternally unchanging" characteristic of Spinoza
or Descartes (N:lI, 59). For Nietzsche, on the other hand,
transitory lind momentary change is eternal. The coiling
serpent, the living ring of life, expresses the unity of
eternity and the "Moment" (N:II, 59). The eternal recurrence
gives a unity, though not a goal or purpose, to unlimited
becoming. Eternal recurrence is the necessity, though not the
order, of becoming. The necessity of becoming, that things
ncccssar ily cternillly become, is a hard thought to bear and
makes eternal recurrence the most tragic thought (N:lI, 96).
For Nietzsche, the eternal recurrence is the being of
becoming. lie states:
To impose upon becoming the character of being -
that is the supreme will to power... That
everything recurs is the closest approximation of a
world of becoming to a world of being: - high point
of the meditation (WP, 617).
Nietzsche provides a manner of thinking such that being is
becoming and becoming is being. In other words, he attempts to
describe life as eternal self-unfolding and self-overcoming.
As such, his is not a metaphysical description in the sense of
describing the fixed and inunutable essence of existence
because the essence of existence is nothing but transitory and
nlomentary change, but his is a metaphysical description 1n the
sense that it accounts for the whole of existence as the will
to power through the notion of the eternal recurrence. For
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Nietzsche, the being of becoming as will to power can only bc
thought through reference to the eternal recurrence. N.i.et~schc
can be considered a metaphysical philosopher in this
particular sense,
Tragedy is the best mode of expression oC the etcr.nal
recurrence, Heidegger points out that the introduct ion oC
Zarathustra and the thought of the eternal recur! cnce in '1'/m!;
Spoke Zarathustra is preceded by the phrase "illcipit
tragoedia" [the tragedy begins 1 at the end of Book Four in 'i'hl)
Gay Science (N:II, 28), He claims that "the tCilg.ic .:Jgc"
commences with Zarathustra, the teacher of the etcrna 1
recurrence (N:Ir, 51). The eternal recurrence is essential to
tragedy. The eternal recurrence is the most tragic thought:
because it is the most burdensome thought of contradiction ilnd
uncertainty (N:II, 30). In The Gay Science Nietzscho's
announcement of the beginning of Zarathustra' 5 tragedy <lnd the
commencement of the tragic age comes immediately after hi:;
first mention of "the greatest weight" oE thli! l.'tcr.nal
recurrence (GS, 341, ]42).
In Thus spoke Zarathustra, which is itselE i1 su~t1}i.ned
tragedy, there is the suggestion that only tragedy with it1i
songs and dances inspired by the Dionysian spirit of musi.c can
joyfully affirm the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche considcr5
the art of tragedy to be the creation of beautiful illusion:,;
which nonetheless enable us to glimpse tho tGrrifyi.ng and
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quo::;tlonable nature of existence. Similarly, Zarathustra warns
the animals '...ith whom he converses that music and lyric poetry
arc fooleries and falsehoods which dance over all things, but
nonetheless he believes only those who can dance, As tragedy
joylully confronts the questionable and terrible nature of
cxistencc, Zarathustra is aware that a serious matter such as
the eternal recurrence must be presented in a light-hearted
manner, so he allows the animals with whom he converses to
address h i.ln.
'0 Zarathu:>tra,' said the animals then, 'all
things themselves dance for such as think as we:
they come and offer their hand and lal..lgh and flee -
and return.
'Everything goes, everything returns; the
wheel of existence rolls for ever. Everything dies,
everything blossoms anew; the year of existence
runs on for ever.
'Everything breaks, everything is joined anew;
the same house of existence builds itself for ever.
Everything 1eparts, everything meets again; the
ring of existence is true to itself for ever' (Z,
III, "The Convalescent"),
'l'he animals give voice to Zarathustra's own thought of the
eternal recurrence which he cannot yet bear. Yet Zarathustra
later comes to joyfully affirm the unbearable thought of the
eternal recurrence. The penultimate section titled "The
Intoxicated Song" recalls the Dionysian element of tragedy and
calls forth the joyful affirmation of the worthiness of living
eteL"nally. There Zarathustra tells the Higher Men how he will
meet death when it comes: ~Was that - life?" I will say to
death. "Very weIll Once morel" (Z, IV, "The Intoxicated
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Song") .
Did you ever say Yes to one joy? 0 my f t: iendl:i,
then you said Yes to all woa as well. All things
are chained and entwined together, all things ilt:C
in love;
if evst: you wanted one moment twice, if evct:
you said: 'You please me, happiness, instant,
moment!' then you wanted everything to returnl
you wanted everything anew, everything
eternal, everything chained, entwined together,
everything in love, 0 that is how you loved the
world,
you everlasting men, loved it etorna Lly <.lnll
for all time: and you even said to woe: 'Go, but
returnl' For all joy wants - eternityl (Z, IV, "'I'he
Intoxicated Song-).
For Nietzsche, the eternal recurrence means that everything -
joy and suffering _ recurs eternally. The fullest joyfulness
in existence wills the eternity of joy, even when it i~
accompanied, as it must be, hy the eternity of suCfor.ing. if
eternal joy is to justify eternal suffering, if eternal joy 1:;
to make eternal suffering worthy of living through, then joy
must be deeper than suffering. Such eternal and deep joy is
tragic. Only the disciple of Dionysus can joyfully ilnirrn th~
eternal recurrence.
In The will to Power Nietzsche associates the Diony~.li.ln
affirmation of all existence with the affirmation of the
eternal recurrence in the context at the overcoming nihil i~m.
He writes:
My new path to a "Yes". - Philosophy, c1B I hElve
hitherto understood and lived it, is il voluntary
quest for even the most detested and noLoriou5
sides of existence.. How much truth Ciln i.l spiriL
endure, how much truth does a spiei:: rJiJCC? - thiH
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beciJm~ for me the real standard of value. Error is
cowardice - every achievement of knowledge is a
consequence of courage, of severity toward oneself,
of cleanliness toward oneself Such an
experimental philosophy as I live anticipates
experimentally even the possibilities of the most
fundamental nihilism; but this does not mean that
it must halt at a negation, a No, a will to
negation. It wants rather to cross over to the
opposite of this - to a Dionysian affirmation of
the world as it is, without subtraction, exception,
or selection - it wants the eternal circulation: -
the same things, the SdII\e logic and illogic of
entanglements. The highest state a philosopher can
attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationsh:i.p to
existence - my formula for this is amer fati [love
of fate] (WP, 1041).
F'er Nietzsche, truth is directly linked to the questionable
and terrifying aspects of life, in this case particularly with
the "eternal circulation H of what is the same. His question
about ho..... much truth one can endure is specifically about how
one can endure the eternal recurrence. His answer indicates
that only the Dionysian affirmation of the tragic character of
existence - amor fati - can endure the eternal recurrence.
Nietzsche's concern with enduring the eternal recurrence is a
mutter of what he considers to be the necessary preconditions
for affirming it. He states: "To endure the idea of the
recurrence one needs: freedom from morality" (WP, 1060). In
this sense the overcoming of Christian morality is the
preparation for the birth of tragedy which is necessary to
affirm the eternal recurrence. Christian morality makes the
eternal recurrence unbearable because it imports a nihilistic
interpretdtion into it - the eternal recurrence as punishment.
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The abolition of Christian mortllity and the subSCqu01\t
establishment of tragedy are required if ....e are to affirm t!lu
eternal recurrence beyond nihilism. The ilcsthctic and tlntt-
moral perspective of tragedy provides th0 necessary
preconditions for the joyful affirmation of tho ct8rflill
Heidegger maintains Nietzsche's distinction botwc,m the
aesthetic and anti-moral essence of tragedy and the 8rrOneOtlH
moral interpretations of tragedy. Quoting Nietzsche, h@
writes:
The tragic has absolutely no original roliltion to
the moral. "Whoever enjoys tragedy mordlly stUl
has a few rungs to climb (XII, 177; from 1801-82).
The tragic belongs to the "aesthetic~ dorouin. '1'0
clarify this we would have to provide an account of
Nietzsche's conception of art. Art is "the
metaphysical activity" of "life"; it defines tll0
....ay in which beings as a whole are, insofar as they
are. The supreme art is the trag tC, hence the
tragic is proper to the metaphysical essence of
things (N:II, 29).
However, Heidegger also holds that any attempt to distlngu.isll
the ~scientific and "metaphysical' from the "ethical." and
"existentiell" aspects of the thought of the eternal
recurrence, the most tragic thought, is doomed to result in iI
one-sided interpretation (N: II, 167). Therefore, despite
Nietzsche's disclaimer, we must attend to the ethical tone of
his tragic thought. We are called to consider our reaction to
this unbearable thought, to consider whether ilnd how we can
endure it, to consider the perspective form which WQ Ciln
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affirm it joyfully. Nietzsche's thought of the eternal
recurrence has a "scientific" (though not positivistic and
objectivistic) and "metaphysical" dimension in that it
attempts to account for the nature of existence as a whole.
This dimension is addressed by the conjunction of the eternal
recurrence and the will to power which posits the being of
becoming. Nietzsche' s thought of the eternal recurrence also
has ·ethical" (though not Christian-moral) and
"existentiell" dimension in that it effects a change in the
way we value existence and live existence. This dimension is
evidenced in the manner in which the conjunction of the
eternal recurrence and the will to power calls for the
revaluation of values.'
Despite Nietzsche's disclaimer that tragedy opposes
Christian mo,rality, he nonetheless maintains that the
Dionysian affirmation of the unity of the eternal recurrence
is accompanied by redemption, a rather Christian-moral notion.
Yet he attempts to define tragic redemption in
contradistinction to Christian morality. For example, the
grand style of tragedy redeems all exceptions through c.
gem'!ral rule and its beautiful forms make it possible to bear
the sight of the terrifying and questionable nature of
, I consider the Christian-moral dimension of Nietzsche's
notion of tragedy, especially as it relatas to the eternal
recurrence, more thoroughly in Chapter 6.
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existence. Zarathustra also refers to the poctic activity of
composing the fragments of humanity together which makes
possible human ~ife and redeems it In the race or ter.rifyinl)
and questionable existence. This activity presupposes the
eternal recurrence.
And it is all my art and ailD, to compose j nto
one and bring together what is fragment and riddle
and dreadful chance.
And how coulrl I endure to be il lIan, if man
were not also poet and reader of riddlcs and
redeemer of chance I
To redef"m the past and to transform every' tt
was' int.o an 'I wanted it thus!' - that alone do 1
call redemption! (Z, II, 'Of Redemption").
The eternal recurrence gives the fragments of tell1poral
existence a unity and so redeems time. It allows us as
temporal beings to escape the unidircctionlll passage:: of time.
Through the eternal recurrence we can will backwards to our
past so that we no longer suffer our past as an inexorable
burden placed on us as if from behind or beyond us. 'rhe
eternal recurrence makes willing backwards to our past
possible because within its cyclical structure we have in fact
willed our past. Nothing is beyond our will. Through the
eternal recurrence we can create our past as we creat.e our
future. The eternal recurrence, by unifying time dnd expanding
the range of our creativity to the fullest, thus redeems time
and us as temporal beings,
The eternal recurrence redeems us irom the spirit of
revenge which is directed against time, or more prcc isciy the
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passage and the past of tille, However, revenge against tilDe is
more than nagging regret since it involves a Christian-moral
interpretation of temporal existence as guilt and punishment.
Revenge is nihilistic because it negates an aspect of
Qxistence, Through the figure of Zarathustra Nietzsche writes:
This, yes, alone is revenge itself: the will's
antipathy towards time and time's 'It was' ...
The spirit of revenge: my friends, that, up
to now, has been mankind's chief concern; and where
there was suffering there was always su~po.::ied to be
punishment.
'Punisnment' is what revenge calls itself: it
feigns a good conscience for itself with a lie ...
'Things are ordered morally according to
justice and punishment. Oh, where is redemption
f.rom the stream of things and from the punishment
"existence"?' Thus madness preached.
'Can there be redemption when there is
eternal justice? Alas, the stone "It was" cannot be
rolled away: all punishments, too, must be
eternal I ' Thus madness preached.
'No deed can be annihilated: how can a deed be
undone through punishment? That existence too must
be an eternally recurring deed and guilt, this,
this is what is eternal in the punishment
"existence" I
'Except the will at last redeem itself and
willing become not-willing -': but you, my
brothers, know this fable-song of madness I' (Z I II,
"Of Redemption").
The Christian-moral interpretation claims that all suft'~ring
is a punishment for some deed and guilt that can never be
undone or repaid. It claims that the only way to avoid the
dc~d and guilt and hence avoid the punishment is to ~top
willing. Yet, in Nietzsche's view, if willing is the very
basis of existence, then the negation of the will involves the
negation of existence. The Christian-moral interpretation
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considers existence i tscl f as guilt and punishmellt. It COIIUl:l
from and calls forth a l.<;;:venlJe against existence. NLot .... schc
opposes the Christian-moral notion of redemption with his
tragic notion of redemption through the ctet:nal l:CClIrrcncc.
I lead you away from these fable-songs when r
taught you: "fhe will is a creator.'
All 'It. was' is a fragment, <1 riddle, <1
dreadful chance - until the creative will iJilYS to
it" 'But I willed it thus!'
Until the creative will says t.o it: . Bul; i
will it thus! Thus shall I will it I'.
Has the will become its own cedccmcr. iJnd
bringer of joy? lias it unlearned the spic it of
revenge and all teeth-gnashing? (1. , II, "Of
Redemption" ) .
The redemption from revenge against time's 'It W<lS' i~ the
redemption from revenge against temporal exis tcnce itilC 1. E. t t
is redemption from nihilism. Zarathustra' 5 redemption i:-;
Dionysian and tragic because it affirms the eternal rccllcconcc
of all things, the eternity of all joy and suif~ci.ng.
Zarathustra's Dionysian and tragic redemption, rather thilrl
redeeming us from this world as if. it were something to b~
escaped, redeems us into a fuller life in this war id of
becoming. Dionysian tragedy brings us the glut! ti.dings of
redemption and "the blessings of my saying Yes and limen" (1111,
z, 6) .10
Heidegger is thus correct when he claims thill:. the Cl:.C("lliJ J
recurrence and the will to power must be thought l:.ogcthac with
10 The Christian-moral dimension of Nietzscho' fl notion o(
tragic redemption is discussed further in Chapter 6.
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L!l,-: r.c.:v;!luation of values (11:11, 16B). The eternal recurrence
pr.o'/idC!s us with iJ WiJY to think the eternal necessity of the
will to powQr or becoming that nonetheless avoids positing a
goal or: purpose to its becoming. When Nietzsche claims that
Lhc thought of the eterniJl recurrence imposes the character of
being on becoming he means that with it we must consider
becomi.ng as the essence of existence. The recognition of this
conjunction of oterniJl recurrence and will to power involves
tho revaluation of values because we thereby recognize that
becoming rather than being is the primary form of existence
and this effects a change in the manner in which w'~ value
existence.
lleideggcr also claims that the eternal recurrence is
Nict'lsche' s fundamental metaphysical po:;ition by which he
means it is nihilistic (N:l1, 5). He does not doubt that
Nilitzsche intends the eternal recurrence to overcome nihilism
(N:II, 172). Yet he considers that Nietzsche can only think
the eternal rCl:urrence on the basis of the experience of
ni!lilism which condemns him to thinking the eternal recurrence
ni.hiiifltically: Zarathustra knows that the only way the
sh0phcrd can free himself from the black snakE; caught in his
throat is to bite off its head (Z, II, 'Of the Vision and the
Riddle"). According to lieidegger, Nietzsche cannot overcome
nihilism (N:II, 175). However, as I argued earlier, I think
Nietzsche does in fact overcome nihilism. The manner in which
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the eternal recurrence enables us to clearly Clnvb,ion the
nature of existence as unlimited becoming rathe/: than ilb~olutc
being and thereby effects a change in our evaluation of
existence. The tragic thought of eternal reCIll:rcncc DVCl:C011lCf;
the Christian-moral interpretation of existencc dcl'incd .:IS
nihilism through the revaluation of val ues.
5.5 A Brief Swnmary
Overall, Nietzsche's notion of tragedy is con~i:;tent
throughout his philosophy, though its formulation and [oeus
changes depending on the stage of his philosophy in which it
appears. In The Birth of Tragedy he considers tragedy as the
affirmation of the unity of all life which aestheticall.y
redeems existence. In Thus spoke Zarathustra he interprets the
tragic vision of the unity of all life in vi.ew Df til{:
conjunction Df the eternal recurrence and the wi 11 tD power
which brings redemption from the revenge against tcmpor.al
existence or the being of becoming, Yet in al! CilSCS he:
considers tragedy in terms of the revaluation of valucs which
overcomes Christian morality defined as nihili.sm. Near. the cnd
of Twilight of the Idols he states:
And with that I again return to the place from
which I set out - The Birth of 7'ragedy WilS my firsL
revaluation of all values: with that I again planL
myself in the soil out of which I draw ;~ll ttwt: I
will and can _ I, the last disciple of ttlr,
philosopher Dionysus _ I, the tcwchcr (J r the
eternal recurrence (7'1, X, 5).
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Dionysian tragedy requires the affirmation of the unity of
life considered as the eternal recurrence and the will to
power. It is the fullest affirmation of the eternity of the
croat.ion and destruction of life, its constant self-
overcoming, its unlimited becoming. By affirming the value of
this sensuous world of unlimited becoming without appealing to
the absolute value of a supposed supersensuous world,
Dionysian tragedy participates in the overcoming of nihilism
through the revaluation of values. This is the sense in which
Dionysian tragedy redeems existence. Nietzsche states that
t.ragic sensibility is humanity's only salvation: MThere is
only one hope for and one guarantee for the future of
humanity: it consists in his retention of the sense for the
tragic· (UM, IV, 4). However, the extent to which Nietzsche's
notion of tragedy and tr.agic redemption commits him to
Christian-moral values and the overall effect this has on his
attempt to overcome nihilism through the revaluation of values
remains to be seen. This is the focus of Chaptpr 6.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
THE QUESTION OF ETHICS AND NIETZSCHE'S AMBIGUOUS (.P.GACY
I know my fate. One day my name will be
associated with the memory o[ something
tremendous - a crisis without equi.ll on
earth, the most profound collision of
conscience, a decision that was conjur.nd
up against everything that had been
believed, demanded, hallowed so far, I am
no man, I am dynamite (EH, IV, 1),
6.1 Nietzsche's Ambiguous Legacy
This conclusion gathers the elements of the previous
discussions to ask another question, thG question of
Nietzsche's destiny or fate, the question of whither and [or
what Nietzsche is destined or fated. specifically, it is the
question about Nietzsche's ambiguous legacy with regardB to
the question of ethics in contemporary philosophy. Nietzsche's
destiny or fate, his legacy, rests with us to a large extent.
How do we receive hill? What do we make of him? If we 1u:e to
take his project seriously, then we must ask about the niltuce
and status of it compared to the Christian moral Lty he seeks
to overcome. Therefore this conclusion raises the question
about the ethical tone and content of Nietzsche's phllosophy
in order to suggest that Nietzsche' 5 legacy Is ambigllous with
regards to the question of ethics.
Throughout this thesis I discussed the manner In whlch
Nietzsche overcomes nihilistic Christian moralil:y to establish
a revaluation of values on the basis of art, specifically
tragedy. I eXilmined his inquiry into the origins of morality
through the appeal to various sciences, his critique of ehe
origins of morality through the genealogical method, and his
overcoming of Christian morality considered as nihilism
through the revaluation of values. This set the context for
the investigation of his establishment of an aesthetic and
anti-moral realm of tragedy and the tragic attitude towards
existence.
Nietzsche considers the overcoming of nihilism in the
form of Christian morality as the preparation and education
for the rebirth of tragedy. Tragedy is meant to overcome
nihilistic Christian-ll\C'cal interpretations of existence.
With reference to The Birth of Tragedy, he states in Ecce
Homo:
A tremendous hope speaks out of this essay. In the
end I lack all reason to renounce the hope for a
Dionysian future of music... I promise a tragic
age: the highest art in saying Yes to all life,
tragedy, will be reborn when humanity has weathered
the consciousness of the hardest but most necessary
wars without suffering from it (EH, BT, 4).
For Nietzsche, "the hardest but most necessary wars" are those
against Christian morality. They are hardest but most
necessary because Christian morality is so much a part of us
that we can never hope to change if we do not overcome it. In
hig view, it is imperative that Chrlstian morality be
overcome. Yet, rather than dread this as our 10s5 to be
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suffered, we should welcome this as the beginning of our
freedom. The event that Nietzsche's madman heralds - "God is
dead~ - is the lack of all absolute meaning, the absurdity of
existence (CS, 125). While the movement away from the sun mi.1y
be chilling and terrifying, it is also the increasing
expansion of our freedom to create new values. We shou Id
cheerfully embark on the "open sea" (GS, 343).
Thus Nietzsche claims that we must joyfully i1ffirm the
tragic vision of existence. Yet the tragic vision of existence
is joyful only beyond Christian-moral interpretations o(
existence. We can only dance and celebrate .....ith child-likn
innocence if we are relieved from the weighty burden of guilt
and punishment. Tragedy directly opposes Christian morality,
but it can only be realized fully when Christian morality i~
overcome. The overcoming of Christian morality docs not me,ln
we cannot posit principles of existence, but any such
principle that is posited must not import i1nd impose itself as
if from beyond this sensuous world and it must rodoem this
sensuous world without first condemning it i1!l Christian
morality does. The notions of will to power and the eternal
recurrence are inunanent to existence and redeem it into
innocence by maintaining that it needs redemption only frorn
Christian-moral condemnation.
However, while Nietzsche considers the overcoming of
nihilism in the- form of Christian morality as tho prcpnration
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and education for the birth of tragedy, it is not altogether
clear whether he avoids all ethical manners of thinking
concerning tragedy. The discussion in the previous chapter
indicates that certain ethical themes remain i.ll Nietzsche's
philosophy, especially with re'lards to tragedy. In order to
determine Nietzsche's relationship to ethical thinking, the
pilrticular configuration of Christian morality must be
distinguished from ethics defined an a wider scale as the
human activity of seeking the meaning of existence and
establishing a way of life appropriate to that meaning.
Nietzsche rejects the former but still remains within the
latter.
6.2 The Ethic of Honesty and Truthfulness
Nietzsche considers himself an .i.Jnmoralist IEH, IV, 4, 6).
IIowever, if there is an ethic, a principled way of life, which
survives in Nietzsche's philosophy, then it is the ethic of
honesty and truthfulness. Honesty and truthfulness are the
mc.tive forces of the self-overcoming of life which is the
primordial activity of existence for Nietzsche. This self-
overcoming occurs on the level of human activity as well. Only
when we are brutally honest and truthful with ourselves we
will be able to affirm the tragic vision of existence without
the protecting and distorting filter of nihilistic Christian-
moral interpretations of it. Christian morality, as well as
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metaphysics and science, defined as nihilism, are all overcome
on the basis of honesty and truthfulness (GS, 357; GN, Ill,
27; EH, IV, 3; WP, 1, 3).1
However, while we may appreciate how Nietzsche's ethic oC
honesty and truthfulness operates in his philosophy in torms
of self-overcoming, it is nonethel.ess problematic in the
context of his philosophy. Nietzsche himself claims "the wilt
to truth requires a critique" and "the value of truth must for
once be experimentally called into question" (GM, III, 2<1).
For Nietzsche, dissimulation and deception are characteristic
of existence and human activity. Existence is art, an artist
and an art work, in the sense that it creates itself through
and as illusion. Human life is only made possible through
illusions Such as morality, religion, metaphysics, science,
and especially art. Only this world of illusions exists.
According to Nietzsche, morality, religion, metaphysics ilnd
science were previously thought to relate us to truth, but now
art recognizes itself and those others as illusions and Lt is
therefore more true than those others which seem to be
disgUised illusions masquerading as truth. In this context
1 Nietzsche's ethic of hO:1.esty and truthfulness parallclli
the ethic of authenticity which is characteristic of many
largely existentialist philosophers like lIeidegger, Jilsper.5
and Kierkegaard as well as Camus and Sartre. r'or an analysis
of Heidegger in this regard see Theodor W. Adorno, 'rhe Jargon
of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Freded.c Will,
(Evanston: Northwestern university Press, 1973),
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NiElt?sche criti.cizes the notion of truth, claiming that truth
is a lie because all truths are inherently lies. Thus truth is
falsity and falsity is truth, in whatever sense we still can
use these terms in his philosophy.
What can Nietzsche's ethic of honesty and truthfulness
mean? What does Nietzsche mean when he entreats us to be
honest and truthful? Paradoxically, he claims we must create
the most honest and truthful j) Ius ions we can in order to
enhance humanity and existence. The most honest and truthful
illusions reveal the nature of existence and hwnan activity as
dissimulation and deception. Given Nietzsche's view I can he
claim that there is an absolute standard or position from
which to judge honesty and truthfulness? Do honesty and
truthfulness even make sense without such a standard or
position? Nietzsche's perspectivism posits the endless
proliferation of perspectives, but he also claims there is an
underlying principle of life - the will to power - which
generates all perspectives and makes it possible to judge
among them. How can Nietzsche maintain this paradox? Is it in
fact a paradox?
Nietzsche's ethic of honesty and truthfulness is a
paradox only within the context of the categories of truth and
falsity. However, this paradox dissipates somewhat if we, as
Deleuze suggests Nietzsche does, remove philosophy from the
"element of truth and falsity~ and p...ace it in the element of
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value (NP, xiii). We must consider the ethic of honesty and
truthfulness as an expression of value, a vGhicle for
evaluation and evaluating among evaluations. Nietzsche docs
not oppose the false "truths" of morality, religion,
metaphysics and science with the true "lies" of art because
all of them are illusory (neither "true" nor "false") product~
of the will to deception that underlies existence and human
activity. Rather, for him, it is a matter of opposing l.1
nihilistic type of evaluation which negates life with il noble
and affirmative type of evaluation which stimulates life.
6.2.1 The Nature of Nietzsche's Ethic
Nietzsche's ethic of honesty and truthfulness is
characterized by the strength of simplicity. In The Birth of
Tragedy he is concerned with the Dionysian affirmation of the
tragic unity of existence beyond Apollinian individu.ltlon (m',
10). In the untimely Meditations he claims that Schoponhaucr
and Wagner possess the sense of the tragic necessary for tho
future of humanity. He admires Schopenhauer being "simple and
honest in thought and life" and he praises Wagner. for b0ing a
"simplifier of the world" tUM, III, 2; UM, IV, 4).
Furthermore, he calls for a restriction of unlimited and
undirected historical knowledge and advocates i.nste'ld the
study of history only insofar as it serves" life" nnd gives
culture healthy horizons or boundaries (UM, II, 11. In illl
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these cases Nietzsche criticizes the culture of his time for
being too complex or for desiring to be so. In his view,
complexity or the desire for it, which is as a symptom of a
weak and sick character in both individuals and cultures,
betrays a tendency towards dishonesty. Rat~er, he equates
simplicity with honesty and he attempts to offer a simplified
and honest vision of existence through recourse to tragedy.
Nietzsche's penchant for the strength of simplicity is
demonstrated in his later work as well. In The will to Power
he states: "Error is cowardice - every achievement of
knowledge is a consequence of courage, of severity toward
oneself, of cleanliness toward oneself" (WP, 1041). It
requires strength to be honest and truthful with regards to
existence. In this respect, for Nietzsche, art is crucial in
establishing the order of rank for life by determining whether
a value serves and stimulates life or denies and degenerates
life. When the aesthetic term "beautiful" comes from enhanced
strength it is meant to be an expression of the coordination
and harmony of all natural instincts. The grand style is the
highest form of such strength and simplicity (WP, BOO). 'l'he
grand style of tragedy plays a decisive role in subsuming
exceptions and nuances under a general rule (hiP, 819). Tragedy
also involves giving the fragments of temporal existence a
unity through the affirmation of the eternal recurrence (Z,
II, "Of Redemption~). Nietzsche's tragic ethic rests on a
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feeling of strength and results in il simplicity that makes it
possible for us to live in a fragmented world.
Nietzsche's ethic of honesty and truthfulness lnvolve:>
giving oneself style, of harmonizing one's discordllnt drives
and fashioning a simple style of character. Nietzsche r.;:[ors
to this ethic as "a phy~ical-spiritualdisciplino" of strength
(hiP, 961). Strength and simplicity of style are relutcd: "We
say the strongest things simply, provided only that we ace
surrounded by people who believe in our strength: such an
environment educates one to attain "simplicity of style"· (GS,
226). Simplicity of style is a matter of artistry in CCI.l,lting
a certain artful character for oneself.
One thing is needful. - '1'0 "give style" to olle' Ii
character - a great and rare art! It is prilcthlCd
by those who survey all the strengths and weilkness
of their nature and then fit them into an arti8tic
plan until every one of them uppeacs ilS art ... In
the end, when the work is finished, it bccomm.
evident how the constraint of il single taste
governed and formed everything large and small.
Whether this taste was good or bad is loss
important than one might suppose, if only it Wc1!:l a
single tastel (GS, 290).
Nietzsche claims that we have a lot to learn from art i.sts in
terms of being "the poets of our life" (GS, 299). Yet as
artists and poets we remain in the realm of i11,,:;ion:;. I"or
Nietzsche, honesty and truth are not beyond di:;hor\r..'sty ilnd
falsity. This dichotomy is no longer an issuo. llilthfJr, his
ethic is a matter of a strong simplicity of style in whi.ch we
create the illusion of unity in oursel·/o:;. Existence l!l act,
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living is an art. Nietzsche's ethic of honesty and
truthfulness is thoroughly aesthetic. Z
Nietzsche's aesthetic ethic of honesty and truthfulness
requires that we judge existence and ourselves honestly and
truthfully in terms of aesthetic principles. When we compare
illusions and attempt to choose the most honest and truthful
l 'I'he conjunction of aesthetics and ethics in Nietzsche's
philosophy greatly influences contemporary theories of
uesthetic ethics. As the essays in Poetry, Language, Thought
indicate, an aesthetic ethics is present in Heidegger's
poetics of existence - "poetically man dwells" - and the
JnDnner in which he considers poetry in opposition to
technology as that which puts us in touch with Being. Like
Nietzsche, Foucault defines ethics not so much as a system of
rules but as a -practice of the self" or a -cultivation of the
sclf~ which is considered the "art of existence" in antiquity.
Sec The Use of Pleasure, Volume 2 of The History of sexuality,
trans. Robert Hurley, (New York: Random Housn, Inc., 1985),
25-]2, and The Care of the Self, Volume 3 of The History of
Sexuality, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1986) 39-68,
especially 44. He also refers to Greco-Roman notions of
-aesthetics of existence~ and ~mora1ity of style- in Foucault
Live (IntervieW's, 1966-84), ed. Sylvlllre Lotringer, trans. John
Johnston, (New York: Semiotext(e) Foreign Agent Series, 1989),
)09-)31. Following Nietzsche, Rorty advocates an ethics of
metaphorical self-creation and sees hwnan life as a poem or
narrative, collapsing -the distinctior: between the moral and
the ~merely~ aesthetic" and calling for a poetic culture
wherein authors and literary critics are considered moral
advisors. See Contingency, irony, and solidarity, especially
23-)5,69, 80-82. For an analysis of Rorty's aesthetic ethics
as indicative of pragmatist postmodernism see also Richard M.
Shusterman, "Postmodern Ethics and the Art of Living- in
Pragma Ust Aesthetics: Living Beau ty, Rethinking Art,
(Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 1992), 236-261. While
Martha Nussbaum does not develop what is considered an
a011thetic ethics in this case, she nonetheless sees ethics as
Dfl aesthetics of existence specifically in light of Greek
tragedy. See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness:
Luck ilnd ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986).
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one we must ask: "has hunger or superabundance becume crcative
here?" (h'P, 846). We must determine what is being CL·0iltivl. ill
any evaluation of -axistence, whe~her it is weilknc!l!; l'r
strength, and 'Ne must determine the manncr in wh.ich .Ill
evaluation is creative, whether it negates oc slill\ll.lilLcs 1 i(,~.
For Nietzsche, this aesthetic principle is reduGud La Lilt)
question of how and in what cases the leCIll "bo,)11 l i fu 1" is
being used. Is it an expression of the romantic or pc:;!'; imi.st.j,:
resignation from life or the classical and tragLc i..l([irilldtion
of all aspects of life, including and ospccililly l.ll(~
terrifying and questionable aspects?
For Nietz.sche, the aesthetic ethic o( honest.y dlld
truthfulness, which is premised on and promote!.! str.t.HlfJth 1111d
simplicity of style, is best evidenced in triHJcdy. Onl.y in til"
grand style of tragedy is the term "beautiful" uscLl from tho
perspective of strength (h'P, BOO). 'l'ragedy C<lOf1ot II:;"
beautiful illusions to cover up the tragic natura o( nxi!JLeno:
because the beautiful illusions themselves expcc!;S tho tr;J{Ji,:
nature of existence. It allows us to experience the silllple but
tragic unity of existence in a way that does not (;ru~h U~;. 'l'h(:
music and myth of tragedy gives order to the dLssorli.lncc: 01
humanity without obliterating the dissonancu 'Nhi.ch consti LUlJ~:;
our tragic human nature (aT, 25). lie states: "Wr~ POSS,~!>s arl.
lest we perish from tho truth" /WP, 827.). SimiliJrl'l, willi
specific reference to tragedy, Nietzsche writes:
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DUL the greatness and indispensability of art lie
precisely in its being able to produce the
appeacance of c silDplcr world, c shorter solution
to the riddle of life ... Art exists so that the bow
shall not break~ lUX, IV, 4).
llictzschc clc1ims that the tragic sensibility is the
pn...>condition for t:h~ health of humanity (UM, IV, 4). According
La him, if we have the strength to affirm the tragic natura of
existence, then we will be able to live according to the ethic
of honesty and truthfulness.
6.7. '- '1'he Status of Nietzsche's Ethic
Jlowever, the status of Nietzsche's ethic of honesty and
truthfulness, expressed in terms of litrength and the
simplicity of style epitomized by tragedy, must be assessed
with respect to the Christian morality which it seeks to
overcome. The relation of Nietzsche's tragic ethic to
Christian morality must be det&rmined because the matter is
not at all clear. For example, in On the Genealogy of Morals
Nietzsche states: ~all honor to the ascetic ideal insofar as
it is honest! (GM, III, 26). He indicates that the ascetic
idec11 which chll.rc1cterizes Christian morality, among other
things, is valuable to him to the extent that it help:; him
overcome Christian morality. Nietzsche claims that the
Christian morality of honef>t..y and truthfulness is the basis of
the overcoming of Christian morality itself (GM, III, 27). In
order to emphsize his point he quotes from The Gay Science:
"8
You see what it waf; that really triulllphed over tlw
Christian God: r.t,.cistian morality itself, the
concept of truthfulness that was understood even
more rigorously, the father conf.essor's refinement
of the Christian conscience, translated and
sublimated irlto a scientific conscience, into
intellectual cleanliness at any pricC! (GS, J!i7).
In this context Nietzsche refers to "the most fateful act of
two thousand years of discipline for truth that in the cnd
forbids itself the lie in faith in God" (GS, 357). He
indicates that this ~will to truth" is not only the remount
but also the result of Christian piety. In a scction Utlcd
How we, too, are sU.ll plous Nietzsche states:
Consequently, "will to truth" does not mean "I will
not allow myself to be deceived~ but - there is no
alternative - "1 will. not deceive, not evon
myself"; and with that. we stand on moral gl'OIl/1(!
(GS, 344).
Nietzsche criticizes the will to truth because he claims th,1t
life is in fact deception ar.d dissimulation. 'J.'he ~moral· will
to truth is in fact a lie with regards to ~immoral" illusory
existence. Similarly, in The will to Power he writes:
The end of Christianity - at the hands of its own
morality (which cannot be replaced) I which turns
against the Christian God (the s~ns~ oC
truthfulness, developed highly by Christianity, is
nauseated by the falseness and mendllciouSn05s oC
all Christian interpretations of the world cHId
history; rebound from "God is truth~ to the
fanatical faith "All is false" (WP, 1).
Significantly, Nietzsche here claims that Christii.Ln morillity
cannot be replaced. He is aware that his ontiro proj~(;t
depends on it, that he requires it even as h~ rejcct~ it.
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'1'hus, through his ethic of honesty and truthh~lness, he has a
dual relationship to Christian morality: he appeals to it and
yet abolishes it.
Furthermore, in The Anti-christ Nietzsche laments the
lniJnncr in '.....hich f.luther's German Reformation hindered Cesare
Borgia's Italian Renaissance of Christianity.
Cesaro Borgia as Pope, .. Am I understood ... very
well, that would have been a victory of the sort I
desire today - : Christianity would have been
abolished! - What happened? A German monk., all the
vindictive instincts of a failed priest in him,
fulminated in Rome against the Renaissance (AC,
61),
Nietzsche applauds the attempt to infuse the principle of life
into Christianity. Yet he does so because, in his view, this
infusion would destroy Christianity which is inimical to life,
However, there is a suggestion here that hI'! would accept a
religion that is based on noble and affirmative values and
stimulates life (AC, 61).'
However, Nietzsche explicitly and emphatically rejects
any association with religion. In the Preface to Ecce Homo he
writes:
Ilere no ~prophet~ is speaking, none of those
gruesome hybrids of sickness and will to power whom
people call founders of religions. Above all, one
must hear aright the tone that comes from this
mouth, the halcyon tone, lest one should do
wretched injustice to the meaning of its wisdom ...
l I discuss this later in terms of Nietzsche's advocacy
of a pagan religion of Dionysus that affirms all aspects of
life.
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It is no fanatic that speaks here; thii:i is not
Mpreaching"; no faith is demanded heee (1m,
Preface, 4).
Similarly, in the final part of the book titled I'o'ny I am .1
Destiny he writes:
Yet for all that, there is nothing in me o[ a
founder of a religion - religions arc a[fairs o(
the rabble; I find it necessary to wash my hands
after I have come into contact with religious
people. - I want no "believers·; r think 1 am too
malicious to believe in myself; I never speak to
masses. - I have a terrible fear that one dily I
wEI be pronounced holy: you will guess why r
publish this book before; it shall prevent people
from doing mischief with me (EH, IV, 1).
What are we to make of these disclaimers in light of hll:l
peculiar relationship to Christianity? Moreover, do these
disclaimers preclude his advocacy of a religion other thiln
Christianity? While Nietzsche demands no faith and wants no
believers, this does not prevent the possibility that he will
garner faith and believers, especially since throughout hi:,;
philosophy he persuasively appeals to Illany religious themes to
characterize tragedy.
According to Nietzsche, tragedy is not meant to correct
existence but it is meant to transfigure existence, and this
can be considered a religious notion. Tragedy provides Uli with
an awareness and appreciation of the unity of existence, il
function which is often associated with religion. Ilc likum;
tragedy's intention to unite all existence to nilturc'l;
forgiveness of the prodigal 5Qn of humanity ilnd he callH
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trugedy ~the gospel of universal harmony· (BT, 1). He appeals
to the doctrine of the ~veil of maya· to describe how tragedy
tears away the illusion of passing phenomena to reveal the
primordial unity of reality (BT, 1). Nietzsche's reference to
~the sale author and spectator of this comedy of art~ and "the
primordial artist of the world~ is similar to religious ways
of referring to God the Creator (BT, 5), He claims that the
meaning of tragedy is that ~the individual must be consecrated
to something higher than himself" so that "he may encounter
something holy" (UM, IV, 4).
Nietzsche also refers to tragedy in the context l)f
religious themes such as sanctificat;'on and justification.
Tragedy participates in ~the great pantheistic sharing of joy
and sorrow that sanctifies and calls good even the most
terrible and questionable qualities of life" (WP, 1050). It
considers existence ~holy enough to justify even a monstrous
amount of suffering~ (liP, 1052). The tragic artist "affirms
the large-scale economy which justifies the terrifying, the
evil, the questionable - and more than justifies them~ (WP,
953). Tragedy is not only a justification and apology for
existence, it is a joyful affirmation of it. Yet Nietzsche's
notion of existence being "holy enough to justify even a
monstrous amount of suffering" and his affirmation of "the
lilrge-scale economy which justifies the terrifying, the evil,
the questionable w is not so different from the Christian
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notion that God's goodness justifies all the suffeJ:"in~ i.lnd
evil in life. Christian theodicy too is concerned with the
justification of existence in these terms.
Most significantly, Nietzsche claims that tragody redeems
existence. This is certainly a religious manner of thinki.nl),
but it is religious in a precise and peculii\r sense for
Nietzsche. It is perhaps in terms of tri:lgic redemption, at
Nietzsche's apparent closest proximity to Christianity, that
he can be best distinguished from it. 'l'ragedy exemplifies whilt
Nietzsche calls ~redemption in illusion" by art (DT, 16).
Art and nothing but artJ It is the great monns
of making life possible, the great seduction to
life, the great stimulant of life.
Art as the only superior counter force to illl
will to denial of life, as that which is antl-
Christian, anti-Buddhist, antinihilist par
exee11 enee.
Art as the redemption of the man of knowledge
- of those who see the terrifying and questionable
character of existence, who want to sec it, the men
of tragic knowledge.
Art as the redemption of the miln of action -
of those who not only see the terrifying and
questionable char1lcter of existence but live it,
want to live it, the tragic-warlike man, the hero.
Art as the redemption of the sufferer - as the
way to states in which sUfferlng is willed,
transfigu.,,;,ed, deified, where suffering is a form of
great delight (WP, 853, II).
For Nietzsche, art which is the stimulant to life opposes
Christianity which is the nihilistic denial of life. However,
Nietzsche at times holds a wider definition of relLgion whic.:h
includes both the affirmation and negation of life. 'rhat is,
religion can be configured either as the affirmation or tho
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nogation of life, both possibilities lire open to it. As with
the distinction between particular moral codes a.nd ethics on
the wider scale, Nietzsche distinguishes between particular
configurations of religion, which mayor may not be
nihilistic. and the general essence of religion which is the
articulation of the meaning of exisl.ence.
To Jetermine: whether the typical religious
man is a form of decadence (the great innovators
are one and all morbid and elliptic); but are we
not here omitting one type of religious man, the
pagan? Is the pagan cult not a form of thanksgiving
and affirmation of life? Must its highest
representative not be an apology for and
deification of life? The type of a well-constituted
and ecstatically over-flowing spirit that takes
into itself and redeems the contradictions and
questionable aspects of existence I
It is here I set the Dionysus of the Greeks:
the religious affirmation of life, life whole and
not denied or in part (WP, 1052).
Hare Nietzsche does not appear to be opposed to religion as
such, but to Christianity in particular. He evaluates religion
by the same standards he uses to evaluate art: whether it is
an expression of disSlItisfaction or gratitude with regards to
existence, whet.her hunger or superabundance has become
creative (hiP, 845-846). Care must be taken to determine which
forms of religion are nihilistic and which forms of religion
are not nihilistic. Nietuche associates Christianity with
nihilism, but. he considers the religion of Dionysus in
opposi tion to nihilism.
According to Nietzsche, Christianity is a nihilistic
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religion because it posits an otherworldly vallie as the basis
of the condemnation of this world. He states: "As soon as we
imagine someone who is responsible for our being thus and
thus, etc. (Cod, nature), and therefore attribute to him the
intention that we should exist and be happy or wretched, we
corrupt for ourselves the innocence of becoming" (WP, 552).
For Nietzsche, to avoid importing responsibility und C]lIilt
into existence ~JOuld be to redeem ourselves and existence, but
this need not preclude religion as such. In 11 nato from ~'hc
Will to Power titled "Redemption from all guilt~ Niet1.5Chc
OppOSGS those who use the nation of Cod to take rcvcngu
against the existence of becoming.
We others, who desire to restore innocence to
becoming, would like to be the missionaries of a
cleaner idea: that no one has given man his
qualities, neither God, nor society, nor his
parents and ancestors, nor he himself - that no one
is to blame for him.
There is no being that could be hold
responsible for the fact that anyone exists at all,
that anyone is thus and thus, that anyone was born
in certain circumstances, in a cert.ain ellV lrOllfficnt.
- It is a tremendous restorative that. such iJ being
is lacking ...
And, to say it again, this is a tremendous
restorative; this constitutes the innocence of illl
existence (WP, 765),
For Nietzsche, there is nothing responsible or guilty for
existence, there is only the whol~ of existence considered as
the innocence of becoming. To him, a religion of the innocence
of becoming is a pagan religion. Such a pagan rul.igion i.s not
necessarily godless, though its god is not. so much the object,
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oC wor~hip as that in whose name existence itself is
celebrated: Dionysus. Nietzsche is the disciple and missionary
of Dionysus who is the principal representative of the pagan
religion of the innocence of becoming.
Oy reason of Nietzsche's constant invocation of the pagan
god Dionysus, his notion of tragedy and tragic redemption can
be considered as religious in the expanded sense of
articulating the meaning of existence. However, Nietzsche's
appeal to religion as such is not adverse to his attempt to
overcome nihilism. Religious manners of thinking are
acceptable to him, as long as they are stimulants to life like
Dionysian religion and not nihilistic like Christianity. The
Dionysian religion overcomes nihilism by affirming the tragic
totality of life. Nietzsche's retention of a religious
sensibility as the celebration of life can be considered as
the overcoming of decadent and declining forms of religion
considered as the condemnation of life. His claims about the
sp.lf-overcoming of great things applies to religion and he
engages in the self-overcoming of religion so that it may
assume a role as the stimulant to a fuller life in this world.
In this sense the Dionysian religion, which expresses its
vision of existence through the art of tragedy, can contribute
to the overcoming of nihilism through revaluation of values.
However, the status of Nietzsche's Dionysian religion, no
matter how distinct it is from Christianity, still remains in
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question. Nietzsche claims that he does not intend to found oJ.
religion and foster believers. Instead, be socks creator
companions who are other than religious bellovet"s: "'l'he
creator seeks companions, not corpses or herds or belicvct"s.
The creator seeks fellow-creators, those who inscribe 11l~W
values on new tables" (2, prologue, 9). Yet he af[o!:"s
Zarathustra as an exemplar of this creative way of liCe. lie
calls us to create our own values, our own goals, our own
selves (2, If "Of the Way of the Creator"). Yet he nonetheless
provides vivid examples of what he would have us create.
Precisely how does he intend his philosophy of Dionysus? I~ it
a religion, and if so, in what sense? How docs he expect us to
respond to it? Are we to become Dionysians?
Even if we accept that Nietzsche, despite his avowed
intention to overcome the particular confi.guratlon o(
nihilistic Christian morality and religion, nonethelesH
retains an ethic of honesty and truthfulness and a religion of
Dionysus in order to address the meaning of existence and
outline the way of life proper to that meiJning, further
questions arise. Does Nietzsche make claims on the manner in
which we live our lives? If so, does his ethic o[ honesty tind
truthfulness, provide us with a positive principle for l i.ving?
Moreover, does the value of Nietzsche's philosophy only
consist in having raised critical questions iJbout previous
configurations of Christian morality and religion? Or can
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Nietzsche's tragic philosophy also provide a constructive
foundation for a new ethic or religion, a new way of life,
beyond Christian morality and religion?
6.) Camus: Assessing Nietzsche's Ethic
Some reference to Camus's writing may be helpful in
indicating indirectly that Nietzsche does indeed huve a
positive contribution t~ make to the question of ethics in
contemporary philosophy. Just as I find it useful to appeal to
Foucault, Deleuze and Heidegger as insightful interpreters of
Nietzsche, so I intend some reference to Camus, not as an
exhaustive inquiry into the issue of Camus's fidelity to
Nietzsche, but as a method of assessing whether Nietzsche's
paradoxical position with respect to ethics is capable of
underpinning a genuine revaluation of values that is
beneficial to the manner in which we live our lives. Camus is
offered here as an affirmative example of the Nietzschean
ethic.
Camus considers the question of whether or not there is
ethic, a way of life, that corresponds to Nietzsche's
overcoming of Christianity defined as nihilism? He asks: "Is
it possible to find a rule of conduct outside of religion and
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its absolute values?,,4 Camus follows Nietzsch~ in attomptill(]
to develop a positive vision of temporal cxistElncC th.. 1:
rejects all appeals to absolute and otherworld ly villllCS buL
nonetheless considers life worth living. lie claims thilt oven
in the absence of eternal values such as Ged, life is woeth
living. In Camus's view, which he shares with Nietzschc, ·cvon
wi~hin the limits of nihilism it is possible to find the moans
to proceed beyond nihilism.~
6.3.1 Absurdity and Creation
For Camus, who if> much influenced by Niet~sche's notion
of tragedy, the tragic nature of existence consistl; in the
condition of absurdity. Camus defines absurdity in iJ
particular manner: "This divorce between man and his lHe, the
actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity·
(MS, 5). That is, absurdity is borne out of the constant
tension between human consciousness and the material world.
The feeling of absurdity or meaninglessness is aroused tlntl
exacerbated because humanity continually asks after. the
meaning of existence which remains resolutely silent.
~ Albert Camus, The Rebel: An essay on Man in Ucvolt,
trans. Anthony Bower, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1954),
21; cited hereafter as R. Camus discusses Niet~s<.:he wLI;h
respect to nihilism (R, 65-BO).
, Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other /-"SSiJY!;,
trans. Justin O'Brien, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), IIi
cited hereafter as MS.
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Ab~Ul:"dity is a function of our temporal existenc~. We are
pl:"csented with the choice of directing ourselves toward
ctcl:"nity or living in history - MThere is God or time" (MS,
64). Absunlity is the tension we feel between our existence in
timG and the pull towards eternal values of exil:ltence, the
tension between finite life in the world and our search for
moaning in the world. In Camus's view, to be true to
existence, we must accept the necessity of absurdity and
choose temporal existence over eternal values. All else
escapes or eludes existence itself. 6
In this context Camus claims that the proper response to
absu.-.:dity is creation. Only in this sense is our temporal and
tl:lmporary life worth anything. In one of his early notebooks
he writes:
To be worth something or nothing. To create or not
to create. In the first case everything is
justified. Everything without exception. In the
second case, everything is completely absurd. 1
He later states: "The absurd world is justified only
aesthetically.·a Camus states in the Preface to The Myth of
6 The notion of fidelity to the absurdity of existence is
the basis of Camus '5 absurd ethic of lucidity and integrity,
as emerges later.
7 Albert Camus, Carnets 1935-1942, trans. Philip Thody,
([,ondon: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1963), 39; cited hereafter as
C:I.
U Albert Camus, Carnets 1942-1951, trans. Philip Thody,
(London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1966),30; cited hereafter as
C:II .
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Sisyphus that "it sums itself up fol:.'" me as <l lucid invltatiull
to live and to create, in the very midst of the descrL" (MS,
v). Like Nietzsche, Camus develops a notion o( the acsthctlc
justification of the absurdity of existence thr.ough the uct o(
creation.
Camus defines the type of creation that best jUBl:ifies
absurd exist<:lnce aesthetically: tragic or absurd cl:.'"ciltion.
Camus refers to Nietz.sche's statement in Twilight of tile Idol:;
that the tragic artist is not a pessimist because he SilYli
"Yes" to all aspects of existence and thereby jU$ti[ics them
(TI, III, 6; C:I, 81). He claim~ that tragic art cilth(lJ: than
despairing art is most significant (C:II, 73). !"Ilrthcclllorc, he
distinguishes between weak and strong tragedy on the b.lliis of
their mode and extent of justification:
What makes a tragedy is that each of tho opposintJ
forces is equally justified, has the right to live.
Hence weak tragedy, which brings unjustified focces
into play. Hence strong tragedy, which jUlltifics
everything (C:II, 52).
Repeating Nietzsche, Camus states: "E:ternal cecur.concc
presupposes the acceptance of suffering" (C:II, 52). Par.illLel
to Zarathustra, Camus refers to the myth in which Sj~yphu~ is
condemned to eternally roll a rock up a hill only to hilVC it
roll back just as it reaches the top. Zilrathustr.il'S "dl.·WrL-
going~ and Sisyphus'S "return" are similar (Z, ProJOljllC, J;
NS, 90). Zarathustra rises above revenge and pity thr.OUfJh
disgust and Sisyphus overcomes his terrible filta thcough 5cocn
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(ii, IV, '''I'he Sign"; MS, 90). In both cases they are
transfigured by their tragic attitude. They approach their
t<Jsk o[ creation joyfully and happily. Nietzsche and Camus
consider tragedy as the deepest joy and highest happiness. We
can be truly joyful and happy only beyond hope and
consolation. 'J'ragic joy and happiness accept all aspects of
life. Considering the tragic and absurd figure, Camus states:
"One must imagine Sisyphus happy" (MS, 91). He further
identifies tragedy with h8f'piness when he writes:
'1'0 increase the happiness of a man's life is to
extend the tragic nature of the witness that he
bears. A truly tragic work of art (if it does bear
witness) will be that of a happy mall (c:r, 54-55).
'rragic joy and happiness justifies the existence of
everything. Tragic art justifies even the absurdity of
existence.
According to Camus, only tragic art or absurd art
maint.ains the feeling of absurdity, the tension between
humanity and the world that fosters meaninglessness, but it
nonetheless conside:r:s life worthy of living in spite of and
even more so because of the absll.rdity of existence. The
absurdity of existence allows us to create freely and
intensely in each moment (MS, 48). Camus claims that tragic or
absurd art (as well as thought) is characterized by three
things; (a) • revol t' or the concrete presence of absurdity
.....ithout escaping either of the terms - humanity and world -
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which are in tension, (b) "freedom" or the i.lW<.lr:encss thilt
there is no future and hence no eternal viJluc~;, tel
Mdiversity" or intensity and quantity of passion in ct"c<ltion
(MS, 86)" A further characteristic of tragic or absurd art is
its futility or its awareness that it passes away and i.lIllOUllts
to nothing in the larger pic ture of exis tence (1015, 1J6).
Creation only has value for the moment.
To Camus, tragic or absurd art cannot of[er hope or.
consolation in the form of an eternal meaning for cx:istencu
(MS, 72). to do so would be to escape or elude absurdity. He
writes:
I want to know whE'~her, accepting i.l life without
appeal, one can also agree to work and create
without appeal and what is the way leading to thol1o
liberties ... But an absurd attitude, if it is to
remain so, must be aware of its gratuitousnoss. So
it is with the work of art. If the commandments of
the absurd are not respected, if the work docs not
illustrate divorce and revolt, if it sacrifice!> to
illusions and arouses hope, it ceases to be
gratuitous.... In the creation in which the
temptation to explain is the strongest, Ciln one
overcome that temptation? In the fictional world in
which awareness of the real world is keenest, eiln 1
:cemain faithful to the absurd without sacrificing
to the desire to judge? (MS, 75-76).
Truly absurd art is itself an absurd phenomenon. It is t:I
symptom of absurdity, not a refuge from absurdity. It
experiences but does not explain absurdity. (MS, '10-71). It
must struggle to keep the tension of absurdity always present
in itself. Camus writes:
And carrying this absurd logic to its conclusion, 1
243
must admit that the struggle implies a total
absencEl of hope (which has nothing to do with
despair), a continual rejection (which must not he
confused with renunciation), and a conscious
dissatisfaction (·...hich must not be compared to
immature unrest). Everything that destroys,
conjures away, or exorcises these requir£'ments
(and, to begin with, consent which overt ....ro....s
divorcEI) ruins the absurd and devaluates t..he
attitude that may then be proposed (MS, 23-24).
'rhe total absence of hope and continual rejection means that
we must not accept any eternal consolation or reconciliation
tJctween humanity nnd world which would dissolve the absurd
nature of existence. The conscious dissatisfaction means that
we must never be satisfied with the way things are at the
moment and continually create things over and over. Absurdity
has value for our lives if we accept it, not with resigned
agreement, but as the necessary and persistent goad that spurs
us on to revolt against it through continual creation.
6. J. 2 The Ethics of Absurdity
For Cam~s, the question of ethics, the question of our
principles for liVing, is first a matter of determining
whetha.r we need o.r do not need a solution to justify
existence. HKnowing whether or not one can live without appeal
is all that into.rostG mo" (MS, 45). In this regard he writes:
"For th0 absurd man it is not a matter of explaining and
solving, but of experiencing and describing. Everything begins
with lucid indifference H (MS, 70). In this context he also
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states: "Tragedy is not a solution" (e:II, 72j. 'rhus,
according to Camus, we should live tragically and aosur.d.ly
without solutions. His ethic is one at the per.potu.11
questioning and cI:eating of values ...... ithout atornil} Illcaning."
For example, Camus claims that Kafka's work beg.in~ i.llJ
tragic or absurd art but ends by offering il IInjver~il.l hopo
(MS, 100). He claims that the same is true of thl:! exi~tcnt.i<ll
philosophy of Heidegger, Jaspers and Kierkegaard. 'l'h01' aU
know the irrational separation of temporal lIIan ilnd historical
world but eventually posit an eternal or extra-temporal
reconciliation of them. He calls this "philosophical ~;lIicido.:-"
because it is a nihilistic evaluation which esci.lpcs and eludcs
absurdity or life itself (MS, 31). 'fa Camus, Clbsurdity wlthout
hope is not the basis for the condemnation of life. Rather., to
be beyond hope is to affirm that life does not requi.re
absolute and otherworldly values, a solution, to make it worth
living. Tragedy is an expression of highest happinQss beyond
hope.
This particular view will be better understood if I
say that truly hopeless thought just happens to bl::
defined by the opposite criteria and thilt the
tragic work might be the work thilt, after all
future hope is exiled, describos tha life of il
happy man. The more cxciting life lS, the mon:
absurd is the idea of losi.ng it. If! tid.:>
9 I return to this theme later in terms of the lIIilnner. in
which ethics, as the perpetual questioning aftQr. the 1110i1ni.ng
of existence, is not exhausted 0[" sol'lOd by any p<1r.ticulc1r:
morali ty or moral code,
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connection, Nietzsche appears to be the only artist
to have derived the extreme consequences of an
aesthetic of the Absurd, inasmuch as his final
mesJ:;agc lies in a sterile and conquering lucidity
and an obstinate negation of any supernatural
consolation (MS, 101).
According to Camus, only Nietzsche is truly tragic and absurd.
lie faco!; absurdity with cold clarity and offers neither hope
nor consolat.ion. Nietzsche lives in accordance with the
absurdity of existence.
Camus suggests that living in accordance with the
absurdity of everyday life is a type of ethic (MS, 48, 98). In
his view, it is dishonest and disloyal or "immoral" to escape
and elude the absurdity of temporal existence through appeal
to the eternal meaning of morality. 10
There can be no question of holding forth on
ethics. 1 have seen people behave badly \-lith great
morality and I note everyday that integrity has no
need of rules. There is but one moral code that the
absurd man can accept, the one that is not separate
from God; the one that is dictated. But it so
happens that he lives outside that God. As for the
others (I mean also i..mmoralisrn), the absurd man
sees nothing in them but justifications and he has
nothing to justify. I start out here from the
principle of his innocence (MS, 49).
I'or Camus, ethics is not something we develop and declare.
Eltistence itself is his "moral code" insofar as existence
dictates our ethics. To him, it would be like God, if God
existed. Codes of morality and inunorality are only
'" 'rhe notion of fidelity to eltistence, already noted in
Nietzsche's philosophy, is the basis of Camus's ethic of
lucidity and integrity toward absurdity, as emerges later.
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justifications for some way of living that is not uligncd wlth
existence or goes against its grain. Camus doLlnas innoccncc
as being in tune with existence: ~''fhe lnnocollcc of <l belll'.!
lies in its complete suitability to the world In which It
lives' .. , The innocent is the person ,,'ho explains nothlng"
(c:r, 39) This recalls Nietzsche'S notion of the "innor.ence o[
becoming" or "innocence of all existence" which is redeemod
from Christian-moral interpretations of respens i.bi.lity and
guilt (WP, 552, 765). Like Nietzsche, Camns clalll15 thilt
morality is based on the idea that our acti.on~ hilVC some
future consequence that either legitimates or nogates them
(MS, 50), However, people imbued with a sense of absurdity
think there is only responsibility but not guilt. At most, we
can use the past to guide ourselves in the future, but wn lIIust
not use the future to justify or condemn our past actions (115,
50). Camus indicates that there arc many forces, especially
the church, which tempt anyone whose absurd sensibility
convinces them of their innocence to falsely accept that: ho DC'
she is gUilty (MS, 39), Camus's early novel 'I'he Outsider
provides a vivid literary example through the manner in whj ch
the witnesses, lawyers, judge, jury, and finally the prill:::t
try to convince Meursault that he is guilty of his crime,ll
In The Fall Camus describes the condition of. absurdiLy in
11 Albert Camus, The Outsider, trans. Stuart Gil.b'Jt:"t,
(Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1942).
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which there is no absolute law, and hence no guilt, but he
does so in light of the manner in which people assume the
roles of judges in order to institute laws and consider others
gUilty.
He who clings to a law does not fear the judgement
that reinstates him in an order he believes in. But
the keenest of human torments is to be judged
without a law. Yet we are in that torment. oeprived
of their natural curb, the judges, loosed at
random, are racing through their job. Hence we have
to try to go faster than they, don't we? Prophets
and quacks multiply; they hasten to get there with
a good law or a flawless organization before the
world is deserted. Fortunately, I arrivedl I am the
end and the beginning; I announce the law. In
short, I am judge-penitent. n
'l'he speaker in this instance, under the borrowed name of Jean-
Baptiste Clamence, claims that everyone feels at liberty to
judge others and yet everyone is guilty. He considers himself
as the most extreme exemplar of this absurd contradiction of
judge-penitent.
No excuses ever, for anyone; that's my principle at
the outset. I deny the good intention, the
respectable mistake, the indiscretion, the
extenuating circumstance. With me there is no
giving of absolution or blessing... In philosophy
as in politics, I am for any theory that refuses to
grant man innocence and for any practice that
treats him as guilty. You see in me, tres cher, an
enlightened advocate of slavery ... Without slavery,
as a matter of fact, there is no definitive
solution (F, 131-132).
Camus is not here rejecting his earlier claim about the
I~ Albert Camus, The Fall, trans. Justin O'Brien, (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 117-118; cited hereafter as F.
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innocence of existence. The Fall is prefaced with a quote from
Lermontov which indicates that he presents Jean-Baptiste as i.ln
example of absurdity become inunoralism. That is, he hlmsel[
does not agree with his character's attempt to condcmn
everyone including himself as guilty. He is critlcnl of this
attitude because he believes in innocence. As notRd carlier,
he therefore does not believe in his character's definitivQ
moral solutions. Camus suggests that the contradictory role of
judge-penitent is properly absurd. As absurd temporal human
beings we are torn between our attempts to institute moral
laws (meaning) and the moral lawlessness (silenco) of tho
world. Yet we become immoral when we consider our moral laws
as eternal or absolute and thereby escape and elude or
otherwise contravene our absurd temporal human existence.
Rather, to be truly "moral M we must maintain the tension and
contradiction of our absurd temporal nature through lucidity
and integrity toward absurdity.
6.3.3 Lucidity and Integrity
Nietzsche's ethic of honesty and truthfulness in the face
of the tragic nature of existence is closely paralleled by
Camus's ethic of lucidity and integrity toward i.lbsurdity.
Camus is here inspired by Nietzsche: • For Nietzsche, .r:aiJ 1
morality cannot be separated from lucidity~ (R, 67). In
Camus's view, we must be conscious of absurdity and remain
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loyal and faithful to absurdity by refusing to escape or elude
it through hope, consolation Or reconciliation. To him, this
ethic of lucidity and integrity is mare "moral- than any
morality that calls us away from temporal existence towards
absolute and otherworldly values.
And now they start to bellow that I am immoral.
They must be translated as meaning that I need to
give myself a morality. Admit it then, you fool. I
do ... Another way of looking at it: you must be
simple, truthful, not go in for literary
declamations - accept and commit yourself (C: I,
15) .
'l'he only type of morality, or mora precisely, ethic, that
Camus gives himself is one in which he becomes simple and
truthful with respect to absurdity. The rolc of simplicity and
truthfulness in Nietzsche's tragic ethic is already noted.
This is another way far Camus to state his ethic of lucidity
and integrity. What, however, are the implications of Camus's
ethic of lucidity and integrity, of living simply and
truthfully toward absurdity? How does such an ethic manifest
itself in our lives?
As Nietzsche claims with respect to his imperative of
creating a simplicity of style, so too Camus claims that
facing absurdity with lucidity and integrity requires that we
create a style of character as the foundation for our way of
life. Camus claims that to be conscious of absurdity and
nonetheless to create is to revolt. "Aesthetic of revolt.
Great style and beautiful form, expression of highest revolt"
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(C:II, 73). To Camus, however, we not only create in teems of
art and thought, we also create ourselves. Rutlu,r, in
creating, through the attitude with which we croate, wo
thereby create ourselves. "To create is likewise to give shape
to one's fate" (MS, B6). This recalls Nietzsche's claim that
we must "give style" to our character by organizing all our
diverse aspects under one ruling taste (GS, 290). lIowcver,
Camus is aware of how difficult this creative task can be,
especially if we attempt to create a unity with an attitude of
lucidity and integrity toward absurdity.
A man who has rcached the absurd and tries to
live consistently with his views always discQvers
that the most difficult thing in the world to
maintain is awareness. Circumstances almost always
stand in the way. He has to live lucidly in a world
whe::o dispersion is the rule.
He thus realizes that the real problem, oven
with:>ut God, is the problem of psychological unity
(the only problem which living out the absurd
really poses is that of the metaphysical unity
between the world and the mind) and inner peace. lie
also realizes that this peace is not possible
without a discipline which is difficult to
reconcile with the world. Here lies the problem,
for it must be reconciled with the world. What must
be achieved is living by a Rule in the world (C:II,
5~6) .0
We might be tempted to add here "living by a ltule of the
~J Camus also writes: "What is it that gives Christianity
its superiority as an example (the only one it has)? Christ
and his saints - the quest for a style of life" (C:II, 12).
Like Nietzsche, he too displays an ambivalent relation to
Christianity. He does not follow it as a committed believer,
but he finds it valuable as an ex.ample of the attempt to give
ourselves a style of life.
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world~ in light of Camus's ethic of lucidity and integrity
towards absurdity. The problem Camus outlines is that we must
not create a style for ourselves that is not of this world
(the absurd tension). Yet we must create a style for ourselves
that unifies us and makes living possible. In other words, a
style must not be a solution. Moreover, our style, though
created by and for ourselves, must be in tune with absurd
existence and must be an expression of absurdity. Yet, at the
same time, absurdity (dispersion) runs counter to our a\:tempt
to lucidly create a style or unity of character that is in
tune with absurdity. The attempt to create a style or unified
character that expresses our absurd nature is emblematic of
absurdity itself as the tension between the human articulation
of meaning in the world and the silence of the world.
The matter of giving ourselves the simplicity of style
does not answer the question of how the ethic of lucidity and
integrity toward absurdity affects our ethos, our way of life.
Assuming we have created a style or unified character that
does justice to absurdity, what attitude toward our life do we
thus :naintain? If we believe in absurdity, then how do we
comport ourselves toward life? Ci:lffiUS writes;
If it is true that the absurd has been fulfilled
(or, rather, revealed), then it follows that no
experience has any value in itself, and that all
our actions are equally instructive. The will is
nothing. Acceptance everything. On one condition:
that, faced with the humblest or the most heart-
rending experience, man should always be 'present'i
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and that he should endure this exporiencG without
flinching, with complete lucidity (C: I, 80).
How does this imperative of being "present" relate to the
ethic of lucidity and integrity? For Camus, being "present"
involves being conscious of absurdity at every moment. Since
all experience is of equal importance or unimportance because
there are no future consequences, we should immerse ourselves
with complete commitment in each present moment. CiJmus opens
The Myth of Sisyphus with a quote from PindiJr: "0 my soul, do
not aspire to immortal life, but exhaust the limits of the
possible" (MS, 2). The ::evolt, freedom and diversity of absurd
art also characterizes absurd life.
This aspect of life being given to me, can I adapt
myself to it? Now, faced with this particular
concern, belief in the absurd is tantamount to
substituting the quantity of experiences for the
quality. If I convince myself that this life has no
ather aspect than that of the absurd, if I feel
that its whale equilibrium depends on that
perpetual opposition between my conscious revolt
and the darkness in which it struggles, if I admit
that my freedom has no meaning except in rl:!lation
to its limited fate, then I must say that what
counts is nat the best living but the mast living.
It is nat up to me to wonder if this is vulgar or
revolting, elegant or deplorable. Once ilnd for all,
value judgements are discarded here in folvor of
factual judgements (MS, 45).
Camus here appears to involve himself in a paradox. lie cla1.n5
that quantity nat quality, mast not best, is the importilnL
issue with respect to life experiences. However, his r::thic of
lucidity and integrity toward absurdity, of living in tune
with absurdity, would seem to suggest that quantity is in fact
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qUiJlity ilnd mOllt is in fact best. Even his claim to substitute
viJluc judgements with factual judgements is itself a value
judgement because he chooses the latter in view of his ethic
of lucidity and integrity toward absurdity. That is, he
filvours factual judgements, those based on the consciousness
of ilbsurdity, for reasons of the ethic of absurdity. It
appears as if Camus makes paradoxical ethical claims similar
to those Nietzsche makes when he overcomes particular morality
on ",'ider ethical grounds. However, this paradox is only
ilppiJrent, iJS emerges later.
Camus realizes that his imperative of "the most living"
requires further definition. Yet through defining it he
indicat.es both its relation to ethics and the manner in which
it itself is an ethic.
'rhe most living; in the broadest sense, that rule
means nothing. It calls for definition. It seems to
begin with the fact that the notion of quantity has
not been sufficiently explored. For it can account
for a large share of human experience. A man's rule
of conduct and his scale of values have no meaning
except through the quantity and variety of
experiences he has been in a position to
accumulate ... I see, then, that the individual
character of a conunon code of ethics lies not so
much in the ideal importance of its basic
principles as in the noT.1ll of an experience that it
is possible to measure ... But already many men
among the most tragic cause us to foresee that a
longer experience changes this table of values.
They make us imagine that adventurer of the
everyday who through mere quantity of experiences
would break all records (I am purposely using this
sports expression) and would thus win his own code
of ethics ... Breaking all the records is first and
foremost being faced with the world as often as
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possible. !low can that be dOllo without
contradiction and without playing on words'! ~'or Oil
the one hand the absurd teachos Lh.:tt ill I
experiences are unimportant, and on thc! othel" i,t
urges toward the greatest quantity of experiencelol.
How, then, can one fail to do illol so l11illly of those
men I was speaking of earlier - choose the (orlll o(
life that brings us the most possible o( that h\ll11.:111
matter, thereby introducing a scale of villllQS l.lIat
on the other hand one clilims to reject? (NS, ·15-
46).
The contradiction Camus indicates here is an aspee\. of the
absurd itself. We may try to develop a principle [or. I l.villeJ
and yet our continual experience destroys j t over ilncl over.
since we must incorporate more and more oxperienco. 1n his
view, to be true to the absurd, we must filco thn world and
experience absurdity as often as possible. Ilis is iJll eLhiC::l of
lucidity and integrity toward absurdity which r.csists iJlly
attempt to escape or elude absurdity through the absolute
values of morality. This makes ethics it perpetual pr.OCCSt1.
Here Camus's ethics seems to consist in exceeding <lnu
surpassing particular configurations of Illoritli.ty and morill
codes, a perpetual process fuelled by ilbsurdity itself.
In this context Camus indicates that Niet:zschc ilLti.lcbi
the morality of Platonism and Chl:istianity (nihi 1 ism) wi-Lh
such force because of his particular circumsti.Lnces cvrJIl though
he does not want to destroy them because he i!'> ilware of thfJi r
po:-litive contributions to cultur13 (C:rI, 39). C,lrnU~l claim:.;
that we should not hold truck with onc-si.dcd ilb:.;oluti:.;1.
13xtremes, though he suggests that at certain point:.; It b(J(;om(~}l
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ncce~silry to forcefully counter things in order to set the
hal<.lnce of existence right. This is the case with Nietzsche's
counter-balancing function as he counters nihilistic morality
in order to continue ethical questioning. For Camus, as for
Nietzsche, it is precisely the tragic or absurd sensibility
which allows us to maintain this tenuous balance. "Belief in
the meaning of life always implies a scale of values, a
choice, our preferences. Belief in the absurd, according to
our definitions, teaches the contrary" (MS, 44-45). This
relates to the view that the tragic or absurd attitude
justifies everything in existence. From the ethical but moral-
free perspective of tragedy and absurdity, all things are
justifV~d and of equal value.
In 'l'he Rebel Camus also attempts to determine Nietzsche' 5
position .ti!".h respect ttl Christianity. He states: -If he
attacks Chr~stianity in particular, it is only in so far as it
represents m"l:alityW (R, 68). He explains ....hy Nietzsche
despises mor<; I tty.
Horalil.~ has no faith in the ;,,·orid. For Nietzsche,
real nlorality cannot he separat.ed from lucidity. He
is severe on the ·calum.niat.ors of the world"
because he discel:ns in the calumny a shameful ta.st.e
for evasion. Traditional morality, for him, is only
a special type of immorality (R, 67-68).
In light of his equation of lucidity with morality and
evasiveness with immorality, Camus continues to indicate the
type of ethic that Nietzsche p=oposes. It ii'i an ethic of
256
absurdity.
Nietzsche cries out to man that the only truth is
the world, to which he must be faithful and in
which he must live and find hill salvation. But dt
the same time he teaches him that to live in <.l
lawless world is impossible because to 1 ivc
explicitly implies a law (R, 72).
To Camus, Nietzsche recognizes the absurd contcildi.ction, the
contradiction that comprises absurdity, betwoen the
lawlessness of the world and our human necessity to I iva wi.t:h
a law. In his view, Nietzsche is loyal and faithful to
existence by affirming the necessity of absurdity - amor. fat.i
(R, 72). Camus claims that Nietzsche refuses to erect ilbsolllt:C
idols, moralities or gods, which lead us away [rom ollr
temporal nature toward eternity. "The rebel who f:irst dOilies
God, finally aspires te replal:c Him. But Nietzsche's n'cssclgc
is that the rebel can only become God by renouncing every f:onn
of rebellion, even the type of rebellion that pcoduccs gods to
chastise humanity" (R, 7]). The ethic of absurdity cequi.res
that we overcome morality because it is ,. immoral" with r:egpcct
to absurdity.
6.3.4 Rebellion and Moderation
The discussion of Camus suggests that E!thi.cH, cons i.der.cd
on a wider scale as the perpetual process of questi,oninrJ aftnr.
the meaning of existencEl and the human action appropri.auJ to
that meaning, is not exhausted by any particular morality or
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morill code. Morality offers eternal and absolute answers to
the questions about the meaning of existence and the code of
human action. Ethics, however, is perpetual questioning. An
absurd ethics knows that it can never provide the meaning of
existence or code of human action, but it continues anyway. It
recogni~es the absurdity of life, the unbridgeable gap between
humanity and the world and the absence of any appeal to
etcrnal and absolute meaning, but it considers the constant
creation of meaning valuable even though it is futile from the
perspective of eternity. For Camus, this can be considered as
metaphysical rebellion. He states: ~Metaphysical rebellion is
the movement by which man protests against his condition and
against the whole of creation. It is metaphysical because it
contests the ends of man and of creation" CR, 23}. This is an
absurd rebellion because it is a contradiction: the attempt to
go beyond our hurnan condition is central to the hurnan
condition.
Camus claims that absurd rebellion is never exhausted by
creation or even by all creation together. Absurd
rebellion is the perpetual process of conscious creating.
Camus considers art as the paradigm of absurd rebellion. He
states: ~Art is the activity that exalts and denies
simultaneously" (R, 253). That is, art requires the world but
art never leaves the world the way it is, Art is caught in the
a.b5urd tension between the silent world and the drive to give
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it unity or meaning. Truly absurd art does not escape Ct" elude
this tension, it maintains the median or moderate point within
it.
Camus also discusses the llbsurd tension between
temporality and eternity, between the silence of the world and
the drive to unity or meaning, in terms of the balance between
stability and movement.
The world is not in a condition of pure stability;
nor is it only movement. It is both movemcnt and
stabill ty. The historical dialectic, for example,
is not in continuous pursuit of an unknown value.
It revolves around the limit, which is its primo
value. Heraclitus, the discoverer of the constunt
change of things, nevertheless set a limit to thi~
perpetual process. This limit was symboli't.ed by
Nemesis, the goddess of moderation and the
implacable enemy of the immoderate. 1\. process of
thought which wanted to take into account the
contemporary contradictions of rebellion should
seel<: its inspiration from this goddess (R, 296).
Camus proposes moderation as the proper foundation for any
rebellion because it is loyal and faithful to tho
contradictions of absurdity. There are no absolutes and yet we
must search for meaning. Camus applies his notion of 1Il0dcl:"i.I tc
rebellion specifically to ethics.
As for the moral contradictions, they too begi.n to
become soluble in the light of this conciliator.y
value, Virtue cannot separate itself [rom reality
without becoming a principle of evil. Nor can it
identify itself completely with reali.ty without
denying itself (R, 296).
Morality is "immoral" when it becomes absolutillt. I~orillity
that does not attend to or change anything of the world h: no
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lonlJor mor.ality eithor. The ethics of absurdity require us to
maintain the position of the rebel by attempting to change the
'Nocld without the security of absolute values. Camus points
out thi.lt murder is often committed on the grounds of either
absolute rebellion or absolute refusal to rebel.
Moderation, confronted with this irregularity
teaches us that at least one part of realism is
necessary to every ethic: pure and unadulterated
v irtue is homicidal. And one part of ethics is
necessary to all realism: cynicism is homicidal (R,
297).
Tn Camus's view, we never possess eternal justification. The
establishment of eternal justification and the actions or lack
of actions based on it is nihilistic because it negates the
absurd nature of existence itself.
According to Camus, then, the ethics of absurdity, lived
absurd rebellion, must remain aware of the absurdity of
li.fe, the tension between humanity and the world, and create
in a WilY that does not negate either or both of the tenns.
Hather, to 'JC ethical we must maintain the contradiction of
ilbsurdity through moderation. For Camus, moderation, not
extremity, is the rule of absurd existence. The lucidity and
integrity of the ethic of absurdity requires that ·....e be
modarute because only then are we loyal and faithful to absurd
existence. The valU/,· of moderation, of thinking at the
morid ian, thus has par"::icular relevance to the ethics of
absurdity. Moderation maintains the perpetual process of
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questioning and creating that characterizes tho ethics o(
absurdity. In this context Camus states: "But it ll> bad
stop, hard to be satisfied with il single way o( seeing, to <]0
witlo.:.ut contradiction, perhaps the most subtle o[ il11
spiritual forces. The preceding merely defines a WilY of
thinking. But the point is to live" (NS, 48).
6.4 Nietzsche' s Positive Contribution
If we consider Camus as an example of a wJ:ltcr who is
genuinely inspired and influenced by Nietzsche, then his
writing should tell us much about Nietzsche. 'I'he notion oE
absurdity as the contradiction engendered by tho perpotual
human articulation of meaning in a silent und meiJni.nglesl>
world, the distinction he maintains between ethics on il wider
scale and particular morality or moral codes, lnd 1 ree LI y
indicate Nietzsche's contribution to the question of cthLcs in
contemporary philosophy. Camus shares with Nil3tzschc an ethic
in which absolute morality is overcome on ethical gr.oundH of.
fidelity to absurd existence. Camus and Niet~schc milinttl in Lho
value of the perpetual process of creating human mei.ln inrJ evr.n
within the absurdity of existence. They both ilttempt to
overcome the nihilism of absolute values thr-ough porpel:lliJ I
creation.
However, there seems to be at least one major. di.([on;nce
between Nietzsche and Camus with respect to the qUCHl:jnn of
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othics. On the one hand, Nietzsche distinguishes values in
torlns of whether they are strong and stimulate life (good) or
....hether they are weak and negate life (bad), but he cannot
give himself a foundation for determining "right" (good) from
"wrong" (evil) as traditional Christian-moral categories. For
him, one's ethic depends on one's evaluation of existence, and
it is therefore vague and indefinite. On the other hand, Camus
ilppcars willing to give himself and others an ethic of conunon
decency, which is more traditionally and specifically moral,
but is also vague and indefinite because it depends on how far
one's sense of commonality extends and on what one takes
decency to mean. In his view, nonetheless, we must not kill
ourselves or others and we should support the oppressed.
Leaving aside the issue of whether Camus is being faithful to
Nietzsche, the foundations for his notion of common decency
must be considered. How can Camus make this type of ethical
claim? 'l'his is a subject for further investigation.
'rhus, in the absence of any appeal to, absolute or eternal
values, I claim that Nietzsche's positive contribution to the
question of ethics is his inauguration of a radical
questioning of ethics. He opens the question of ethics in a
manner that has as yet never been closed. For him, ethics is
itself the attempt to keep open the question of ethics and
resist its closure. Nietzsche'S ethics is the overcoming of
particular morality and moral codes. Nietzsche states his
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ethical imperative in this manner: WEithor abolish YOllc
reverences or - yourselvesl" The lattor would be nihilism; but
would not the former al!:lo be - nihilism? This is our question
mark" (GS, 346). The discussion throughout this thesis
indicates that, though Nietzsche raises the question of his
own nihilism, he is not a nihilist. 'rhe abolition of
reverences, our particular configurations of morality and
moral codes, rather than the abolition of ourselves i.llld our
perpetual articulation of meaning is the overcoming o[
nihilism. For all that Nietzsche destructively criticizes with
respect to morality, his question of ethics also provides the
positive preparation fer an ethics or way of lifo beyond
nihilism. Nietzsche addresses his philosophy to preparatory
human beings: "For believe me: the secret for harvesting from
existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment
is - to live dangerouslyl" (GS, 283j. That is, i!S tempocal
human beings, we must live without the security of absolute
and eternal values.
Perhaps I am doing injustice and mischief to Nietzsche.
I would not be the first to do so. Nietzsche's philosophy is
open to, indeed invites, multiple and sometimes contradi.ctory
interpretations. Nietzsche appeals to Dionysian tragedy to
overcome nihilistic Christian morality, but he Jni.ly he
considered as contributing to ethics on il wider scale.
Nietzsche's call for the rebirth of tragedy is testi.lmcnt to
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his intention to engage in the overcoming of nihilism through
the revaluation of values, specifically Christian morality,
but the final result of his project remains as yet undecided
since he has a paradoxical relation to Christian morality.
'I'his is the persistent question of Nietzsche's destiny or
filte, his ambiguous legacy. What is crucial in Nietzsche's
ambiguous legacy? Nietzsche's contribution to the question of
ethics in contemporary philosophy may be difficult to
determine because of its paradoxical and preparatory nature.
Preparatory thinkers like Nietzsche break new ground but leave
behind them newly unearthed stones as well as fertile soil.
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